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PARTI 
BACKGROUND TO LAND USE PLANNING IN THE FIFTH REPUBLIC 
1 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The focus of this book is the development of French land use planning, urbanisme , during 
the Fifth Republic from 1958-1985 and, in particular, the preparation of local plans, les 
Plans d'Occupation des Sols (POS). 
Central to any explanation of the changes in the land use planning system over the study 
period are the socio-economic and administrative-politico contexts of that system. More 
especially in France, the literature on land use planning and the empirical research for this 
study have demonstrated that land use planning as an activity of central government and 
peripheral administration (now local government), is directly influenced by the age old 
concern of centre/periphery power distribution. 
During the study period, an important political change took place when, in 1981, the Parti 
Socialiste (PS - French Socialist Party) came to power after twenty -three years of Right / 
Centre Right governments. Of central interest is that the PS were committed to 
decentralisation of government functions, the shift of executive power from central 
government to subnational governments. Moreover, for the first time during the Fifth 
Republic, urbanisme, emerged as a national political issue and formed a central part of the 
PS decentralisation proposals. Preparation of the POS, the main land use plan, was 
decentralised to the commune, the lowest tier of subnational government. 
The radical legislative steps taken by the Mitterrand administration during the first two years 
of office provided very different contexts for land use planning from the previous years. In 
the pre Mitterrand or pre decentralisation period of the Fifth Republic, the land use planning 
system and the POS were established by the de Gaulle administration (1958-1969). This 
Right wing administration was espoused to central state control of public functions including 
urbanisme and to a minimum of executive power to subnational governments. The same 
administration also promoted the practice of administraive lead in the organisation of public 
functions. This meant that administrative arrangements and procedures were set up and 
became fully operational before any legislation was introduced. The governments 
succeeding those of de Gaulle, also Right/Centre Right wing, continued these beliefs and 
practices. 
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The first argument to be pursued in this book relates to the pre Mitterrand or pre 
decentralisation period: it is that the operation of the French system of land use planning in 
the pre decentralisation period represents a mirror image of centre/periphery relations in 
France and that the study of POS preparation, one of the few ways to examine these 
relationships, is an effective way of doing so. In the course of developing this argument, the 
effectiveness of the POS in controlling land use is analysed and the finding reached is that it 
was the most effective planning instrument at that time. 
In 1981, the claim of the PS to cany out the decentralisation of central state power , 
essentially the modernisation of the Napoleonic system of public administration, provoked 
considerable interest, debate and speculation in France. This book contributes to this 
discussion only in the field of land use planning. The question posed in the title of the book 
"real or imagined decentralisation ?" indicates the discussion to be pursued in susequent 
chapters. Key questions arising from the PS claim to decentralise land use planning relate to 
the agents of change, the first post-war Socialist government, to the instruments of change.to 
the legislative texts introduced, and to the practice of land use planning after the legislation 
came into force. Of importance in this study is the effect of a very different political ideology 
post 1981; an ideology which seeks to promote democracy at the local level of government 
and thus a shift in centre/periphery power distribution. Under these circumstances, it would 
not be unreasonable to expect land use planning to reflect clear legal lead and guidance, 
greater intervention and direction in market forces, strong local control and clear lines of 
technical responsibility and accountability. What seems to be the case is a rather different 
picture which is not as clear as these expectations would suggest This leads to the second 
main argument to be pursued in this study which is the following: that the post 
decentralisation system of land use planning outlined in the legislation, at first glance, looks 
like a decentralised system. However, more detailed examination reveals that there are 
ambiguities in the legal texts, differences in the way these could be interpreted and difficulties 
for the implementation of the them. Together, these issues suggest that decentralisation of 
land use planning might be more "imagined" than "real". Further, the legislative measures 
introduced by Mitterrand for the control of land use are less interventionist and allow less 
public control than those introduced by de Gaulle. In other words, there has been a 
noticeable relaxation in planning regulations. Such a phenomenon in the recent past, has 
been described as "deregulation". Combining this with the lack of real decentralisation, 
nothing in the way of proper land use planning and control is gained at the local level. 
The structure of this book has been designed to reflect the pre and the post decentralisation 
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periods. Parts land 2 cover the pre decentralisation period and the first argument of the 
study is treated at the end of Pan 2, in Chapter S. Parts 3 and 4 are concerned with the post 
decentralisation period and the second argument of the study is treated in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Chapter 9 is also concerned with a concluding comparison of the pre and the post 
decentralisation periods. 
This first Chapter concentrates on the social and economic contexts of land use planning, 
urbanisme , and its evolution from the SecondWorld War through the years of de Gaulle's 
office. Part of the discussion relates to the corresponding evolution of national and regional 
planning which, as will be shown, are systems of public planning different and distinct from 
land use planning. 
The Post War Period up to 1958 
The scale and pace of socio-economic development in France from the Second World War to 
the mid nineteen seventies is at least equivalent to a century of change in many of her 
industrialised and urbanised European neighbours. Indeed, such is the fascination of this 
change that a wealth of literature examines and explains the recovery of the war-ravaged 
nation ( 1\ a nation which, even before the onset of war, had demonstrated all the symptoms 
of population stagnation and economic decline (2). In the context of dynamic social and 
economic renewal and modernisation, and certainly for the first two decades after the war, 
land use planning, urbanisme , was of little importance to the development process. By 
contrast, national planning and subsequently regional p\aniúng,aménagement du territoire Р^ 
were seen as central to recovery. Yet increasingly since the start of the Fifth Republic in 
1958 and more especially towards the end of de Gaulle's office in 1969, national and 
regional planning had become much less significant than land use planning. Indeed, today, 
regional planning has almost ceased to exist and national planning continues, but is a shadow 
of its former self W, To some extent this reversal in the importance of different forms of 
public planning is what might be expected. After a period of top-down national and regional 
social and economic intervention or directìon.what can be described as strategic planning, we 
might expect more attention to land use detail at the local level. Nevertheless, what is 
interesting in France is that strategic planning has almost failed to survive in a country which 
has had a long, well-known and well-established centralist political system with a Colbertist 
tradition and dirigiste economic management(5). Moreover, the degree of planning 
intervention at both strategic and local levels taken together, is different from what might 
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have been expected. In particular, given the different ideological positions of political 
parties since 1958, and especially in view of the Socialist Party victory in 1981, then it 
would not be unreasonable to expect more planning at all levels after that date. The findings 
of this study show that this is not the case. 
A brief look at the post war years prior to the start of the Fifth Republic might begin to help 
explain the importance of strategic planning relative to land use planning. There is little 
doubt that National Plans, introduced by Jean Monnet (the first Director of the Commissariat 
Général du Plan ) in 1946, promoted the belief that France was facing up to the twentieth 
century (6>. The philosophy of Monnet's First National Plan (1946-1950) was modemisation 
or downfall, plan or perish. That an urgent need for government policy existed there can be 
no doubt The country had lost 1.5 million people during the war years and population was 
declining; nearly one-third of the active labour force still worked in primary sector activities 
and only two regions (Nord and Alsace/Lorraine) had industrialised in the earlier part of the 
century; only 50% of the total population lived in towns of greater than 500 population and, 
more generally, recovery of economic output looked doubtful given the war damage to 
existing industrial installations and to basic infrastructure (7 ). The approach to these 
circumstances which Monnet took was that of selecting priority economic sectors, an 
approach which might be described as a pragmatic strategy(8). Essentially, growth targets 
were set for six basic industrial sectors (First Plan), whilst these were extended to all sectors 
over the period of the Second Plan. The Second Plan also laid down housing targets (9). 
Important in the making of National Plans was involvement of the private sector, restaffmg 
of the Ministries and the creation of a central plan-making body, the Commissariat Général 
du Plan (CGP). Change in the staffing of Ministries is particularly interesting. Aidagh^10) 
describes this as "replacing the gerontocracy with the meritocracy"; the idea to introduce a 
new breed of technocrats in the Ministries, and a sort of think tank élite in the CGP, was 
clearly regarded as an important means of achievmg the ends of the National Plan. To some 
extent this development, later described as technocratic elitisme, was a strengthening or an 
extension of the existing civil service tradition, but the new élite was given more personal 
recognition and a discretion hitherto restricted to only a few top civil servants 
(fonctionnaires). The significance of these administrative actions, the personal recognition 
and the style of administration associated with it, is reflected in the way the administration 
and management of land use planning developed. 
In respea of economic growth, the technocrats of the First and Second Plans were extremely 
successful. Industrial output, for example, regained pre-war levels by 1951 and the Plans 
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were able to stay on course despite an extremely lengthy period of inflation reaching levels of 
29% per annum between 1947 and 1953. GDP growth targets set for both plan periods 
were exceeded(11). Many economists have argued that with the assistance of Marshall Aid, 
growth would have been achieved despite the Plans(12). This is difficult to demonstrate but 
what is important is that the first two Plans created a positive climate of volontarisme (13), 
involvement of the private sector in public planning, a national institutional structure for 
planning and more general awareness of planning instruments. 
Simultaneous with economic recovery was population growth, le bébé boom . Natural 
increase of population, for example, averaged 0.69% per annum over the period 
1946-1954 (14). Clearly de Gaulle's plea in 1946 "en dix ans, douze millions de beaux 
bébés" was well on the way to being achieved. At the same time, it is worth remembering 
that the bulk of population growth over this period was swelling the size of the urban 
population, not only in Paris but also in the provincial cities and medium-sized towns. In the 
same way as economic growth was supported by an institutional framework and policy 
instruments, a Ministry of Population was established in 1946 (15\ whilst an interesting 
range of social benefits geared to providing aide à la famille (family allowances) were also 
introduced. These benefits, including family allowances, child benefits, family transport 
subsidies and tax concessions were especially favourable to families with more than three 
children, and the subsequent and continued population growth, "the demographic miracle", 
owes much of its success to these policies (16). 
Although statutory provision for land use planning existed over this period in the form of 
"projets d'aménagement .d'embellisement et d'extension" (projects for the management, 
improvement and expansion) for towns greater than 10 000 population, no enforcement of 
this legislation took place and few projects were carried out (17). In any case, the means to 
implement a scheme in terms of financial, technical or professional assistance, were limited 
and poorly defined (18\ It is likely, given the close association between public housing 
provision and land use planning, that if the former had had a higher priority in the first two 
National Plans, greater attention would, more likely, have been given to the outdated land 
use planning provisions (dating back to decrees of 1919 and 1929). Yet just as outdated as 
the land use planning, was the related system of housing rentals and, consequently, housing 
tenure. After the First World War, a rent freeze had been imposed to protect soldiers and 
their families (19\ This freeze still existed after World War Π, only being lifted by Claudius 
Petit, Minister of Reconstruction and Town Planning, in the Housing Act of September 
1948 ( 2 0 ). At the same time, little provision of public housing existed(21). Thus, given that 
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the bulk of the housing stock was privately rented and given the lengthy rent freeze, there 
had been no economic incentive to add to or to maintain the existing stock. Added to this 
gloomy picture was, of course, the extensive war damage to the existing stock. Overall, the 
cumulative effect of neglect, housing shortage, war damage and little choice of housing 
tenure meant that considerable attention to housing would be required. Indeed, an obvious 
mismatch was beginning to appear with, on the one hand, economic prosperity and, on the 
other hand, poor quality residential environments. Yet interestingly, Duclaud-Williams 
points out that housing conditions do not seem to have caused much public debate at the 
time, nor indeed in subsequent decades (22\ The legislation for the re-introduction of public 
housing (HLM Organisations(23)) in 1947 was not discussed in Parliament and, over the late 
forties and early fifties, the cost of reconstraction was allowed to use up the bulk of moneys 
allocated for new housing ^ . It is evident from the figures of housing conditions in the 
fifties and even later that to treat housing as only one aspect of economic management to be 
realised through indicative National Plans was less than adequate. The census of 1954, for 
example, reveals that in that year, 42% of homes had no running water, 73% were without 
flushing toilets and only 10% had either a bath or shower (25\ 
Whilst poor housing conditions failed to become an issue of electoral importance over the 
postwar years, what did become a big issue was the imbalance between Paris and the rest of 
the country. This was made public in 1947 by Gravier in his well known text "Paris et le 
Désert Français" ^ , where he compares indices of economic advantage/disadvantage and 
indices of well-being between the capital and the rest of the country. Unlike housing or land 
use planning, regional imbalance posed an immediate political threat .with the formation of 
voluntary Regional Expansion Committees (27'. The step towards political support for 
regionalism had important political ramifications during the succeeding decade and, at the 
same time, important implications for the way in which national, regional and land use 
planning developed. 
Thus, until the end of the Second National Plan, planning was a state controlled activity at 
the national scale whilst regional planning did not even exist and land use planning was a 
Cinderella activity operating at the level of the commune and concerned almost entirely with 
development control (le certificat d'urbanisme and le permis de construire (2S)). 
The de Gaulle Years, 1958-1969 
The priorities of the fust UDR Government of the Fifth Republic in the Third National Plan 
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(1958-1961) were not too dissimilar from those of the predecessor Right/Centre Right 
coalition governments. Major attention over the Plan period related to the economy 
(devaluation of the franc in 1958), new trade outlets (membership of the EEC in 1958) and 
foreign policy (the troubles in Algeria). Yet the introduction of land use planning decrees in 
1958 demonstrates some recognition of the inherent problems of rapid urbanisation and the 
first Gaullist attempt to widen the narrow base of planning and public development policies. 
Nevertheless, whilst these decrees of 1958 (29) introduced two types of plan, PUD (Plan 
d'Urbanisme Directeur) and PD (Plan de Détail), their enforcement was weak and the 
administrative machinery for their implementation was introduced only several years later in 
1966 (formation of the Ministère de l'Equipement (30)). In looking at subsequent policies 
and policy instruments in planning which were introduced by de Gaulle, it is mteresting that 
most of them, unlike the 1958 decrees, demonstrated an administrative lead rather than a 
statutory one (31). In other words, the administrative arrangements and associated practice 
became well established before the legislation was drawn up. By contrast to the statutory 
plans of 1958, the introduction of ZUP (Zone à Urbaniser en Priorité) in the same year, 
allowed a quick method for the zoning of urban extensions and, at the same time, provided 
communes with powers to intervene in land acquisition at existing use value. For 
communes pressured by urbanisation, the ZUP instrument became more favoured than the 
land use plans and, used in association with HLM development (social housing 
developments) '3 2 \ it was seen as the main land use planning tool. Unfortunately, many 
social and planning problems resulted and it can be argued that ZUP were a contributory 
factor to the politicisation of land use planning. On the other hand, negative views of ZUP 
developments have to be tempered when considered in the context of extremely poor housing 
conditions and higher population and urbanisation growth rates than in the previous decade. 
In particular, over the sixties, whilst natural increase in population remained at similar levels 
to those of the fifties, 0.69% average per annum, the total population swelled considerably 
with the repatriation of more than one million from the former colonies, notably after 
Algerian independence in 1962. Thus, over the sixties, the total population increased much 
more rapidly; viz: 
1946 40.1 millions 
1954 42.7 
1961 46.2 
1971 51.4 
Immmigration also served to swell the population of towns. By 1950, for example, only 
54.5% of the population lived in towns of more than 500 people, whereas by 1962 this 
figure had risen to 66% (then the definition of "urban" was changed from 500 to 2 000 
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people in the 1962 census and the urbanised population was given as 66.2% in 1968 and 
70.6% in 1970(33)). Distribution of urbanisation was, however, uneven throughout the 
country in terms of absolute numbers. The Paris conurbation was the principal recipient of 
population: 
1962 7 535 844 ] 
] 8.6% growth in 6 years or 1.37% per annum W 
1968 8 182 241 ] 
Yet medium-sized provincial cities especially, in the east and south of the country, also grew 
rapidly(35). In total, between 1954-1962,540 000 people moved to towns and cities each 
year. At the level οι département also, the national pattern of population distribution which 
emerged over the sixties was one of imbalance - only 22 départements (counties) out of the 
total of 96 départements accounted for 60% of the total urban population growth (36). 
These départements and the towns and cities within them stretched from the lower Seine to 
Paris and from Paris to Marseille. France had become a three region country .with 
population growth to the east of this line, decline to the west and with Paris in the middle as a 
separate region claiming the lion's share of population, economic growth and socio-cultural 
facilities. Both Thompson ^7) and Ardagh P") provide detailed accounts of the multifaceted 
aspects of the capital's supremacy. Similarly, Allen and Maclennan (39) and Liggins (40) 
discuss this issue but focus more generally on the resultant regional economic imbalance in 
the country as a whole. Essentially, the economic variables of imbalance identified by 
Gravier in the nineteen-forties had simply intensified by the sixties. Despite the setting up of 
Regional Expansion Committees, little had been achieved; their proposals, in fact, lacked 
sufficient administrative muscle or political recognition to be implemented. In 1959 (decree 
of 7th January) an administrative step was taken to strengthen the Regional Expansion 
Committees by the creation of 21 "programme regions" each of which had a "conférence 
inter-départementale " (inter-county committee) ( 41 ) Figure 1.1 shows the 
regional/departmental boundaries. 
Notwithstanding the initiative to establish programme regions, the government made it very 
clear in a circular that, "The département remains the basic unit of French administration " 
(42\ In other words, the state and the existing administrative sub-divisions of the state, the 
départements and the communes , were in no way being superseded by this new, 
non-elected, embryonic regional administration. Yet the regional dimension is prominent in 
the Fourth and Fifth National Plans ( 1962-1965 and 1966-1970 respectively ) of the de 
Gaulle government. 
FB 11 ТЬЕ FRENCH RÉGONS ANO ΟΕΡΑΒΤΕΝΐΝΤ« 
Looking at these 4th and 5th National Plans, changes other than the regional dimension are 
evident; first, the substantive content of these Plans shows a widening of interests and 
secondly, the start of problematic relationships between the National Plan and the State 
Budget appear for the first time. Green ( 4 3 \ for example, describes the Fourth Plan as "a 
new phase in national planning in France". In this Plan there was an obvious renewal of 
volontarisme , with both the private sector and also the Trade Unions participating in the 
preparation of the Plan; the economic content of the Plan was strengthened by in-depth 
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market surveys of every sector of production and attention was devoted to industrial 
reconversion in the older industrial areas of the north and the poor agricultural areas of the 
west. The Plan saw the improvement of infrastructure including policies for housing, 
community facilities and a better living environment, as necessary elements in town and 
country planning (the latter was mentioned by name in this Plan). Also, greater social justice 
and equity were to be promoted through a wide range of social policies geared towards 
disadvantaged groups - especially students, the elderly, low wage earners and large families. 
Finally, the Plan introduced "tranches opératoires" (regional slices of the implementation 
process), although Hansen(44) has pointed out that the delay in preparing these "tranches", 
appearing as they did after the State Budget of 1963, meant that they were not implemented. 
That same year, 1963, saw the economy in crisis and the replacement of the National Plan 
by the Stabilisation Plan of Giscard аЪ5іаіп§, the then Finance Minister. As a result of the 
Stabilisation Plan, the viability of the National Plan, which had not prevented serious 
economic imbalance within the national economy, was called into question. At the same 
time, questions were being asked by regionalists about regional imbalances and urbanisation 
problems. Two important initiatives were taken as a response to regional questions in 1963 
and 1964 prior to the start of the Fifth National Plan. In 1963 La DATAR, La Délégation à 
l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Action Régionale, was founded by Georges Pompidou 
and Olivier Guichard, based on an idea of Eugène Claudius Petit. The latter had described 
the activity of aménagement du territoire as, 
The search for a better distribution of men within the geographic framework of 
France, taking account of natural resources and economic initiatives". ^45' 
Many definitions of aménagement du territoire have been produced subsequendy in English 
and French. Thompson(46) translates it as "prospective development of the territory" whilst 
the French Embassy describe the agency as an interministerial agency with a co-ordinating 
role. They also say that the main tasks of La DATAR is "to apprehend all the processes of 
economic development with the aim of harmonising growth amongst regions" ^47). La 
DATAR was essentially a small multidisciplinary élite force which had four main objectives: 
(i) The co-ordination of regional programmes and budgetary allocations related to 
area development within the context of the National Plans and the State Budget. 
(ii) The preparation of plans and policies for urban growth/urbanisation. 
(iii) The relocation of industry. 
(iv) The re-organisation of rural areas. 
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To administer these areas of responsibility, La DATAR set up a whole range of study groups 
and agencies within the regions (48\ The nature and role of these agencies has been 
discussed extensively elsewhere ^ ; what is important about them here is that they were not 
locally accountable nor were they executive bodies. The regional policies and regional 
structure plans (schéma directeur d'aménagement et d'urbanisme) which they produced were 
advisory documents which could only be implemented by the Ministries and their "field 
services" in the provinces ^ . 
In 1964 further regional reforms were introduced. These created "regional prefects" with 
responsibility for the regional economic and planning policies of central government in the 
regions. New regional committees(51^ were a further example of administrative tinkering, 
with no new powers being given to the regions. The Napoleonic administrative structure 
thus remained intact. 
Many of the consequences of these two sets of administrative actions in 1963 and 1964 
found their expression in aspects of the Fifth National Plan in 1965. The Plan followed 
many of the same spatial, regional, principles of its predecessor and also a broad or 
comprehensive substantive content was evident A noticeable change in the planning process 
could be observed; objectives of the Plan were refined by ensuring that each objective related 
to forecasts and that for each, clear details of implementation were given. In this way the 
CGP felt it would be easier to monitor and review the Plan and to make allowances for 
changing circumstances. At the same time, the public credibility of the Plan might be raised, 
thus preventing the necessity of Stabilisation Plans. Many of the substantive developments 
outlined in the Fifth Plan were a clear reflection of proposals emanating from La DATAR 
Study Groups (OREAM - Organisaríon Régionale d'Etudes de l'Aire Métropolitaine). Other 
developments suggested in the Plan were, in fact, subsequently incorporated in regional 
plans, produced by the OREAM. Examples of these included the new towns programme in 
the Paris Region, large port/industrial complexes in Normandy and in Provence, the 
Rhone/Rhine canal project, tourist developments in Languedoc, industrial and commercial 
decentralisation from Paris, policies for industrial reconversion of declining industrial 
regions and the introduction of Public Development Corporations (52\ Many of these 
developments were implemented only in part by de Gaulle and many were later abandoned or 
criticised over the seventies as "grandiose" developments and symbols of the grandeur 
which de Gaulle was said to have promoted in public policy. 
It can be argued that, by the mid sixties a substantial shift in national and regional planning 
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had taken place. National planning had become regionalised, more comprehensive in content 
and more sophisticated econometric models and forecasting techniques were used in the 
preparation of the Plan. Regional plans, albeit that they were only advisory plans, had 
emerged and, on the one hand, their content reflected national policy, and ,on the other 
hand, they demonstrated the need for related land use planning. By contrast to national and 
regional planning over this period, land use planning had made little progress. The ZUP 
remained the planning instrument most predominantly used at the local level and most 
predominantly used for housing areas. In particular, figures of housing completions per 
annum for selected years from 1950-1975 demonstrate the substantial impact of the increased 
priority given to housing (53) ^ 54': 
1950 70000 1960 320 000 
1954 162 000 1965 350000 
1956 238 000 1971 450 000 
1958 270000 1975 500000 
Also, the impact of the increased priority given to public housing is evidenced by the 
increased spending on land purchase for iL In 1955, before the de Gaulle administration 
came to power, this expenditure stood at 4 billion FF per annum whereas, after only five 
years in office, in 1963, it had increased to 41 billion FF per annum (53\ 
The rapid expansion of residential areas over the period produced the grands ensembles, 
large public housing schemes on the edge of towns and cities. The characteristics of such 
development are well known and have been provided elsewhere by Evensen ^56^ and 
Clerc(S7). Girard in the preface to Clerc's book described the social and environmental image 
of these as "une image brutale, presque violente" ^ (a brutal, almost violent image), 
inhumane, lacking social and community facilities, featuring high density, high rise 
monotonous architecture and creating long, inconvenient commuting journeys; in short, 
reckless urbanisation. The Ministry of Construction was concerned and, in 1963, was 
promoting the idea of a new Land Use Planning Act. Especially relevant was a circular 
issued by J. Maziol, the Minister of Construction, in June 1963 (59) which made a plea for 
radical legislation and greater controls in land use planning. Simultaneously, the journal 
'Urbanisme' 6^0* devoted a whole issue to this subject Interestingly, Maziol and senior civil 
servants produced all the copy for this issue. Immediately after these two publications 
appeared, a working party under the chairmanship of R. Mace (Directeur de la Direction 
d'Aménagement Fonder et de l'Urbanisme- - an arm of the Ministry of Construction) 
produced new draft land use planning legislation(61). No action was taken on this and the 
matter was left in abeyance until after the presidential elections of 1965. In 1966, a further 
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set of proposals for new land use planning legislation was put forward to the government by 
Pisani as Minister of the newly created Ministère de l'Equipement in 1966 (62). Despite 
counter projects, including one from Mitterand (63\ Pisani succeeded in getting the PLOFU 
(Projet de Loi d'Orientation Foncière et d'Urbanisme - Proposal for the Outline Act for Land 
Policy and Planning) approved by govenunent. After very long debates in both the 
Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat ^ 64) where a large number of amendments to details of 
the text were introduced - including amendments by Gaston Defeire, Mayor of Marseille (65: 
- the Land Use Planning Act was finally passed in December 1967, the Loi d'Orientation 
Foncière ("The Outline Planning and Land Act"; this is the usual English translation of this 
Act Strictly speaking a direct translation is "The Land Orientation Act"). Veltz neatly sums 
up the importance of the LOF when he says: 
". .avant 67 tout n'était qu'improvisation et bricolage" (66) 
(Before 1967 everything (meaning planning) was only improvisation and 
bric-a-brac). 
During the period 1966-1967 when the PLOFU and the LOF were being debated, there was 
a change in government administration the importance of which cannot be ignored or 
underestimated. In 1966, the Ministère de l'Equipement (Ministry of "Equipment" - formed 
by the fusion of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Construction) was formed 
and became a vast Ministry with very powerful "field services", the Directions 
Départementales de l'Equipement (DDE'S)(67). The importance of technocrats and 
technocratic élites, originally introduced by Monnet in the CGP, was strongly adhered to by 
de Gaulle. This was witnessed in La DATAR and then extended by him to the Ministries. 
The élite group of the DDE'S who became the technocrats of land use planning were the 
graduates of grandes écoles, notably the Ecole Polytechnique, and the engineers oí Ponts et 
Chaussées(6i\ In view of the reorganisation of the Ministries, staffing of the Ministries with 
graduates oî grandes écoles and then the enactment of radical land use planning legislation, it 
could be said that land use planning fared particularly well over the mid sixties. Yet these 
developments were viewed negatively by many people; their view was that they served to 
illustrate the strong role of the state in what was increasingly being seen as local matters. 
More generally at that time, though, there was a wider, growing mistrust of the nature and 
style of state bureaucracy which the de Gaulle administration had promoted. Also, many 
other related matters were causing discontent in the country at the time: discontent in the 
regions with the state-controlled activities of La DATAR and discontent at the lack of 
executive regional powers for regional assemblies; discontent amongst mayors that land use 
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planning was a joint responsibility between the state and the communes and not the sole 
responsibility of the latter, discontent amongst mayors in the Paris Region when the first 
regional structure plan was issued in 1965 containing expensive developments to which they 
would have to contribute without necessary state loans being made available; discontent in 
urban areas everywhere that core communes were subsidising the services of those living in 
the recently urbanised peripheral communes ; discontent in rural communes with dwindling 
populations which made service provision increasingly difficult to afford and, more 
generally, discontent that communal independence,which since Napoleon in 1789 had been 
so highly prized, was threatened by these financial burdens. All of these discontents and 
pressures played a part in the student riots and general strike of 1968. Yet it was the issue 
of regionalism, not communal finance or communal reorganisation, which was incorporated 
in the referendum of 29th April 1969. The government's failure to secure a majority in this 
referendum (which included reform of the Sénat along with the question of regionalism) was 
the decisive blow which made de Gaulle resign in April 1969. 
The defeat of de Gaulle to some extent reflects the fact that lip service had been paid to 
regionalism over the sixties. The political ideology of the Gaullists was clearly that of 
étatisme ; central control of all aspects of government functions and activities and the lack of 
executive power at subnational level. Regjonalising the National Plans, introducing regional 
plans and local land use plans produced conflict for a centrist government - conflict between 
centre and periphery. As Simmons indicated C), these planning activities, if they are to be 
effective, require local information. Information gathering requires participation which, in 
tum, threatens central control and increases the possibility of the plans being questioned and 
undermined. It would be unfair to give the impression that government was unaware of the 
dilemma of central control under these circumstances. Indeed, this awareness is evidenced 
by the forceful debates in the Assemblée Nationale over the referendum. In practice, 
however, political expediency prevailed and the rhetoric of "management" was adopted as an 
acceptable substitute for democratic decentralisation. 
The Nineteen Seventies 
The question of regionalism was not, in fact, resolved through democratic decentralisation in 
the post de Gaulle period and was not of electoral concern again until the election campaign 
in the spring of 1981. Although further administrative tinkering took place in 1972, the new 
regional reforms of that year simply produced a watered down version of the regional 
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administration advocated in the de Gaulle referendum proposal. Reluctance of government to 
stray from the centralist tradition was strong^70*. 
Throughout the seventies and indeed up till 1981, a definite shift in government interest away 
from the region was evident in national planning and national policy. The Sixth National 
Plan (1971-1975) stressed that regional objectives had to be tentative. Despite the fact that 
closer attention was given to finance for the implementation of this Plan's priority 
programmes, the Plan targets were not achieved and this in spite of the fact that the Plan had 
introduced a larger number of preparatory commissions to ensure more reliable forecasting. 
Similarly, the Seventh Plan (1976-1980) was overtaken by the Barre Stabilisation Plan 
almost before it had been introduced. Green W has argued convincingly that no matter how 
sophisticated the National Plan preparation techniques and procedures are, what counts is the 
political support and the means to ensure that the ends can be achieved. Moreover, she has 
demonstrated these were lacking at that time in France and that short-term interventionist 
measures (Stabilisation Plans) increasingly demonstrated the inherent conflict between 
national indicative plans and the annual State Budget Of course, such conflict is increased 
when there is a downturn in the economy. 
Also evident over the Sixth and Seventh National Plans was the emergence of concepts such 
as quality of life, small is beautiful, human scale development, along with pleas for increased 
participation from départements and communes . Although extensive study of the 
reorganisation of local administration was carried out over this period (the Guichard Report 
of 1976), the Napoleonic system of local administration continued despite its anachronism. 
Consistent with the general shift away from the discussion of regionalism and 
régionalisation, the activities of La DATAR and its study groups diminished and petered out 
Regional structure plans were no longer prepared and the local land use plan, the POS (Plan 
d'Occupation des Sols - land utilisation plan), introduced by the 1967 Act and implemented 
from 1971, came to dominate French planning. The socio-economic context of this period 
will be considered later, in Chapter 6, and will demonstrate the greater difficulty experienced 
in forecasting associated with national and regional plans in periods when decline rather than 
growth is the dominant trait Allied to this, of course, is the reduced political support for 
documents which are likely to make inaccurate projections. Government planning policy at 
national and regional scales over the seventies also demonstrated the dismantling and the 
erosion of most of the Gaullist policies developed in the sixties. Yet it shows also two 
important elements of continuity; the continuity of central control in government activities and 
the importance of technocratic élites in the planning process. The latter characteristic is 
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especially true of the land use planning system as it was developed over this period. 
Mitterrand and the Socialist Government , 1981-1985 
Not surprisingly the election campaign of Mitterrand and the PS (Parti Socialiste) in 1981 
stressed decentralisation as a way of reducing the power of state bureaucracy and of 
providing executive power to directly elected subnational councils or local governments. 
As Kesselman says: 
"... decentralisation is a central ingredient in the overall Socialist project which 
seeks to rationalise the state, revitalise civil society and alter the balance between 
the two. Within this project, vibrant local governments serve as a buckle (to 
use Bagehot's metaphor) linking the state and civil society". ^ 2^ 
Equally important in the PS platform were nationalisation and planning at both national and 
subnational scales and both economic and land use planning. The three goals of the PS can 
be viewed as complementary. Through décentralisation the central state, as represented by 
the "field services" of Ministries at subnational level, is released from its former excessive 
involvement in essentially local socio-economic and political conflicts. The state then 
devotes more energy to national affairs and through nationalisation, is able to intervene and 
direct more effectively national economic management Planning provides local governments 
with the process and the instruments to seek conflict resolution. Kesselman has observed 
that many political scientists doubted the realisation of these goals but argues forcibly that 
they were timely (73). In particular, the discontent of local mayors in respect of finance, 
which was quoted earlier, was cited by him as a crucial factor. Between 1962 and 1977 he 
quotes that subsidies to communes fell from 28% to 12% of local investment. Similarly, 
over the period 1975 to 1979, local taxes rose from 24% to 35% of all direct taxes. 
Moreover, the Left alliance (PS and PC - Parti Communiste) had held the most important 
communes (2/3rds of the 220 largest cities) since the 1977 elections, and many Socialist 
mayors of large communes were key figures in the PS and the new Government. Pierre 
Mauroy, the new Prime Minister, was also mayor of Lille and President of the Nord 
Regional Council; Gaston Déferre, the new Minister of the Interior and Decentralisation, 
was mayor of Marseille and President of the Provence Côte d'Azur Regional Council. Both 
these Ministers as well as many other important mayors new in government, had spent the 
post-war years struggling with the problems of urbanisation in the context of state controlled 
budgets, plans and policies. In addition, it is worth remembering that both Déferre and 
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Mitterrand had been extremely active in debating of the LOF in efforts to ensure more 
decentralisation of power and more eqiiity between centre and locality in land taxation (74\ 
The swift introduction of legislation to enable the three goals of the new government to be 
achieved can be viewed as a break from the traditional administrative lead taken since the 
war. A nationalisation programme was introduced within the first six months of office and 
within two years, two of the proposed seven Decentralisation Acts were on the statute books. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has provided the context of the study period and has especially concentrated on 
the period from the war till the end of the de Gaulle administration in 1969. Apart from 
showing the general and dominant socio-economic and administrative-politico changes over 
this period, it highlights a number of specific, crucial factors which shaped the statutory land 
use planning system. For example, the dominance of the central state and limited or lack of 
executive power at sub-national levels (étatisme) , the belief in public planning as a 
promotional activity conducted with the private sector by negotiation and agreement 
(volontarisme), the importance of a meritocracy with considerable discretion 
(technocratisme), and administrative rather than legislative lead in government activities. The 
chapter has also discussed the changing relative importance of national, regional and land use 
planning. Later, Chapter 6 will expand on the contexts of the land use planning system over 
the nineteen seventies. However, it is worth stressing that the foundations laid down by de 
Gaulle not only in respect of the law of land use planning but also the administration and 
practice of it remained in force, with only minor modifications, even after Mitterrand came 
into power (in fact, until October 1983). 
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CHAPTER 2 • FRAMEWORKS OF ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The previous chapter provided the background to the development of land use planning in 
France and concentrated especially on the years before and during the de Gaulle 
administration. The discussion touched on some of the complexities of studying a planning 
system. This work will be concerned not only with the procedures in the planning system as 
laid down in law, but also with the process of reaching decisions, with the related 
behavioural characteristics of the actors involved in practising planning and with the 
socio-economic and politico-administrative contexts of the system. This chapter presents the 
various frameworks of investigation and analysis which empirical study demands. 
Four main sections are included comprising first, a discussion of the purpose, nature and 
methods of studies looking at planning systems in other countries; in other words, in 
countries other than the researcher's native country or other than those with which the 
researcher is closely familiar; secondly, analytic frameworks of the centre/periphery 
dimension in the planning process; thirdly, decentralisation and political ideology and 
fourthly, methodology. Whilst the latter section will simply describe the methodology used 
for the empirical work discussed in this book, the first section will complement this by 
considering, more generally, the methodological difficulties of studies in other countries. 
Cross National Planning Studies 
In the British planning literature this book would be described as an example of a "cross 
national planning study"; the author is not French, is not working in France and the study is 
primarily, although not exclusively, written for a non-French audience. The book might also 
be described as "comparative"; however, what is being compared here is the land use 
planning system in France over time and especially during the periods of office of two very 
different Presidents with very different political ideologies. What the book is not is an 
example of what is often described as a "cross national comparative planning study". The 
distinction between a cross national planning study and a cross national comparative planning 
study is worthy of explanation and reflects in the recent and increasing interest in such 
studies in the planning literature (especially in Britain). This interest is represented in the 
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literature as a discussion not only of the purpose and nature of study but also of the 
methodologies used for study. 
The purpose of studying in another country, in any discipline, is generally the belief that 
someone somewhere will benefit from knowing what people elsewhere have thought or have 
done; that is, a form of transfer or diffusion of knowledge. The specific motivations for this 
transfer or diffusion have been reviewed by Masser ^ drawing on the work of other social 
scientists such as Hecksher (2), Feldman Φ and Cyr and Leon ( 4\ Hecksher, writing about 
studies of government quotes seven reasons for engaging in cross national study. These 
include: 
(i) pedagogical importance 
(ii) realistic view of our own government as a consequence 
(iii) to provide ideas for the development of our own institutions 
(iv) to "blow our own trumpet" 
(v) to refine the tools of description 
(vi) to contribute knowledge towards a general inductive theory 
(vii) to test hypotheses. 
Similarly, Feldman in looking at the area of public policy, provides three explanations of 
cross national study namely: 
(i) to expose a range of choice 
(ii) to provide insight into other institutions 
(iii) to distinguish the essentials from the trivia. 
Finally, Cyr and Leon discussing public administration, say that studies in other countries 
are "a means of overcoming country-specific training in this field" W. Masser sums up these 
motivations as applying equally to the transfer of planning knowledge, and suggests that they 
relate to the development of practice and theory. This is indeed consistent with the views of 
Paludi and Hamnett(6) writing on the subject at an earlier point in time. Clearly then, there 
seems to be general agreement on the purpose of research in other countries. By contrast, 
there is much less agreement on the nature of it, the approach and emphasis adopted. This is 
especially true in the field of planning. It is in looking at the nature of the research and then 
the methodology, that the distinction between a cross national study and a cross national 
comparative study is apparent. 
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The nature of study in other countries can be considered by looking at the main approaches to 
it. In the British planning literature and the social science literature, two main approaches to 
study predominate. First, there is an approach where the emphasis is on the study of more 
than one country and on the comparison of experiences O. Within this first approach there 
are a number of detailed studies which look at a smaller number of countries, often only two, 
and which seek to compare directly a limited or narrowly defined substantive area(8). This 
approach can be called the cross national comparative approach. Secondly, there is an 
approach which rejects the notion of comparison as ал emphasis of study and which 
concentrates on description and explanation of some substantive area in a country different 
from the researcher base ( 9\ This approach can be called the cross national approach. The 
former approach, described here as the cross national comparative approach, has 
predominated in planning. This is possibly due to the fact that the motivation for study has 
related more to the transfer of practice. By contrast, studies adopting the second approach, 
described here as the cross national approach, have been more common in political science 
and have been inclined more towards pedagogic motivations. Indeed, this distinction is 
demonstrated very clearly by comparing the terminology of the respective disciplines applied 
to researchers with these differing emphases and interests. For example, non-French 
political scientists such as Wright <10\ Machin ( , 1 \ Kesselman(12) or Cemy and Schain (13) 
are simply described by their own colleagues as "French" specialists. In planning circles, 
no such description has emerged and those interested in planning in another country are 
described as "comparative" specialists. This latter description is evidenced as a terminology 
in planning publications(14'. The description is unfortunate since it directs the expectations 
of cross national planning research to direct comparison between and amongst countries. 
The approach to research in planning, as in political science, can be cross national without 
being comparative. Indeed, it will be argued below that the limitations placed on research in 
other countries are extensive and that an explicitly comparative approach and emphasis can be 
particularly hazardous. 
The explicitly comparative approach is demonstrated in a number of texts in recent years 
which, as Bourne comments, range from: 
"... collections of independent descriptions of planning practice in various 
countries in which little or no attempt is made to carry out a comparative 
evaluation; to highly generalised comparisons of national planning system 
attributes that largely ignore the differences existing between them as a result of 
their historical and economic development" ^ 15) 
These extensive descriptions mentioned above basically say what a planning system is but 
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often forget to say what it is not and why that is the case. This is regrettable for the 
development of theory and practice. What is also evident, of course, is the extent to which 
there is an over-elaboration in the studies of any similarities between or amongst countries 
and an under-explanation of their differences. This latter problem is perhaps most noticeable 
in studies which adopt "the case study approach". Perhaps one of the main facilitators of the 
case study approach is the international conference. This author has already commented on 
the lack of mutual understanding amongst planners from different countries in these 
situations: 
"... lack of mutual understanding of respective planning systems and their 
context was evident. Thus, case studies of practice were described by 
practitioners at the conference but participants were unable to ask questions 
about practice raised in order to evaluate the contribution of these case studies in 
their national context"(16) 
Sharpe (1T) has provided some interesting guidance on the approach to comparative study 
using case studies. He suggests two possibilities; first, the principle of maximum similarity 
where case studies should be limited to a single kind of planning situation in a single 
country, i.e. all the research is conducted in the one country so the contexts are the same. 
Secondly, the principle of maximum discreteness of focus where case studies from different 
countries are chosen on the basis of very narrowly defined hypotheses about planning 
practice. The latter approach is cited by Masser ^18) as evidenced by the Leiden-Oxford 
study (19) which was exemplary in its thoroughness in both choice of approach and 
methodology of study. Another study of policy instruments in Britain and Holland, 
conducted by Needham (20), is also free of criticisms in the choice of approach and 
methodology. The author is well-qualified to discuss case studies of policy instruments in 
these two countries because he has worked for a long time in both and, in addition, his work 
is not a direct comparison but rather makes clear the relationship of policy choices in each 
country to a set of considerations which public planning agencies may use in making these 
choices. Thus, these studies have ensured that there has been a thorough appreciation of the 
differences in context between the two case study countries. 
Turning to the methodological difficulties of the cross national comparative studies. The 
major difficulty with these, as Feldman argues, is the problem of finding researchers with 
experience in the other country or countries being studied. As he says: 
"There is a value to comparative analysis but there are no short cuts to acquiring 
competence..."(21) 
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These sentiments arc echoed by Laconte writing on the transfer of practice experiences: 
"For a planner to take advantage of the experiences of other countries requires 
an unusual capacity to cross national cultures. Transfers of experience are more 
often based on images than on facts"(22) 
The Leiden-Oxford study for example, was able to overcome this problem in that it was 
conducted by planners with experience in both the British and the Dutch planning systems 
who used Sharpe's maximum discreteness of focus approach. Thus, the problems of 
knowing the planning context, language, terminologies, practices, and knowing suitable 
contacts were overcome. Similarly, choosing a suitable hypothesis reduces the risk of 
comparing like with unlike. Moreover, by maintaining teams in the two countries of 
comparison, changes over time are always monitored and the research does not run the risk 
of being out of date. Finally, the participation of researchers with experience in both systems 
reduces considerably the possibility of ethnocentric bias in analysis (23). Yet it has to be 
said that few other explicitly comparative studies have demonstrated the care and attention 
that is evident in the Leiden-Oxford study. 
The problems of conducting cross national research without an explicitly comparative focus 
are similar in nature, but differ in degree. More especially, this approach requires the 
formulation of research questions such as would be asked by colleagues in the "foreign" 
country. As a consequence, the issue of ethnocentric bias in research design and research 
analysis is perhaps much more crucial. Naturally, the process of reducing ethnocentric bias 
takes a long time and possibly can never be entirely eliminated. Thus, for researchers 
conducting cross national research of this type, constant contact with foreign colleagues and 
acceptance by them is a prerequisite, as well as frequent and, if possible, protacted visits. 
Bourne echoes these views: 
"The pace of events, policies and attitudes often exceeds the rate of renewal of 
planning ideas and the adaptation of planning instruments. Anyone who has 
undertaken longitudinal research in the same environment knows the difficulties 
involved. The conundrum we face is that the development of an adequate body 
of planning theory necessitates both longitudinal, and cross national research"^24· 
Yet, if experience does enable an objective evaluation to be made, it is encouraging to read 
that this can be appreciated. For example, Michel Jobert in the Preface to "Une Politique de 
Grandeur " by P.G. Cemy, an American political scientist working in Britain as a "French" 
specialist, praises the work: 
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"Il est très encourageant de constater que des ailleurs étrangers peuvent se tenir, 
mieux que les nôtres, loin de iécueil de la flatterie ,de l'hagiographie et de la 
complaisance. Ils se tiennent loin aussi du dénigrement, de l'hostilité et de 
l'incompréhension. Leur réussite est naturelle parce que leur jugement n'est 
pas obscurci" № 
(It is very encouraging to note that foreign authors can have a better grasp than 
ours, being far from the danger of flattery, hagiography and complaisance. 
They also keep away from denigration, hostility and lack of understanding. 
Their success is natural because their judgement is not obscured). 
Bourne makes a useful summation of the prerequisites of success for cross national research; 
he suggests that it has to be done with explicit, modest goals and considerable patience ^ 6 ) . 
It is perhaps the lack of patience and/or the desire for quick results that has inhibited this 
approach in planning research. 
Further, the pay-offs of cross national research are more limited for the development of 
planning practice. Certainly, the results of cross national research can be used post hoc for 
comparison, but this is really a bonus to the main goal of such study, i.e. explanation and 
understanding. Other reasons, though, for the lack of the cross national approach by British 
planners could be the cost of this type of research or the lack of a tradition in foreign 
languages or the belief that since Britain has one of the oldest, statutory land-use planning 
systems, there is nothing to be learned abroad. On the other hand, it is perhaps worth 
reflecting that planning as an academic discipline in Britain is relatively youthful and that, 
until the recent past, research priorities were much more concerned with development of 
British planning theory and practice. Moreover, British academics in planning have 
concentrated more on teaching and training than on pure research (27λ 
The research reported in this book was conceived and conducted simply as a cross national 
planning study. No comparative emphasis was included in the research design. In other 
words, this study represents years of research which was carried out as a series of short, 
linked studies with modest goals. Each successive study used the findings of the 
predecessor. Through this iterative process, the research increasingly became more 
evaluative and latterly, over the period of study of POS (Plan d'Occupation des Sols) and 
decentralisation, the research was more concerned to pose up to date questions on French 
planning practice. In this longitudinal process, the comparison between the pre 
decentralisation and the post decentralisation periods emerged in the same way as it emerged 
in French planning practice and the French literature on the same. 
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Planning Process; a Framework of Analysis 
This book is concerned with the process of plan-making at the local level, the level of the 
commune . A process such as plan-making incorporates a number of dimensions including 
procedures, professional practice, behavioural relationships of those making the plans and 
the substance of the end product, the plan itself. In this study each of these dimensions will 
be looked at. More especially, the process is considered here as a process which provides 
evidence of the nature of relationships between central government and local communes and 
their roles in decision-making during plan-making. This is a longitudnal study which was 
begun before the introduction of new legislation in 1982, the Decentralisation Acts(28). The 
comparison in the book is a comparison of the planning process pre and post decentralisation 
viewed from these various perspectives. 
The choice of analytic framework or frameworks for cross national research raises the 
important question - is it appropriate to analyse research findings using frameworks imported 
from another country or countries? This is perhaps the most interesting question. More 
especially, the search for an appropriate framework of analysis forces the researcher to 
consider carefully the extent to which these are bounded by national milieu(29). Masser, 
in a paper which reviews planning process models comments that: 
"Both the community decision-making model and the policy implementation 
process model emphasise the extent to which the participants' behaviour during 
the planning process reflects their perceptions of the circumstances that are 
associated within the particular planning situations in which they find 
themselves". ^ 
The "particular planning situations " refered to above, which are suggested as being 
fundamental to study of the planning process, are the particular attributes or characteristics 
forming the milieu or context of the planning system. In all countries where planning is 
conducted, the planning system is conditioned by certain attributes or characteristics which 
can exist, individually or even collectively, in many other countries . But the difference 
between planning systems in different countries is the particular combination of system 
attributes. Turning to this study, at least three imponant characteristics of the planning 
system in France are considered, in combination, to provide a specific milieu. The first of 
these is that there are dual and often multiple roles of actors participating in the plan-making 
process. For example, the mayor of a commune is politically elected (he/she can also be in 
a position of holding more than one political office), is the administrative agent of the state 
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and is charged with a technical responsibility. Sometimes the mayor is also a landowner in 
the territory for which the plan is being prepared. This latter characteristic is also true of 
some members of the Municipal Council. Civil servants in charge of plan-making also have 
dual roles as administrators and as technicians. Secondly, many of the "urbanistes " 
("planners") in France are not people trained in planning and are, in fact, engineers who are 
the managers of the planning system. Moreover, these "urbanistes " are not employed by 
the commune for whom a plan is prepared but are employees of the central state who work 
at subnational level in the département and not in the commune. The third characteristic of 
the planning system in France is a behavioural characteristic. The actions and beliefs of 
actors observed in the formal gatherings which form part of the planning process are 
conditioned by the historical culture of French administrative process. This has been most 
forcibly commented on by Crozier 
"To compromise, to make deals, to adjust to other people's claims is frowned 
upon; it is considered better to restrict oneself and to remain free within the 
narrow limits one has fixed or even those one has to accept. This insistence on 
autonomy and the pattern of restriction is old in France." ^31) 
Consequently, according to Crozier, what might be reported as observed behaviour in formal 
meetings can be, and often is, contrived behaviour. 
British or American models of planning process ^2) assume different properties of the milieu 
namely, the separation of political, administrative and technical roles and whilst situations of 
contrived behaviour can be accommodated in these models, they are unable to accommodate 
the former characteristics, the lack of clear lines of responsibility and accountability found in 
France. As a result of this lack of clarity and, in addition, the particular combination of 
system attributes, a microbehavioural framework of analysis of the French planning process 
is not readily available from outside France. Moreover, within France, a microbehavioral 
framework is not available. A more useful French framework of analysis seems to be that 
of Thoenig (33) which focuses on the macropolitical process of "cross-regulation" and 
"cross-functioning controls" in centre/periphery relations. Thoenig's model of 
centre/periphery relations was developed in the nineteen seventies(35) and can be located in 
the field of the sociology of organisations. The model is a general, macro model of the 
relationships between and amongst decision-makers from the commune level of subnational 
government, at the lowest level or "base" of study , through to central government, at the 
highest level or "summit". This model would seem to be appropriate to a study of planning 
in particular because the nature and strength of the power base of mayors and civil servants 
in the preparation of POS can readily be regarded as an example of centre/periphery relations 
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in France. In the case of POS, the centre is represented by the civil servants of the DDE 
(Direction Départementale de l'Equipement) ^ and the periphery by the mayor. 
Thoenig points out that, at first glance, decisions taken about the subnational level, the 
periphery, are seen to be treated by two institutionally and seemingly independent sets of 
actors: on the one hand, the officials of the central administration and , on the other hand, 
political leaders at the periphery levels. He also points out that each of these two institutional 
systems, the administrative and the political, seem inward-looking and self-contained at all 
levels. Further, co-ordination and communication between and amongst them looks like an 
impossible task. 
However, his analysis and model posit a set of mechanisms of co-ordination and 
communication which are informal in nature. These mechanisms are the "cross-regulations" 
or " cross-functioning controls" . These occur in the following manner: decisions are taken 
at each subnational level (e.g. the département or the commune ), not within each of the two 
institutional systems in a hierarchical way, but rather across them. Moreover, decisions 
require the cross intervention (of a third party) from the subnational level above the one for 
which a decision is required. Thus, at the commune level, the mayor is regulated from the 
département level by civil servants (fonctionnaires) and not, as might be expected, by 
politicians of the département through the political system. Since the two sets of actors, 
political and administrative, occupy different functions in the institutional systems, the 
cross-regulation is also cross-functional. In the same way as the mayor is cross-regulated 
by département officials, so are these latter, in tum, cross-regulated by national politicians, 
members of the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat, not to mention national level civil 
servants in their respective Ministries and grands corps. Figure 2.1 shows the zig-zagging 
routes of the cross-functioning controls. 
In addition to describing the zig-zagging routes of communication and co-ordination between 
the two institutional systems, Thoenig also describes these relationships as being unequal. 
He describes how actors at the lower levels will seek to develop interdependence with those 
at the next higher level of the periphery. Acceptance of an inferior role in cross-regulation is 
said to provide an actor with superiority at his/her own level in the periphery. Thus, 
decisions are made in decision centres at each level of the periphery by a small number of 
people according to the principle that those who intervene in decisions as third parties do not 
execute the decision. 
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Figure 2.1 Cross-Functioning Controls 
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Département Préfet 
DDE fonctionnaires 
Commune Mayors 
In this decision-making system, decisions ultimately go to the centre, Paris, and, under these 
circumstances, the decisions are taken as a result of pressure from intermediaries in the 
periphery. They are not imposed decisions from centre to periphery. Central policies and 
decisions travel from Paris to the periphery in the same zig-zagging manner. Thoenig's 
general model of centre/periphery thus descibes relations as external, unequal, 
cross-regulating, cross-functional and informal. He claims that the system is inefficient, 
insensitive, that there is a mistrust of public debate and that decisions are taken in secret (36). 
Using the variables provided by the Thoenig model of cross-functioning controls, it is 
possible to conduct a micro level study at the local level and then relate the findings to the 
macro model of relationships which he describes. Viewed in this way, the analysis provides 
a more appropriate test of a model in the national milieu of the model. Moreover, as the 
empmcal study in this book is longitudinal, it is possible to apply the Thoenig model over the 
pre and post decentralisation period. Thus, applicability or otherwise of this model under 
different circumstances can be assessed. 
Decentralisation and Political Ideology 
The Thoenig model discussed above will constitute the main framework of analysis of 
centre/periphery relations and thus is, of course, central to the analysis of decentralisation. It 
should be remembered that the model was developed in the context of Right wing political 
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control during more than two decades of the Fifth Republic and, given the extensive 
legislative changes relating to decentralisation introduced by the SociaUst administration of 
Mitterrand from 1981 onwards, it is important that any analysis of the plan-making process 
and of centre/periphery relations over this period should also be aware of the political 
traditions and ideological position which lie behind these changes. 
The general belief certainly prior to 1981 of French administration and government, was that 
France was one of the most centralised states in Europe(37). Yet it should be remembered 
that even before Mittenand both political and administrative decentralisation did exist.08' 
Indeed, as Smith has pointed out, there is no single country without some form of 
subnational government or administration '3 9 ' . The nature and degree of decentralisation 
before and after Mitterrand, as in all other political and administrative systems , are a 
reflection of the political choices which are made about the territorial distribution of power. 
In other words, decentralisation is seen by politicians as a way of securing political 
objectives. An analysis of the political objectives of each successive French government 
since the start of the Fifth Republic is clearly beyond the scope of this book. However, it is 
important to be aware of the main distinguishing political orthodoxies before Mitterrand. In 
particular, the crucial difference between Right and Left wing political parties in the modern 
states with capatalist economies is the extent to which the state overtly intervenes in the 
economy and how far decentralisation or the redistribution of power from centre to periphery 
has a part to play in this process. 
The conservative governments of the Fifth Republic up until 1981 accepted a wide range of 
state interventions in the economy. The strong corporatist links between the state and 
business generally led, as might be expected, to government policies which promoted 
economic activity and, in particular, industrial expansion and concentration as against 
command-style planning. Thus, economic policy and land use planning policy for that 
matter, have been indicative, supportive and reinforcing of the status quo. In other words, 
Right wing parties supported what might be called business-orientated intervention rather 
than welfare intervention. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that there was 
resistance to change in centre/periphery relations. 
Making contrast with Right wing parties, Cemy and Schain have raised some interesting and 
relevant points on the winning of power by Socialist parties in democratic countries with 
mixed economies: 
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"Socialist parties generally present programs based on innovative, rather than 
merely reactive, state intervention. This means that the state must experiment 
with new, or at least ostensibly new tasks, roles and activities, and these may 
require a capacity on the pan of the state institution for creative policy-making, 
adaptability and what has been called "steering" or forward-looking 
coordination....While conservative parties can often benefit from inertia, 
Socialist parties when they come to power are expected to 'do things' " ^ 
It would not be unreasonable to assume that the Mitterrand administration would conform, at 
least in part, to the characteristics described above and that more active and direct 
involvement in the economy and in land use planning would result. Also it would not be 
unreasonable, given the political platform of the PS in 1981, to assume that a substantial 
redistribution of power from centre to periphery would be attempted as a means to achieve 
this. 
In order to analyse the effect of decentralisation on land use planning, then, it is important to 
understand that the aim of the decentralisation programme was to change decision-making 
processes through increased participation and local democracy. The problems raised by this 
change can be seen partly by comparing the stated aims of decentralisation with the 
legislative texts which were supposed to implement it. As will be seen, the results which 
might be expected from the latter legislation - and which the findings of this study thus far 
confirm -suggest more "imagined" than "real" changes. 
Methodology 
It was stated earlier in this Chapter that this study is both cross national and longitudinal in 
approach. It was also stated that the approach was developed over a number of years and 
was iterative. The iterative approach was regarded as the only mechanism to reduce 
ethnocentric bias. Thus, this study of planning in France developed over a period of ten 
years. During the first five years, the main objectives were to achieve competence in the 
language and especially technical language, to understand the administrative and political 
structures at central and local levels and to come to grips with the meaning of urbanisme and 
the various professions involved in that activity. Over these years the author was fortunate in 
being able to carry out some small studies (41), to work in planning practice (42\ to keep in 
touch with planning academics(43) and to make contact with a large number of planners in 
many planning agencies. 
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Over the subsequent five years, two empirical studies were carried out, one in 1981 and one 
in 1983. Throughout this period constant contact was maintained with colleagues in France 
to get access to up to date circulars, legislation and journals ^ and, in addition to the two 
study periods spent in France for the empirical work, other additional visits were made (45\ 
Perhaps of greatest importance over both of these periods was the extent to which a 
"foreign" practice was actually being understood. In these circumstances the researcher has 
tobe evaluative of his/her own capabilities in the light of other people's responses. Tests 
of acceptability have to be introduced. For example, in this case, the author felt that it was 
important to publish in French (46) and to give papers at conferences on planning in 
France^47). 
Turning now to the specific aspects of methodology, the two empirical studies will be 
discussed. The first study, conducted over a 3 month period in 1981, investigated the 
process of preparation of Plan d'Occupation des Sols, POS, using two methods; first, 
interviews using interview schedules were carried out with mayors of communes, planning 
staff of the Ministry "field service", the DDE, planners in the Ministry of Environment and 
planners in planning agencies connected with grouped communes ^ 48*. 
In addition to the interviews, the author attended plan preparation meetings, groupe de 
travail W\ as an observer in each of the study areas. Four study areas were selected to form 
a geographic cross-section of the country including the départements of Bouches du Rhône, 
Loire, Essonne and Pas de Calais. (Fig. 2.2 shows the location of the study areas). 
These départements were chosen for several reasons. First, research of this kind is 
extremely time consuming and travel from one study area to another has to be both quick and 
economic; secondly, the chosen départements had very diverse social, economic and 
geographic backgrounds; thirdly, figures of the preparation of statutory plans in each 
demonstrated very different results (50^ and finally, each of the DDE's were willing to 
accommodate the author (51\ 
In addition to the time spent in each of the départements work was carried out in Paris at the 
Ministry of Environment where planning officials were interviewed and time was also spent 
with academics in the capital studying planning . Details of these interviews and meetings 
are provided in Appendix 2.1. 
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Figure 22 The Study Areas 
The research proceeded in each département by the same method. Preliminary collection and 
analysis of plan preparation data was carried out and the organisational structure of the DDE 
and the political composition of communes were studied ( 5 2 \ Then a programme of 
interviews with officials and mayors was prepared as well as a programme for attendance at 
plan making meetings. The success of such an approach, to a large extent, relied on 
goodwill and co-operation from French colleagues, especially over the first few days. In all 
cases this was prepared in advance by correspondence and telephone calls made several 
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weeks before the visits. In all cases a positive response was achieved. Clearly the presence 
of a "foreigner" conducting research, funded partly by the French government, must have 
been perplexing, but governmental support may have legitimated the study. On the other 
hand, governmental support was considered by the author as a possible stumbling block in 
the sense that the research might have been regarded as some sort of semi-official 
investigation. Indeed, this view was expressed directly and, to some extent, indirectly. 
Under these circumstances, co-operation had to be achieved through careful explanation. 
This particular problem had to be overcome, especially with planning staff of DDE's (both 
fonctionnaire staff and contracted staff) (ì3). More especially, the particular nature of the 
relationship between fonctionnaires and contracted staff(one of tension) meant that the 
researcher was placed in a rather delicate position between two opposing groups. The 
relationship between mayors and planning staff resulted in the same problem(54). It was thus 
very important to be seen to treat everyone in exactly the same way, to pursue maximum 
diplomacy and to listen to discussion about one group from the others without actively being 
involved. In extremely delicate situations where an attempt is made to involve the researcher, 
through eliciting his/her views, "foreign-ness" can be used as an escape mechanism. Yet 
"foreign-ness" can be dangerous because if it is used extensively then the results of 
interviews can be affected, responses can become a public relations exercise and the 
researcher can lose all credibility with one interviewee who, in turn, can influence others yet 
to be seen. 
A last point concerning the interview approach and observations at meetings is how to 
record the findings/responses. When conducting interview-based research constant eye 
contact with the interviewee is necessary. A common practice under this circumstance is to 
use a tape recorder to record the interview. The problems that this method can cause are well 
known^55) so, to ensure that the interviewee was not intimidated, the researcher resorted to 
occasional note taking. After the interviews, the notes are written up more fully. These 
methods can appear to be unscientific but they are the best possible ones in a situation where, 
to a large extent, human reaction and response cannot be determined in advance. If the 
interviewer keeps the interviews fluid, without long breaks, and gauges the degree of 
formality appropriately, then successful response can be achieved. Clearly it is unnecessary 
to provide further details of interview conduct; suffice it to say that careful preparation, 
attentiveness and attention to detail throughout the interview, and careful yet subtle cross 
checks of responses, are prerequisites. 
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The second empirical study, conducted in 1983, also used the interview method described 
above. By contrast to the first study, the aim of this second study was to understand the 
decentralisation legislation of 1982 and 1983 respectively, then, on the basis of this 
understanding, to interview mayors and planning officials about their reactions to it. In 
addition, the study aimed to update statistics from the previous study. The work was 
conducted in Paris, at the Ministries of Interior and Decentralisation and 
Urbanisme/Logement and in the Nord département over a period of three months. Details 
of interviews are provided in Appendix 2.2. 
As in the previous study, careful preparation involved advance correspondence and telephone 
calls. Again, as in the previous study, the work was partly sponsored by the French 
government. The study area was different from the previous study for reasons of time and 
money but also because the Nord département provided an excellent base for meeting 
officials in different types of planning agency *56\ Also, of course, it was the département 
where the mayor of Lille was also Prime Minister and it was felt that discussion and impact 
of the new legislation was likely to have been greater there. 
Access to and co-operation from mayors, political parties and planning officials was good 
and few refusals for interviews were recorded. The interviews themselves were longer than 
the interviews in 1981, not least because the legislation was discussed in its own right as 
well as with respect to the effects it would have on the planning system and plan preparation. 
The researcher did not use the offices of the Nord DDE as a base nor the Paris Ministries. 
Indeed, universities were used as bases ^7). This proved to be less successful than the 
study bases used previously because it was much more time consuming to make contact 
with politicians and much less time was spent with planners. On the other hand, because the 
researcher was spending more time in the one place it was useful to be more anonymous in 
dealings with various different individuals. Indeed, given that contact was being made with 
political party offices and officials, the external and impartial environment which the 
University provided was probably important. 
Conclusions 
This Chapter has pointed out some of the pitfalls and limitations of cross national research. 
The research on which this book is based was deliberately conducted as a series of small, 
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incremental, modest studies in an effort to understand the difference which the French 
system of planning represented to the author. Without constant contact with colleagues in 
France, this type of study is not possible. Their continuous co-operation is a necessity. 
Research of this type is time consuming but it is also valuable personal experience. More 
especially, it provides an excellent method of sharpening up the researcher's adaptability 
exposed to systems of land use planning in other countries (58). It is the author's conclusion 
that, furthermore, this cross national approach can provide a starting point for the cross 
national comparative approach. The chapter has also set out how the analysis of the 
decentralisation of land use planning will be based primarily on Thoenig's macro model of 
centre/periphery relations and, in addition, on analysis of the innovating legislation and 
policies of the Mitterrand administration post 1981. 
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PART Π 
THE PRE DECENTRALISATION PERIOD, 1958-1981 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROFESSIONAL 
CONTEXTS OF LAND USE PLANNING 
Introduction 
This second part of the book concentrates on the pre decentralisation period. This Chapter 
develops three aspects of land use planning touched on in Part I; the law of land use 
planning, the administrative context and the actors involved in the plan-making process. 
That land use planning law existed prior to 1958, there is no doubt The problem, however, 
as we have seen, was that the law was piecemeal and was not implemented in respect of 
plan-making. Lack of enforcement can partly be attributed to insufficient means but it is also 
a reflection of the lack of clear political support for changing the status quo. This situation 
also appeared to be the case during the early Gaullist years. In comparison, the latter part of 
the sixties saw the introduction not only of a new Land Use Planning Act but also of an 
administrative structure which, in theory, could implement that law. Crucial in the 
discussion of the 1967 Act is the extent to which it reinforces the status quo or is innovatory 
in substance and in terms of the means to ensure its application. The subsequent legal 
changes in the mid-seventies which modified this law will also be considered from this 
perspective. 
That decentralisation existed before 1981 there is also no doubt. What is important to know, 
of course, is the form which this decentralisation took. Thus, the nature of national and 
sub-national government will be touched on as well as the administration of planning and 
those agencies with responsibility for plan-making. From this discussion, the linkages 
between the political, administrative and technical systems will be identified. More 
specifically, it is important to know the degree of linkage/overlap in the role of actors and 
also the extent to which clear lines of accountability are discernible. These issues, in fact, 
form part of the characteristics specific to the French milieu discussed in Chapter 2. 
After discussing the roles and responsibilities of actors in the planning process, mayors, civil 
servants in planning and contracted planners, their sociological characteristics will be looked 
at here. It is felt that knowledge of these characteristics, the second characteristics, specific 
to the French milieu can help explain the behaviour of actors in French administrative 
processes. Equally important, however, in this understanding is the discussion of their 
motivations for this behaviour. Chapter 4 will look at these. 
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The Law of Land Use Planning 
A detailed, historical review of French land use planning law is clearly beyond the scope of 
this book. In an effort to identify the main legislation. Appendix 3.1 has been included to 
show a chronological list of the main Acts and decrees before, but especially during the 
twentieth century. It should be noted that, in France, only Acts of Parliament are subject to 
Parliamentary debate. By contrast, decrees are subject only to Parliamentary approval. 
Thus, when we look at legislation over this century it is significant that before the 5th 
Republic, a lengthy period elapsed between successive Acts concerned with the plan-making 
aspects of land use planning, viz. between the 1919/1924 Acts (1) and the 1943 Act(2). In 
comparison, the 1967 Act was followed quickly with the 1969, 1971 and 1976 Acts. Also 
evident over this century is that the early legislation in France focus sed on building 
regulations and building alignment as related to public health and to road construction. 
Lucas describes this evolution as being similar to those in many other W. European states ®\ 
The first plans laid down in the 1919, 1924 and 1943 Acts were simple in content and 
emphasised the an of town planning more than the science of it Whilst these plans included 
"déclarations d'intention" (statements of intent) they were weak in implementation, "ne 
comportant acune obligation précise" (4) (not containing a single precise obligation). A final 
point regarding this century is the increasing amount of legislation relating to land use 
planning in particular and associated legislation concerned with compulsory purchase and 
other aspects of land management This is evident from 1935 onwards. 
There is general agreement that by far the most important land use planning legislation this 
century is the Loi d'Orientation Foncière (LOF). The appearance of the LOF in December 
1967 was heralded as "un tournant capital dans l'histoire de l'urbanisme en France" ^ (a 
decisive turning point in the history of French planning). The rhetoric of the time is said to 
have suggested that the legislation had, " ...le caractère et la vigueur sans précédent de ses 
dispositions " (innovatory character and unprecedented vigour of its provisions)(6). 
What was especially significant about this legislation, apart from the content and the impact it 
made on planning literature, was the extremely lengthy Parliamentary debates of it which 
took place between June and December 1967. In this lenghty debate, the Bill was examined 
very closely and it is not surprising to find a much greater awareness of plans and 
plan-making subsequently in France. For example, Givaudin, the former chief of DAFU 
(Direction d'Aménagement Foncière et de l'Urbanisme) at the Ministry of Equipment, made a 
very interesting remark about the Act and his reactions to it: 
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"Je m'étonne par conséquence que d'éminents juristes découvrent quelquefois 
dans la loi des nouveautés. Il faut les excuser car bien rares sont ceux qui ont 
les textes anciens. Je me réjouis par contre quand je vois l'essor et la popularité 
que prennent les nouveaux documents d'urbanisme" (7K 
(I am therefore surprised that eminent lawyers sometimes find new things in 
Acts. One must excuse them because it is rare to find any of them to have the 
old texts. By contrast, I rejoice when I see the vigour and the popularity 
connected with the new planning documents) 
Givaudin's view above is clearly reflected by his belief that the new plans of the LOF are 
simply a better version of the 1958 decree plans; "... il faut reconnaître que le SDAU et les 
POS sont une milleure variété de plan que le PUD" (8) (It should be admitted that SDAU 
and POS are a better variety of plan than the PUD). Yet leading specialists in planning law 
including Nicholay and Rousillon amongst others, have discussed the LOF and suggested 
profound differences between it and preceding legislation(9). Clearly differences of opinion 
in respect of the legislation are a clear reflection of professional focus as much as anything 
else. On the other hand, differences such as these do reflect the general difficulty in 
commenting on legislation. This can be done in a number of ways: first, the strict legal 
approach would investigate legislation in terms of its legal form and contribution to the 
corpus of law; secondly, as in the case of Givaudin, a planner might look at the nature of 
practice change which might be expected as a result of the law and/or a planner might simply 
describe the legal provisions for practice; thirdly, a social scientist might be more concerned 
to analyse the legal content in terms of the ideological content of the law or effects which a 
law might have on the nature of society or some aspect of societal organisation (10). For 
example, in the latter case, it would be possible to discuss a land use planning Act in terms of 
distribution and social justice. Here, it is intended to look at the content of the LOF simply in 
terms of the legal provisions it contains in respect of plans and plan-making and to identify 
any other significant provisions of it which relate to land use as might affect plans. 
Discussion of the implications of the LOF for planning practice and progress is to be found 
in the in the next two chapters. Similarly, other land use management instruments and the 
societal and ideological implicadons of the legislation will be looked at later. 
The overall concerns of the LOF were two-fold. First, the introduction of land use plans, 
and secondly, associated instruments and fiscal measures for land management. Each will be 
considered in tum although it is intended to treat only the most significant innovations of the 
latter category - especially those which have a direct bearing on the former. 
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The Act provides for two types of plan; at the higher level, the Schéma d'Aménagement et 
d'Urbanisme (SDAU)(11) and at the more detailed level, the Plan d'Occupation des Sols 
(POS)(12). Every commune with a population of more than 10 000 must have a SDAU or 
be included in one but it is possible that only pan of a commune need be included in the plan 
and a third possibility is that several communes can be included. In the Paris region, each 
département is divided into a number of sectors each with the responsibility of preparing a 
sector SDAU. This is the only region where complete coverage of SDAU is required. The 
SDAU is essentially a strategic plan for 15 years laying down changes in the location of 
population, major facilities, transport infrastructure, service infrastructure, preferential 
development areas and areas of renovation. The responsibility for designating SDAU 
boundaries lies with the departmental préfet, (the chief executive officer of the département), 
a civil servant of the Ministry of Interior. The plan has no legal force and there is no right of 
appeal against it by third parties. On the other hand, whilst it is not a legally binding 
document, the other plans and land use planning instruments at the lower tier must conform 
to iti"). 
The lower tier plan, the POS, is concerned with detailed land use over 10 years in the context 
of the SDAU (if one exists). The geographical area of coverage of the POS could be the 
same as the SDAU; that is, all of a commune or part of a commune or a grouping of 
communes . In contrast to the SDAU, the POS is "opposable aux tiers" - is a legally 
binding document giving third parties the legal right of contest. The POS is required to 
provide details of land use and infrastructure, the former as land use zonings with associated 
regulations for each land parcel. The regulations define the Coefficient d'Occupation des 
Sols (COS) or plot ratio, height controls and building regulations in both existing and future 
built up zones. Infrastructure details concerned with roads and services are provided in a 
costed programme. By contrast to the SDAU, the Act provides for an enquête publique 
(public inquiry) of the POS - basically this is a set period for written or oral objections to the 
plan and is administered by an arbiter appointed by the département (14). 
The plan provisions in the LOF include a hierarchical arrangement of plans with the lower 
der conforming to the upper tier yet allowing for the preparation of lower tier plans in the 
absence of approved upper tier plans. Also, the nature of the two plans is of interest. The 
SDAU are strategic and do not relate to specifîc or identifiable land parcels whilst the latter 
are local, detailed and very specific. More generally, the nature of both plans could be 
described as universalistic; this means that they are standardised in style and content 
throughout the country and their content has been determined not so much by local 
circumstances as by the pattern books used in their preparation. Thus, the plans for all areas 
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are alike in appearance and in content. Comparing the SDAU and POS to their 
predecessors, the 1958 plans, the previous legislation provided for much more selectivistic 
(i.e. place specific) inteipretation, and these other distinct differences are evident. First, both 
the Plan dVrbamsme Directeur (PUD) ana the Plan de Détail (PD) were legally unspecific 
and no obligation existed in the decree for the preparation. For example, "Le Plan 
d'Urbanisme Directeur (PUD) peut contenir l'indication des parties du territoire dans 
lesquelles seront établis des Plans d'Urbanisme de Détail" (Article 2) (15). (The PUD can 
contain an indication of the parts of the territory in which detailed plans will be established) 
or " Le Plan de Détail peut determiner les conditions d'occupation du sol de façon aussi 
précise que cela est nécessaire en particulier pour les quartiers à rénover ". (Article 2) (16) 
(The detailed plan can determine, can lay down in as much detail as necessary, the land use 
conditions, in particular for renewal neighbourhoods). 
A second point in which 1958 type plans were different to the 1967 plans is that the PD did 
not apply to the same geographic areas as the PUD. Indeed, the former applied only to 
"... certain secteurs ou quartiers" (Article 1) (certain sectors or neighbourhoods). The 
geographical applicability of the PUD, by contrast, was exactly the same as the SDAU or the 
POS. In general, the relationship between the two plans of 1958 was more tenuous than that 
between the LOF plans and much more imprecise. The notion of COS or any equivalent, for 
example, did not exist nor did the process of enquête publique . Whilst the latter process 
was included in the 1958 legislation, it only applied in respect of land designated to be 
compulsorily purchased (17). In contrast to the LOF, the 1958 decree paid much more 
attention to the Paris region and almost twenty per cent of the text was devoted to this (18). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both types of 1967 plan were to be prepared jointly 
by communes and the administration(19). On reading through the 1958 decree, there is no 
direct mention of responsibility for plan preparation. The text would suggest, however, that 
the communes concerned would be "consulted" " consultation des collectivités 
intéressés" (20) (consultation of affected municipalities). The inference is that communes 
were only to be informed. 
Turning to the proposals which led to the LOF, in 1967, these appeared in 1964 and 1966. 
It is worth considering these briefly to review the evolution of ideas over the sixties. The 
1964 proposals originated in the Ministry of Construction in the office of R. Mace (Directeur 
de la Direction de l'Aménagement Fonder et de l'Urbanisme) (DAFU). Recommendations 
produced by working groups chaired by Mace appeared publicly in the journal Urbanisme in 
1964 (21). The major differences between the 1964 proposals and the LOF in respect of 
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plans were, first, the names of plans Schéma Directeur de Structure (SDS) and Plan 
d'Utilisation des Sols (PUS) and Coefficient d'Utilisation des Sols (CUS). The second 
difference was that the plans were to be prepared "avec le concours des communes" (with 
the co-operation of the communes ). More importantly, the 1964 proposal suggested a 
radical package of fiscal measures connected with development of land and with land use, 
those will be mentioned later. 
By 1966 when Pisani, as the new Minister of Equipment presented the PLOFU (Projet de 
Loi d'Orientation Foncière et d'Urbanisme), the names of the plans suggested in 1964 were 
changed to the LOF names, and the preparation for plans became the joint responsibility of 
the administration and the commune . Generally then, the provisions of the LOF in respect 
of plans derived directly from the 1964 and 1966 proposals. This suggests continuity of 
thinking about plans from the early sixties till the LOF, in contrast to big differences between 
LOF plans and 1958 decree plans. 
In contrast to the LOF clauses relating to plans, the remaining contents of the LOF concerned 
with associated fiscal measures and land management instruments, changed greatly over the 
sixties. These aspects are treated chronologically for clearer understanding of their 
evolution. The 1964 proposals introduced an interesting package of fiscal measures related 
to land and building development comprising: 
(i) A tax payable on undeveloped, yet already serviced land. This tax was to be 
assessed on the basis of increased market value created through servicing and 
would be sufficiently high to force sale or development to take place. 
(ii) A retroactive tax on undeveloped land which was not yet serviced (but where 
servicing was planned) was to be levied after the land was sold or developed. 
(iii) In zones which were not yet serviced, an alternative COS, i.e. a higher COS, 
was allowed but all service charges would be paid by the private developer. 
In addition to the above, the 1964 proposals also allowed a developer the right to negotiate 
with neighbours to equalise COS in an area. Thus, for example, if the overall COS for an 
existing area was lower than was allowed, then agreement between a developer and those 
with the lower COS could be reached to allow the developer an increased COS. This was 
also to be taxed as an overdensity tax (taxe de surdensité). 
These measures were changed considerably in the 1966 proposals for the Act, when Pisani 
proposed the taxe locale d'équipement - a tax payable on land whether serviced or not and 
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only payable on land which was already approved for development. He also proposed a 
further tax - an impôt fancier annuel. This was a flat rate tax designed to encourage land to 
be sold. The tax for higher COS was maintained by Pisani and, in addition, in "Les zones 
opérationelles publiques" - public development zones - the COS could deviate from the 
COS specified in the TOS 02). 
The fate of the 1966 fiscal proposals for the Act was that few of these were incorporated in 
the LOF. Essentially the taxe locale d'équipement was maintained, whilst the impôt fancier 
annuel was rejected after an appeal by Debre and Pompidou to de Gaulle(23). The proposed 
deviations from the COS were maintained. In addition, and most importantly, the Act made 
provision for the ZAC - Zone d'Aménagement Concerté - (concentrated management zone) 
and more especially for public and private ZAC. The former were essentially an evolution of 
the Zones Opérationelles Publiques whilst the latter were a new introduction. This was a 
particularly important addition. It is a zone: 
"... dans laquelle la collectivité décide d'intervenir pour réaliser ou faire réaliser 
l'aménagement d'équipements des terrains en vue de les céder ou de les 
concéder à des utiliseurs publiques ou privés ". 
(... in which the commune decides to intervene to realise or to have realised the 
improvement of land infrastructure with a view to ceding the improved land or 
to granting a concession to public or private developers). 
The crucial measure of the ZAC was that it allowed for deviation from all ЮЗ regulations 
within its boundaries. Given the magnitude of this permissible deviation it is surprising that 
the matter was not subject to Parliamentary debate(24). 
Thus, looking at the evolution of fiscal measures and land management instruments from 
1964 until the LOF, what is obvious is the complete turnaround; the proposals of 1964 
presented a strong package of fiscal measures which would have secured tight control of land 
supply, land availability, land price and a bigger financial participation by the private sector 
in servicing costs and development charges. The subsequent proposals of 1966 and the 
contents of the LOF show a dramatic erosion of this package and a return to "soft" fiscal 
measures and extremely liberal development as witnessed by the ZAC. The latter, in 
particular, is said to "effacer le POS" - to take precedence over the POS. 
In the years after the LOF, the law of land use planning was amended but, with few 
exceptions, the provisions of subsequent legislation did little to change the basic provisions 
laid down in 1967. Chalandon, the new Minister oî Equipement from 1968, was explicit 
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in his dislike of the plans and land use controls as contained in the LOF. In particular, he 
favoured a much more simple system of plan preparation and associated instruments of land 
use control. In other words, a more selectivistic system which gave more discretion to 
decision- makers^25). Yet despite these views, little legislative change occurred over the 
1967-1970 period. As Veltz points out, the 1970 decree showed "minimal" change 
focussing only on the details of regulations (26\ 
Perhaps the most crucial question over the early seventies concerns the relationship between 
SDAU, POS and ZAC and the fact that the latter takes precedence over the POS. In 
essence, the situation was that the ZAC had to conform to a SDAU; but if the latter did not 
exist, the absence of planning was obvious(27). In 1974 and 1975, circulars were issued by 
the Ministry of Equipment which laid down changes that would provide greater control 
under these circumstances (28\ These ensured first, that a ZAC was no longer allowed in 
communes without either a SDAU or a POS which had been started. Secondly, if a POS 
was in the course of preparation then a private ZAC could not go ahead unless it was 
compatible with the draft POS, whereas a public ZAC could not go ahead until after the final 
POS was prepared. Thirdly, in cases where a POS was approved or in final draft form, the 
ZAC could only be designated in either existing urban zones, that is existing built up areas, 
or in prospective development zones. Finally, if a POS was in the process of public 
consultation, a ZAC had to be delayed until the POS was published. In addition to the above 
changes, the outline Act of 1975 (Projet de Loi Galley) ^0 ' introduced the notion of enquête 
publique in advance of ZAC designation. This proposition had been considered extensively 
by a committee of inquiry under the chairmanship of M. Pierre Delmond P1*. All of the 
above measures were finally incorporated into the 1976 Loi sur l'Urbanisme and the revised 
Planning Code of that year W . It is clear that the whole question of ZAC conformity was 
extremely lax until 1976, yet many would argue that the issue was not totally resolved after 
1976 either. In particular, the view has been forcefully expressed that the conformity of 
ZAC to SDAU gives the SDAU a legally binding status - that is, is oppposable aux tiers (32). 
De facto rather than de jure this would seem to be the case, although it will be evident later in 
the discussion of practice that the small number of approved SDAU meant that the principle 
could only apply in a small number of locations. 
In summary of the above discussion of land use planning law over the pre decentralisation 
period, the crucial question of analysis relates to whether the legal changes were a 
reinforcement of the status quo or an innovation in substance. Effectively, the question turns 
on the differences between the two sets of provisions contained in the LOF, the first relating 
to the plans and the second to the associated land management instruments. The fact that 
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these two sets of provisions were brought together in a single Act is considered innovatory. 
Moreover, the legal provisions for the plans as they were changed between 1958 and 1967 
are considered innovatory. For example, plans of the LOF are much clearer in their legal 
requirements than their predecessors, they are also much clearer in details of purpose, 
geographical area of applicability, relationships of the two types of plan, responsibility for 
their preparation and in their technical content. In short, the uncertainty surrounding plans 
under the 1958 decree was replaced by clarity and certainty in their 1967 successors. More 
generally, it could be said that this clarification introduced a more "scientific" approach to 
plans (33) and, through the associated guidelines of plan content, reduced the possibility for 
including the artistic elements of previous plans. The implication is that, the greater the 
vagueness in legislation and plan preparation guidance, the more selectivistic the plans could 
be; the more specific and clear these were, the more universalistic the plans would become. 
Subsequent to the LOF, the question of ZAC conformity to SDAU and POS was finally 
regularised in 1976, but neither this nor the previous legislative changes over the seventies 
could be regarded as innovatory. Rather, the measures of the seventies might be described 
as legal adjustments. 
The legal provisions in the LOF in respect of associated land management instruments 
represent a watered down version of the proposals for 1964 and demonstrate clearly that the 
spirit of the Act as proposed, especially in the early sixties, was very different to the Act as 
approved. Nevertheless, it is felt that these omissions or reductions in the content of the 
LOF do not reduce its overall impact. Further, the 1976 Act resolutely confirmed the POS 
as the dominant legal instrument of land use planning practice in the seventies. Whether or 
not the PUD referred to earlier by Givaudin would have achieved the same impact cannot be 
proved but it is doubtful. In any case, the administrative and professional changes in land 
use planning which took place over the sixties make it impossible to speculate because these 
changes brought with them a very different context to the one which existed in 1958. These 
matters will be examined below. 
The Administrative Context of Land Use Planning 
Despite the rapid urbanisation and economic growth this century, the system of "local 
administration", the territorial organisation of subnational government, rather surprisingly 
remained unaltered over the pre decentralisation period. Thus, the system of subnational 
government remained as it was first laid down by Napoleon, and France still has more 
subnational government institutions than most other states of the EEC put together(34). 
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At the lowest level of subnational government is the commune of which there are more than 
36 000. The communes were created from the pre-existing parishes of the Ancien Régime. 
At the intermediate level there are 96 départements (counties) which were created by 
Napoleon. The general idea behind their delimitation was that each part of their area had to 
have accessibility to the governmental seat, the préfecture, within one day's travel by horse 
and cart. Finally, at the upper level there are 22 régions which, as we have seen in Chapterl, 
were first created by the grouping of départements in 1959. These three levels, taken 
together, represent what is called "local administration". But this term can be confusing 
because it is generally used in France to mean local authorities and, in addition, can include 
the "field services" of Central Government Ministries. Moreover, at the local level these 
"field services" are often described as "the state". By contrast, the term "local government" 
is not used in France and often the term "municipalities" is used to denote communes. 
Of the three tiers of local administration, only communes and départements have directly 
elected councils whilst the régions have nominated councils with membership drawn from 
members nominated by the other two tiers. The life of commune Councils and the General 
Council of the département is six years. In the former case, the whole membership of the 
Council is re-elected every six years whilst in the latter case half of the members are elected 
every three years. The two-round majority list voting system is used, and both councils elect 
their own leaders - mayors and presidents respectively. In addition to these electoral 
arrangements for local administrations, there are three other sets of elections; two of these are 
for election of national politicians, députés (M.P's) who sit in the Assemblée Nationale and 
sénateurs who are members oî Sénat. The former group comprise 491 members whilst the 
latter group comprise 295 members (35). Confusingly, the electoral cycle is different in both 
cases being 5 years and 9 years respectively and different from the third set of elections, the 
Presidential elections, which are held every seven years. Thus, the French public seem to be 
semi-permanently steeped in election campaigns of one sort or another electing thousands of 
elected members for the various levels of government (see Appendix 3.2 for a diagrammatic 
representation of elections). 
Apart from the frequency of elections in France, an interesting feature of the electoral system 
is the possibility of сити/dei mwutos, (accumulation of public office). Thecumu/ allows 
individuals the right to stand for public office in communes, départements and central 
government As Ashford points out, in 1978,79% of députés and 93% of sénateurs held 
all sorts of offices including those mentioned for the Mayor of Dunkerque: 
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"... in 1974 (he) was also a deputy, president of the Communauté Urbaine , 
president of two public housing societies, of a chain of co-operative stores and 
of the national public housing agency (HLM)"(36) 
Perhaps this particular mayor had accumulated more functions than most, but the system is 
generally used by all political parties. Again in 1978, for example, the Parti Socialiste (PS) 
and the Parti Communiste (PC) together had 83% of their députés with accumulated 
functions and 82% of their sénateurs. Similarly, the Gaullist and Republicans together had 
77% and 75% respectively ^75. 
In addition to the cumul , another interesting feature of the system of elections pre 
decentralisation is that the mayor of a commune is simultaneously the politically elected head 
of the Municipal Council, and, at the same time, agent of the state. This rather ambiguous 
role means that mayon, on the one hand, have to represent the interests of their local electors 
whilst, on the other hand, they are agents of central government answerable for their actions 
to civil servants, the préfet - chief executive officer of the département. This form of 
administrative control of the prefer over the mayor is called la tutelle (power of tutellage). 
This characteristic has already been mentioned in Chapter 2 as forming a part of the 
cross-functioning controls embodied in the system of centre/periphery relations. 
A final point of interest connected with elections and local politicians is the weak role of 
political parties in France. Whilst the PS and PC have a relatively strong organisation at the 
level of the département, all parties are weak at the local level and national party policy is 
seldom adapted to the local level. This means that the mayors have been relatively 
independent of party control. However, more generally, political pames in Fiance have 
tended to show much less zeal in initiating change than political parties in many other West 
European countries. Indeed, it is said that French political parties have tended to reflect 
change rather than direct it (38\ However, this picture did begin to change over the pre 
decentralisation period and particularly before the 1977 local elections. In earlier elections, 
the polarization of the two main Left wing parties, the PS and PC, was evident. For 
example, they failed to draw up united lists for the local election of both 1965 and 1971. 
However, the Union de la Gauche , an electoral pact of the PS, PC and minor Left wing 
parties formed in 1972 proved to be effective for the first time in the 1977 elections, winning 
2/3rds of the large towns (of more than 30 000 population) P'). Whilst the pact continued to 
exist after these elections it was much weaker, and differences between the two main parties 
in it became more serious. 
The pact held until the 1981 presidential elections. Table 3.1 demonstrates the evolution of 
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party control in towns with a population of more than 30 000. It is obvious that both PS 
and PC have had a strong local electoral base over the whole pre decentralisation period and 
that the 1977 elections served to strengthen this considerably. Urban problems, urban 
development and urban plannmg came to the fore in the elections of 1977 in many of these 
towns(40). The problems associated with grands ensembles, insufficient public housing, 
grandiose planning schemes, imposed plans and insufficient communal budgets, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, all contributed to the upsurge in Left support. Underlying many of 
these problems, however, was the shift in population and the lack of successful initiatives to 
modernise the organisation of sub national governments, especially the patchwork of 
communes. 
Table 3.1 The Number of Towns (of more than 30 000 population) with Mayors of Different Political 
Panics during the Pre decentralisation Period 
Election Yeais 
PC 
PS 
Miscellaneous Left 
Radical 
Centrist 
Independent 
RI 
UDR/RPR 
Diverse 
Total 
1959 
25 
41 
17 
6 
12 
15 
8 
24 
10 
158 
1965 
34 
33 
14 
6 
13 
13 
8 
25 
12 
158 
1971 
45 
40 
9 
4 
26 
11 
12 
30 
15 
192 
1977 
72 
83 
8 
2 
9 
13 
15 
15 
3 
220 
Source: Adapted from Schain, M. A. "Conditional support for communist local governments in 
France; alienation & coalition building" in Сету, P. G. & Schain, M. A. (eds) (1985) 
Socialism, the State & Public Policy in France. Francis Pinter, London, ρ 61 
The shift in population has brought with it major problems; first, the spread of conurbations 
engulfed formerly rural communes which were anxious to retain their independence; 
secondly, additional costs for core communes of cities with declining populations which 
provided central functions used by these suburban communes ; and thirdly, rural communes 
which were having difficulty maintaining services for a decreasing population. Whilst the 
pre decentralisation period witnessed a number of schemes to encourage communal 
groupings, these have not been particularly popular ( 4 2 ) . Table 3.2 shows the shift in 
population distribution more clearly: 
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<100 
10O-5ÛO 
500-5 000 
5 000-30 000 
30 000-100 000 
100 000+ 
Total 
Source: Thoe 
433 
15 251 
20 734 
384 
28 
5 
36 835 
nig, J.C. "Local 
3 877 
20130 
12 380 
1124 
160 
37 
37 708 
goverameni 
4 012} 
18 714) 
12 168 
1266) 
190) 
39) 
36 389 
t institutioi 
Table 3.2 Evolution of Communal Population ,1851-1975 
Size categories ofCommunes Number of Communes % of Nauonal Population 
1851 1968 1975 1851 1968 1975 
13.52 10.65 9.33 
67.03 30.47 29.50 
19.45 58.88 61.17 
100 100 100 
Lagroye, J. and Wright, V. Local Govemment in Britain and France. London, Allen & 
Unwin, 1979, ρ 101 
Table 3.3 gives a breakdown of the types of groupings which are possible and some 
description of their functions, administration and numbers. What is evident from the table is 
that the more tightly binding the grouping is on individual communes, that is the district or 
the communauté urbaine, the fewer the number of such groupings. The syndicate 
(SIVOM), for example, is by far the most popular grouping arrangement. In addition to the 
grouping possibilities given in the table there are also provisions for fusion or merger of 
communes. Incentives for this purpose emerged in 1964 (43> but suffered from the lack of 
finance ( 4 4 \ Then, towards the end of the de Gaulle administration, in 1968, the Fouchet Bill 
was prepared. This would have ensured compulsory groupings but it was dropped after the 
troubles in 1968. In 1970 and 1971 the subject re-emerged in extensive legislation ^45) 
which not only introduced better financial arrangements for functions and groupings but 
which, at the same time, released communes from some of the financial controls enforced by 
the préfet (46\ Nevertheless, by the mid seventies when the Guichard Report of 1976 
emerged, it was obvious that the "sentimentality" for communes referred to by Ardagh (47) 
would win through against the proposals for obligatory federations (48\ 
The administration of land use planning has only marginally been affected by communal 
groupings although it will be obvious from the discussion above that there is a need for 
groupings to deal with land use plans and development issues. With the exception of only 
twenty -five planning agencies set up in large towns, nine planning agencies associated with 
new towns and the Paris planning agency (49), land use planning in the pre decentralisation 
period was a function of the state and administered at the level of the département. 
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Table 3.3 Types of Communal Groupings in France, Year of Introduction, Functions, Administrative 
Linkages of the Grouping and Numbers(by numberof groupings, number of communes, and population total) 
Type of 
Grouping 
Intercommunal 
syndicate for one 
purpose (SrVU) 
Intercommunal 
syndicate for 
several purposes 
(SrVOM) 
District 
Шип 
Community 
(CU) 
New Town 
Intercommunal 
Syndicates 
DateEst'd 
in Law 
1890 
1959 
1966 
1966 
1971 
Functions of the 
Grouping 
One Intercommunal 
was electricity or 
water 
Voluntary choice of 
variety of services 
Voluntary choice of 
a number of services 
but must include 
fire and housing 
Possible only in 
urban areas of 
> 50 000 population. 
A variety of joint 
functions is possible 
but planning, 
construction & 
management of 
schools & housing 
are compulsory 
All aspects of 
development of the 
new town 
Administrative Linkages 
of the Grouping 
Joint Meeting to discuss the 
service - no administrative 
organisation in common 
Joint meetings to discuss 
services in common but no 
administrative organisation 
in common 
Communes have to form a 
joint administration and 
joint financial arrangements 
for the joint services 
This is by far the tightest 
form of grouping requiring 
a joint council (nominated), 
joint permanent 
administration and joint 
finance 
Only covers those parts of 
the commune located in the 
new town - administrative 
organisation similar to the 
District 
Numbers 
(1978 Figs) 
n/a 
Ceased to exist 
after 1959 
1859 groupings 
18 016 communes 
21 031 370 
population 
155 groupings 
1319 communes 
5 641316 
population 
9 groupings** 
252 communes 
4 149 843 
population 
8*** 
Evry; Cergy 
Pontoise; Rives 
de L'Etang de 
Bene; Lisle -d'Abeau; 
Villeneuve D'Ascq; 
SL Quentin en 
Yvelines; Marne 
La Vallée 
New Town 1971 
Ensemble Urbaine 
All aspects of 
development of the 
new town 
Parts of commune cede 
land to the new town to 
forni the commune 
1 - (Le Vaudreuil) 
* Source: Receuil ¡fl/iformations Statistiques sur IVrbanisme (1978), DUP, Ministère de 
L'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie, pp 14/15 
** Four of these were compulsory 
*** Over the 1970,s one of these, Villeneuve D'Ascq, merged communes 
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Figure 3.1 outlines planning administration in France as a whole before Mitterand. Of the 
agencies shown in Figure 3.1 the most important for the administration of land use planning 
and land use plans are the 96 Directions Départementales de l'Equipement (DDEs) located in 
each département. 
Figure 3.1 The Adninistraion of Planning ш France in the Pre Decentralisation Period 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
REGIONAL LEVEL 
DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL 
MECV 
(Ministire de ГЕп ютетеп t 
et duCadredeVU) 
SRE 
(Service Rigumde dt 
[Equipment: m 22 
regions) 
DDE 
(Direction Dépanmentak de 
tEqiupmenl: ш 9<Dép<rtemaas) 
LA DATAR 
(DiUgation àtAmimgemenldu 
Temtoire tt à l'Action Régionale ) 
OREAM 
(Organisation Ré$ionaU ¿Etudes 
de l'Aire Métropolitaine : 
in 8 provincial cities) 
COMMUNAL LEVEL 
(grouped communes) 
I 
Agence dUrbamsme 
(in 25 towns 
assoaaied wuh 
communal groupings) 
I 
Etabussement 
РиЫіс ([Aménagement 
(in 9 new towns) 
APUR 
AtelierParisienne 
dUrbamsne 
(aty and département 
of Paris planning 
agency)* 
* Paris is the only city which is a commune and département at the same time 
Source: Wilson, I.B. (1983) "The preparation of local plans in France". Town Planning Review. 
Vol . 54, No.2 ,p . l57 
The role of the DDE is to prepare the SDAU and the POS jointly with those communes 
which are not direcdy serviced by their own planning agency, such as an agence d'urbamsme 
(planning agency) or an établissement public d'aménagement (public development 
authority). However, even in the few cases where such an agency exists, the DDE still has 
the very important co-ordinating and supervisory role in plan preparation (50\ Although the 
DDE is located at the level of the département, it is not responsible to the General Council of 
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the département. Rather, it operates as a decentralised "field sendee" of the Ministry of 
Environment (MECV) and is responsible to the préfet and, ultimately, to the Minister of 
Environment 
Of the other agencies shown in Figure 3.1, the Service Régional de l'Equipement (SRE) and 
MECV effectively assist and guide the work of DDEs. The DATAR and OREAM have 
already been mentioned in Chapter 1. Whilst these agencies continued to exist over the pre 
decentralisation period, their role as plan-makers declined over the seventies and, in any 
event, the plans they prepared were only advisory. 
The administrative structure of land use planning as represented, in particular, by the DDEs 
was referred to in Chapter 1 as a development of the de Gaulle period. Indeed, the DDEs, 
like DATAR and CGP, represent the strong administrative lead in modernisation and the 
associated emphasis of technocratisme (the giving of considerable discretion to a meritocratic 
group of professionals). The DDEs were established in 1966, one year before the LOF, 
when the Ministries of Construction and of Public Works were joined to form the very 
powerful Ministère de l'Equipement <51>. Like DATAR and the CGP, the DDEs were staffed 
by fonctionnaires (civil servants) from the powerful grands corps of the Ecole 
Polytechnique and the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées. The role of the grands corps is 
particularly noteworthy. These are traditional corporate bodies with a privileged role in the 
recruitment and promotions within the French civil service. The civil servants in land use 
planning are members of these corps and thus cany on the tradition of educated élites in the 
administration, explaining part of the continuity of meritocracy from Monnet onwards 
(discussed in Chapter 1). These civil servants also demonstrate the strong emphasis on road 
engineering as opposed to land use planning in DDEs. This issue will be elaborated below 
in the consideration of the sociology of the actors in land use planning and plan-making in 
particular. Whilst changes were made in the administration or Ministry level after de Gaulle, 
notably the expansion in 1976 with the creation of the Ministère de l'Environnement et du 
Cadre de Vie, the DDEs retained their names and functions till the post decentralisation 
period. 
Within the DDE itself, the work and organisation reflects the functions of the two Ministries 
as they were joined in 1966 and the addition of the land use planning function that was 
added. The activities which are the responsibility of the DDE are consequently many and 
comprise plan-making (SDAU and POS), development control (processing of certificat 
d'urbanisme and permis de construire), 7AC, compulsory purchase of land, transport 
planning and road construction, public housing construction, provision of public utilities and 
construction of public buildings. The common administrative organisation of the DDE is 
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shown in Figure 3.2 . 
Fig. 3.2 Traditional Subdivisions of the DDE 
DDE 
GAC UOC INFRA GEP 
Groupe d'Admmistratwn Urbanisme Infrastructure Group dTtudes 
Central Opératwnelle (roads, drainage, et Programmanon 
el Construction sewerage, water) (plan making group) 
(implementation, 
construction and 
development 
control) 
Source: Wilson, LB. Local plan preparation in France, Town Planning Review. Vol, 54, Bo. 2, p. 161 
As can be seen from Fig 3.2, the most important group for plan-making is the GEP. The 
role of the GEP and the actors in plan-making who form part of the GEP will be considered 
in the next Chapter. 
A number of substantive issues have emerged in the description of local administration in the 
pre decentralisation period. It is incontrovertible that, in terms of creating an administrative 
structure for land use planning and plan-making, the de Gaulle years must take the credit (or 
maybe the blame). Nevertheless, an older and perhaps a less creditable feature of local 
administration is the anachronistic mosaic of communes - with its consequences for service 
delivery, economic efficiency and land use planning issue. This would seem to suggest the 
inviolability of the commune resulting from its political strength. In this connection, the 
possibility of the cumul produces not only what Kesselman (52) describes as 
over-institutionalisation, but also what Ashford describes <53) as greater leverage of local 
politicians over national politicians. Qearly the interplay of local and national is popular and 
necessary amongst French politicians. This is why successive governments have not dared 
tamper with the communal structure. Of course, in another sense, it is an ambiguous 
situation; roles of politicians can be numerous and responsibilities are thus numerous but this 
does not mean to say that the interests of the locality are the same as those of the centre or 
vice versa. Ambiguity is compounded in that the mayor is not only a local politician but is 
an agent of the state. Turning to the civil servants of the GEP, the main actors in 
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plan-making, a similar set of overlaps or national/local interplay is evident On the one hand, 
they are joint partners with the mayors in plan-preparation having both administrative and 
technical responsibilities; on the other hand, they are agents of a Central Government 
Ministry, MECV, answerable to their own Minister directly and answerable, through the 
préfet to another Minister, the Minister of Interior. Generally then, there are lines of 
accountability but to whom these are addressed at any point in time is not clear. These 
characteristics identified above would seem to provide justification for the claim in Chapter 2 
that administrative characteristics of French land use planning are milieu specific to France. 
Who are the Planners? Who are the Politicians? 
Before turning to look in more detail at the relationships between the above actors in the 
plan-making process in Chapter 4, some sociological background information is given here 
which will provide further understanding of the planning process. In a sense, what is 
considered below are the questions - who are the planners? Who are the politicians? 
The answer to the first question to a great extent is provided by the results of a study carried 
out in 1980 by the Société Française des Urbanistes (SFU), French Society of Planners, and 
reported in a number of sources (54) (55) in 1982. Perhaps the most interesting general 
characteristics of the French planner is the title "planner" itself; " Le titre urbaniste n'est pas 
protégé-tous le monde peut donc s'intituler urbaniste" (The title "planner" is not protected -
so everyone can call themselves a "planner") (56\ 
This means that neither the planner nor the planning profession is recognised by the state 
and given a State Charter. It also means that the SFU is basically an association and not a 
professional Institute. 'Urbaniste d'Etat', state planner, by contrast, is a recognised title, 
instituted by statute in 1962 by de Gaulle and comparable to the grands corps. However, 
in 1981 there were only 98 "urbanistes d'état" in the French administration (57\ Perhaps 
one of the reasons for the small number of officially recognised planners is that entry is by 
competition, is only open to architects and requires an extremely lengthy period of academic 
and practical examinations. By and large, architects have been able to make a living easily 
without the additional investment of time and energy that this examination requires ^8 \ 
According to the survey, 3 000 "urbanistes", planners, worked in France in 1980. Their 
educational background is given in Table 3.4 below: 
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Table 3.4 Educational Background of "Urbanistes" in 1980 
% 
Architects 41 
Engineers 14 
Geographers 14 
Economists 10 
Social and Political Scientists 10 
Pure planners 6 
Surveyors 3 
Others 2 
Source: SFU Study 1980 reported in references (54) (55). 
The table shows the dominance of architects, most of whom work in private practice and 
other private agencies and most of whom are only engaged in planning on a part-time 
basis <59>. 
Employment of planners is elaborated in Table 3.5 : 
Table 3.S Employment of " Urbanistes " in 1980 
% 
Contracted to State 31 
Private Practice 21 
Other private agencies 18 
Municipalities 13 
Semi public agencies 7 
Civil Servants 7 
Civil servants in Municipalities 3 
Source: SFU Study 1980 reported in references (54) (55). 
The above table can be supplemented by Table 3.6 below for a clear picture of employment 
in D D E s : 
Table 3.6 Numbers of Civil Servants and contracted staff 1977and 1981 in GEP and UOC Sections 
G E P U O C 
Civil Contracted Civil Contracted 
Servants Staff Servants Staff 
1977 411 1054 705 3 339 
1981 352 954 527 2 819 
Source: Receuil d'Informations Statistiques sur IVrbanisme. 1978, DUP, Ministère de l'Environnement et 
du Cadre de Vie. 1977pp 28129; and 1982 pp 34135 
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What is of interest from the two previous tables is the small number of plannen who work 
for the public sector and for the GEP in particular. The UOC section of the DDE in Table 
3.6 has been included because these civil servants and contracted staff are concerned with 
land management and some are consulted on plan preparation. However, these people 
would not call themselves "urbaniste". The table also shows the small size of the GEP staff, 
compared to UOC staff within the DDE structure, also the declining numbers of staff in both 
DDE sections between 1977-1981. Other findings from the SFU study indicate that the 
planning profession in France is 85% masculine and youthful. In respect of the latter 
characteristic, two thirds of the 3 000 planners are less than 40 years old and three quarters 
of the total have worked for less than 10 years. A final observation on the SFU study and a 
very important one is the use that was made of the study. This was the plea to government 
for the need to recognise the profession and, as a first step towards this, to form a "bureau 
de qualification" (a qualification bureau). Unfortunately this plea was turned down in 1981. 
A further aspect of importance in the employment of public sector planners in DDEs (not 
discussed in the SFU survey) is the distinction made in Table 3.6 between civil servant 
planners (fonctionnaires) and contracted planners (contractuels). The former group, the 
management group of GEP, have little formal planning education. Essentially they are 
trained as engineers in the system of grandes écoles , notably Polytechnique/Ponts et 
Chaussées, or sometimes less well known schools (60\ Although some of the grandes 
écoles began to introduce courses in planning over the seventies (61\ the content of these 
courses was limited and optional (62\ A final difference between the two types of planner in 
the DDEs is that the fonctionnaires have employment for life, security of tenure, whereas the 
contracted staff are employed on term contracts. Associated with this difference are the 
salary differentials. The fonctionnaires are provided with honoraria in addition to their 
salaries, the contracted staffare not(63). 
To answer the second question, who are the politicians? - is a much more difficult task. We 
know that there are large numbers of politicians in France and that many of them have 
duplicated but few studies have looked at the lower administrative levels as distinct from the 
upper levels. In particular, Marceau ^64' points out that studies of mayors, municipal 
councillors and general councillors of the département are rare. 
At the national level, the social characteristics of Government Ministers over the Fifth 
Republic up to 1981 remained constant but are different from those of the Third and Fourth 
Republics. Table 3.7 below gives an indication of the previous occupation of Government 
Ministers over the three Republics. 
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Republic 
28.5 
14.0 
0.9 
2.6 
0.8 
3.0 
8.3 
29.9 
1.7 
. 
11.3 
Fifth Republic 
50.0 
9.3 
13.6 
2.6 
0.8 
0.8 
7.7 
23.5 
. 
0.8 
0.9 
Table 3.7 Percentage Government Ministers by Occupation in the Three Republics, 1870-1980 
Third Republic 
Occupations 
Civil Servants 29.0 
Industrialists 5.0 
Higher Management 
Shopkeepen/Artisans 1.0 
Farm Owners 2.0 
В lue Collar Workers 
Journalists/Writers 7.0 
Liberal Professions 41.0 
Officers 14.0 
No Profession 
Others 1.0 
Source: Adapted from Bimbaum, P., see references (65) and (66), ρ 131 
What is evident from the table is the substantial increase of civil servants and higher 
management over the period and the decrease in liberal professions. Moreover, the 
Bimbaum study shows that the bulk of the increase of civil servants was of "higher" civil 
servants. By contrast, access to Ministerial posts for those of lower socio-economic 
background has been continuously limited over all three Republics. 
Also at national level over the period 1958-1981, most of the members of ministerial cabinets 
had been top civil servants - in fact, between 87-91% ( 6 7 \ A study carried out by the Centre 
d'Etude de la Vie Politique Française Contemporaine ( 68 ) and reported by Marceau, gives us 
a picture of the socio-economic background of députés in 1969-1970. More than fifty per 
cent of députés came from a family with fathers who had been politically active and 20% had 
another near relative in politics. As to their own occupational background, 79% of them 
were, as she describes, from "the well-off sections of the population", with the percentages 
of their former occupations quoted as follows: 
% 
Industrialists 11 
Civil Servants and Higher Management 21 
Liberal Professions 28 
Shopkeepers 5 
White collar /Technicians 5 
Primary School Teachers, Artisans.Middle Management 9 
Total (referred to above) 79 
This picture is summed up by Marceau as suggesting a narrowing of the socio-professional 
basis for recruitment to the Assemblée Nationale (69\ 
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A further study of the Sénat reported by Marceau and carried out by F. le Reclus in 1969, 
quotes the socio-professional origins of senators, as shown in Table 3.8 : 
Table 3.8 Sodo-Professional Background of Senators, 1969 
% 
Liberal Professions (11% lawyers) 27 
Farmers/Commercial Professions 16 
Management (including Civil Servants) 13 
Teachers (4% university) 9 
White Collar Workeis/Middle Grades 8 
Woricere 3 
Source: Marceau, J. ref. (64), ρ 65. 
Since the Sénat is dominated by the mayors of small communes, mostly in rural areas, it is 
not surprising to see the large number of farmers in the above figures. Similarly, as with the 
Assemblée Nationale, the access of manual workers to power in France over the pre 
decentralisation period was extremely limited. An interesting implication of the socio 
professional background of politicians is that the higher the socio professional category, the 
more likelihood of education through the system of grandes écoles . Given the strong 
attachment to this system and its continuing influence after graduation, then a close social 
network based on these ties can operate in such a system. 
Another review by Birnbaum of political élites over part of the Fifth Republic gives us some 
indication of the social origins of mayors. In reference to a study by Aubert V0\ Bimbaum 
provides Table 3.9. The table indicates that, in the small communes of less than 30 000 
population, the predominant professions of mayors were fanners, retired persons and 
tradesmen/artisans. These findings relate closely to those of Sénat composition discussed 
above, but differ from the socio professional background of other national politicians. By 
contrast, in communes of greater than 30 000 population, there is a small percentage of 
mayors from the agricultural sector (1.5), from artisans/small traders (2.0) and from retired 
persons (2.5). In these communes it can be noted that the professional composition is 
much more similar to that of national politicians, with a much higher percentage of 
industrialists, professionals, intellectuals, civil servants and upper management from the 
private sector. One way in which both large and small communes are similar to the national 
political bodies is the small number of lower socio-professional categories, although the 
group form a sizeable percentage in the bigger communes. 
66 
This review of the social characteristics of French politicians has been brief and limited to 
their socio professional background. Nevertheless, from this limited information it is clear 
that there are differences between the political leaders of small and large communes and 
these differences are reflected at national level in the composition of the Sénat and 
Assemblée Nationale. 
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Planning agencies m large towns (connected with communal gmtipmgsì 
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Metz 
Dunkerque 
Maubeuge 
Saint Orner 
Strasbourg 
Lyons 
Rouen 
Le Havre 
Belfort 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE PREPARATION OF THE POS 
Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on the POS and, more specifically, is concerned with the process 
of POS preparation. Jhe findings reported here are based on empirical work which was 
carried out at the end of the pre decentralisation period in 1981 at the Ministry of 
Environment and in the DDE's of Bouches du Rhône, Loire, Essonne and Pas de Calais. 
Two distinct yet inter-related aspects of the POS preparation process are considered here. 
First, the procedures of plan preparation are described. These details of planning practice 
complement the legal background of plan preparation presented in the previous chapter. 
Secondly, the substantive concerns of the process are considered by analysing the formal and 
informal contacts and exchanges of the actors in plan preparation. Whilst this analysis 
provides insight into the technical or professional inputs and concerns, an equally relevant 
insight is provided of the separate and mutual roles and relationships of the actors. This 
latter part of the analysis complements the sociological information on mayors and planners 
reviewed in the last chapter and, at the same time, it completes the review of the 
characteristics specific to the French planning process which were discussed in Chapter 2. 
In a final section of the chapter, POS preparation progress over the pre decentralisation 
period is reviewed. This review, along with the above analysis, will form the basis of the 
next chapter which will deal with evaluation of the POS itself and the process by which it is 
prepared. 
Procedures of POS Preparation 
The formal administrative process of POS preparation can be displayed as a number of stages 
which are shown in Figure 4.1. The figure highlights the appropriate sections of the Code 
d'Urbanisme О. The stages of plan preparation as shown in this figure are also used for 
revision of a POS which has already been approved. However it is worth mentioning that in 
cases where the revisions to an approved POS are very minor and where these do not involve 
classified woodlands, a slightly shortened version of the procedure is possible (see 
Appendix 4.1). 
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Central to the procedure of plan preparation as identified in Figure 4 .1 , is the composition 
and work of the groupe de travail (working group) which is identified in cells 2 , 3 , S and 9. 
It is this group, comprising central government officers and local notables (2* which 
determines the content of the plan. Figure 4.2 below sets out the participation at groupe de 
travail. 
Figure 4..2 Participation at GmçtdeTrwiàH 
Mayor (Quiipenoo) 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Chamber of 
Agriculnue 
I 
Préjtí 
sous-Prifet DDE 
GEP UOC INFRA Sector 
Engineer 
* 'field service' of the Ministry of Agriculture 
— may attend if they wish 
Source: Wilson, LB. local Plan preparation in Fiance, "Town Planning Review". Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 163 
As Figure 4.2 would imply, the mayor is always present at the groupe de travail and, in 
general, he is accompanied by several members of the Municipal Council even in small 
communes. The Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture send one or two representatives 
each but by far the biggest representation comes from the state services, who always 
outnumber all other participants put together 0 \ The D D E is represented by a number of 
people; from the GEP section there is always a fonctionnaire planner, a chargé d'études (a 
contracted planner, section head) and a contracted planner, both U O C and INFRA sections 
each send at least one engineer who is usually л fonctionnaire and finally, there is a sector 
engineer. The latter is a DDE employee who works in a decentralised office in the locality. 
The other state service, the DD A (Direction Départementale de l'Agriculture) sends one or 
two staff. From time to time the préfet or a sous-préfet may attend the meetings but their 
presence tends to be more of a courtesy call to the mayor and an opportunity to demonstrate 
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Figure 4.1 Stages in the Preparation of POS or of Rreview (revision) of a POS Already Approved 
1 Prescription of the POS^, ^ 
(а) ЪуаШ of ргфз 0>) by oreé of préfet (c) by acts concerning PUD 
for a communal grouping іе іяоп 
(R 123-l-3e) (R 123-l^e) (R124-1) 
2 Préfet creates xhcgroupe de travail (R 123-4) 
3 Series of groupe de travail meetings 
4 Draft POS sent out for consultation to other State "field services" 
(2 month umescale) (R123-5) 
S Pnft transmits responses of consultations to 
groupe de trama (R123-5) 
6 Final draft POS sent to Municipal Council(s) 
(3 month Umescale) (R 123-6) 
7a POS published by 
m* ofprtfet (kl23-7) 
POS takes effect 7b POS published by 
Minister after call-in 
8 Enquête publique 
(R123-8) 
9 POS sent back to groupe de trovad to consider recommendations •Ui)
objections (R 123-9) 
10 POS sent to Municipal Council(s) 
(3 months umescale) (R 123-9) 
11 a Approval of Council(s) 
12a Approval by 
(123-10) 
1 lb Opposition of Council(s) 
12b Inter-tmmstmal 
approval if less thar 
50,000 populauon 
(R123-10) 
12c Approval by decree of 
Conseil d'Etat if more 
than 30,000 people 
(R 123-10) 
POS takes effect 
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that they are continuing to keep an interest in what is happening in the département. Thus, 
groupe de travail meetings involve participation of large numbers of officials. However, 
the significance of official participation lies not in their sheer weight of numbers but in certain 
other characteristics. Most important of these are the differences in status between different 
officials. As will be discussed below, these status differentials have an important bearing on 
both the proceedings of the groupe de travail and the subject matter discussed at its 
meetings. 
The mayor is always present at the groupe de travail and, in general, he is accompanied by 
several members of the Municipal Council even in small communes . The Chambers of 
Commerce and Agriculture send one or two representatives each but by far the biggest 
representation comes from the state services who always outnumber all other participants put 
together (3). The DDE is represented by a number of people; from the GEP section there is 
always a fonctionnaire planner, a chargé d'études (a contracted planner, section head) and a 
contracted planner, both UOC and INFRA sections each send at least one engineer who is 
usually л fonctionnaire and finally, there is a sector engineer. The latter is a DDE employee 
who works in a decentralised office in the locality. The other state service, the DDA 
(Direction Départementale de l'Agriculture) sends one or two staff. From time to time the 
préfet or a sous-préfet may attend the meetings but their presence tends to be more of a 
courtesy call to the mayor and an opportunity to demonstrate that they are continuing to keep 
an interest in what is happening in the département. Thus, groupe de travail meetings 
involve participation of large numbers of officials. However, the significance of official 
participation lies not in their sheer weight of numbers but in certain other characteristics. 
Most important of these are the differences in status between different officials. As will be 
discussed below, these status differentials have an important bearing on both the content of 
the groupe de travail and the subject matter discussed at them. 
The activities of the groupe de travail as shown in Figure 4.1 have no prescribed timescales. 
However, as can be seen from the Figure, the consultation stages shown in cells 4,6 and 10, 
have prescribed timescales as indicated. An allowance of three months for consultation with 
the Municipal Council(s) may seem a long time but it should be remembered that these often 
meet infrequently, especially in smaller communes. More generally, a full review of plan 
preparation progress and timescales will be given later in the chapter but it is worth giving a 
first indication at this stage. By way of example, the average time from the start of POS to 
approval of it, was about 6 years in three of the four départements studied by the author (in 
the fourth département figures were not available). Table 4.1 gives the duration in the 
three départements. 
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6 years 
Syeais 
6 years 
3 months 
8 months 
8 months 
Table 4.1 Average Time Between Start of POS and Approval of POS in Three Départements, 1970-1981 
Département No. of No. of ЮЗ Average time between start of 
Communes approved POS and approval of TOS 
Bouches du Rhone 119 14 (at 01.01.81) 
Loire 327 72 (at 01.02.81) 
Pas de Calais 909 25 (at 31.12.81) 
Source: Départements of Bouches du Rhône, Loire, Pas de Calais - periodic returns for the Receuil 
dlrtfnrmnrìons Statisngues sur І тЬаяшпг.. Ministère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de vie. 
Of the stages of POS preparation, the publication stage is important Once the final draft plan 
is "published" it is used as the basis for development control (i.e. decisions relative to 
applications for planning and building permission, certificat d'urbanisme and permis de 
construire respectively). Approval of the plan from this stage, on average, takes about nine 
months. However, given that "publication" is before consultations, it is quite possible that 
the final plan can be refused by the Municipal Council In these circumstances, use of the 
published plan as an interim plan could be a lengthy affair. 
The enquête publique stage of plan preparation is also of interest. Whilst the literal 
translation of this stage means "public inquiry", the procedure is not an oral quasi-judicial 
procedure as the English term would suggest to planners. Rather, the procedure is one of 
consultation of the public through displaying the final draft plan in a public place in the plan 
area <4). A commùsaire enquêteur (inquiry commissioner) is appointed by the DDE to be 
present during the display period. His role is to receive written objections or observations 
from members of the public. Generally he is in attendance for the last few days of the 
enquête period which is at least IS days. After the enquête, he summarises the comments 
and observations of the public and prepares a report for the DDE. 
One important administrative action which can be taken although not shown in Figure 4.1 is 
sursis à statuer (sisting of pending development applications i.e. holding these back from 
consideration until the provisions to be put in the plan are clear). This procedure can take 
place at the start of POS preparation and would apply to projects likely to compromise the 
content of the plan. It applies for a period of two years. 
Throughout the preparation of the POS, there is strict adherence to administrative 
procedures. In an effort to ensure this, the Ministry of Equipment prepared a number of 
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guidance manuals during the early seventies (5). These manuals contained detailed and 
precise instructions for each of the plan preparation stages and included, for example, 
prototype letters, orders, etc. to ensure conformity throughout France. Similarly, planning 
agencies for grouped communes often prepared their own simplified versions of guidance 
material in respect of administrative procedures (6). Thus, a large documentation 
mushroomed on this subject in the early to mid seventies. In addition, the planners of DDE's 
and planning agencies also produced a lot of material on POS over this same period. This 
took the form of brochures and booklets to guide mayors. Some examples are given in 
Appendix 4.2. These are particularly interesting documents because they serve to 
demonstrate the very big initiative taken by DDE's and agences d'urbanisme in an effort to 
promote understanding of the POS. 
In summary of the formal, procedural stages of POS preparation, groupe de travail is 
considered as the fulcrum of this activity. Their meetings, most importantly, are the only 
occasions in local administration in France where representatives of the state and local 
politicians sit down together in the same room to prepare a joint product Moreover, it is one 
of the very few areas where a researcher could observe the nature of relationships between 
state and locality. Fortunately, the author was allowed to attend groupe de travail meetings 
as an observer in each of the four départements studied. Yet these meetings are not open to 
the public and it is exceptional even for interest groups to be allowed to attend. 
Practice of POS Preparation 
Evidence on how the POS is prepared in the DDE and at groupe de travail is presented here 
and is based on observations made at groupe de travail, interviews with officials and 
mayors, and general observations of office conduct and planning practice made whilst 
conducting this research from a base in DDE's. 
Although the organisational structure of two of the four DDE's in this study was different 
from the classic structure shown in the last chapter V\ responsibility for POS preparation 
within each was the same. Essentially a POS was prepared on the basis of technical input 
prepared and co-ordinated by one contractual planner who was responsible for a number of 
POS. This planner was directly responsible to a chargé d'études (section head) who was 
also a contracted planner and he/she, in tum, was responsible to ufoncnonnaire planner who 
was part of the senior management All of the contracted staff preparing POS were carrying 
extremely heavy workloads and many were responsible for over twenty POS. Generally 
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speaking, the staff establishments of all DDE's were extremely small in relation to the 
workloads and in relation to the number of communes to be served W· 
It is furthermore interesting that, in the four départements studied, a total of 365 POS had 
been started by 1981, but in only two cases (Fos and Aries in Bouches du Rhône) were the 
plans being prepared for only parts of communes. Moreover, communal groupings did not 
play a considerable role. Indeed, whilst extensive communal groupings for various 
purposes existed in Pas de Calais, these limited themselves to joint discussions of POS 
relative to plan regulations. Thus, each of the communes in such a grouping had its own 
POS incorporating the jointly agreed regulations. 
Aerial photography was extensively used evident in survey work for the plans in all 
départements and planners complained of the lack of time for extensive field survey and site 
visits. In fact, their working day seemed to be dominated by meetings, especially meetings 
with other sections of the DDE in respect of infrastructure provision between communes. 
In particular, roads and drainage were of prime concern. With the exception of these two 
services no mention was madeof other strategic considerations; such as considerations which 
were derived from SDAU and considerations which dealt with inter-relationship of people or 
activities between communes . Indeed, when questioned on the role and importance of 
SDAU in POS preparation, little interest or concern was expressed and even the issue of 
conformity did not seem to be an important matter. In general, the attitude of planners to 
SDAU was that they were unimportant and in the many situations where an approved SDAU 
did not exist, the attitude (specifically mentioned on several occasions) was that one had to 
plan "using one's nose". Of the four départements studied in 1981, the situation of SDAU 
was as follows: 
Bouches du Rhône 
Loire 
Essonne 
Pas de Calais 
Even in Pas de Calais where a big initiative to prepare SDAU had taken place, a distinct 
scepticism about their value to POS preparation prevailed. In addition to making the survey 
and analysis of existing conditions, both of which were heavily physical in content and 
elementary in terms of analytic technique, the planners of the GEP liaised with UOC 
engineers to decide on POS regulations connected with zoning, building regulations and 
COS (coefficient d'occupation des sols - plot ratios). It was difficult to determine the extent 
to which these matters were generated by the GEP, UOC or groupe de travail and most 
SDAU approved 
0 
1 
1 
7 
SDAU started 
12 
3 
18 
8 
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people interviewed claimed to be the originator. It is the author's view that the GEP and 
UOC jointly worked on these and that from discussion at groupe de travail, modifications 
were incorporated. These regulations form an essential ingredient of planning jargon and are 
predominant in groupe de travail discussion. Essentially they are prepared on the following 
basis: first, the commune is divided into two main zone types namely U zones (Urban 
zones) and N zones (Natural zones -undeveloped areas); within each of these two categories 
a number of sub categories are prepared, for example, UA, UB, UC ... UX or NA, NA ... 
NX. The number of sub-categories is variable and depends on the nature of a communal 
area. Thus, in communes which are largely urbanised, the number of U zones is large and 
the types of U zones within the typology relate to the physical and functional diversity found 
in the area. Finally, within each sub-category there are a number of regulations. The 
standard number is IS. These are described in Table 4.2. 
4.2 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Dispositions Applicable in the Zones* of TOS 
(•zone here refers ю subdivisions of U and N, e.g. Ua, Na etc) 
Authorised land use in the zone 
Land uses notpermioed in the zone 
Access and roads 
Water and drainage 
Residential use of land 
Development beside roads and public places 
Setbacks of buildings 
Construction on already developed land 
Development within the curtilage of existing buildings 
Height of buildings 
External appearance and protection of perspective 
Parking 
Open space and landscaping 
Maximum allowable COS 
Deviations from the maximum allowable COS 
The text detailing the above dispositions is called the règlement. This document, together 
with the sanitary annex (dealing with water and drainage) and the rapport de présentation 
(presentation report) forms the written documentation of the plan. The latter document is 
divided into two parts, namely analysis of existing conditions and a description of the POS 
zones and sub zones. With the exception of Essonne, standardised règlements were not 
found. Thus, variations of POS regulations were prepared for individual communes. The 
plans contained in the POS comprised servitudes (infrastructure details) (1:3000 scale) and 
the land use plan (at 1:5000 and 1:2000) 
Whilst contracted planners were primarily involved in the tasks described above (i.e. survey 
and negotiations with the UOC section ), the role of the chargé d'études was to prepare 
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plans and, in addition, to liaise with fonctionnaire planners who were responsible for 
management of the GEP and liaison with mayors. The main preoccupation of the 
fonctionnaire was administration of the process. Thus, the organisation of POS preparation 
in DDE's was through hierarchical management structures (even, as in the case of Pas de 
Calais, if area or sector teams existed in the GEP). Clear lines of accountability and 
responsibility existed. Perhaps the most noticeable feature of the organisational 
arrangements was that plan preparation was regarded as an individual rather than team 
activity. Indeed, most planners worked alone in anonymous offices which physically and 
organisationally gave a feeling of isolation. Many planners, in fact, commented that they felt 
isolated. Contacts with mayors were made by both fonctionnaire planners and contracted 
planners, but the formality of these contacts probably differed. Fonctionnaires tended to 
see mayors at the DDE. Whether their meetings were formal or informal is not known; in 
discussion with both it would seem that plan details were discussed at these meetings. 
Contracted planners, on the other hand, seemed to have developed their own mechanisms 
and access to politicians outside of the office environment in the communes . From what 
was said by contracted planners, in these circumstances meetings were informal and often 
not reported as having taken place. 
Turning to the groupe de travail it would not be unreasonable to assume that the work 
prepared by planners, and described above, would be presented at groupe de travail. In 
other words, we might expect a pattern of work output with stages identified to correspond 
to meetings of the groupe de travail . Whilst much of the planning work may eventually 
have been discussed to a greater or lesser extent at groupe de travail the pattern of work 
outputs was not found to be specifically geared to these meetings. In fact, little evidence of 
prior preparation, for example by way of handouts or summaries of plans, was found and 
little prior discussion of these meetings seemed to take place in the GEP. 
Meetings of the groupe de travail were infrequent, not related to the stages of plan 
preparation and, generally, several months elapsed between meetings. Observed conduct at 
these meetings demonstrated that the overall purpose of the meetings, to produce a plan, was 
clear enough, but motivations, expectations, knowledge of planning and the power base 
between participants was variable. Detailed observations of the meetings will now be 
discussed and will focus on the contributions of each participant and on his/her relationships 
with the other participants. 
The mayor, as chairperson, takes the lead at meetings and the other politicians tend to play a 
relatively passive role in the process and are only likely to intervene in discussion under 
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unusual circumstances. Without exception, mayors conducted meetings in the absence of 
formal agendas and this wasted considerable time in procedural discussion. By and large, 
such discussions were usually proceeded by the mayor focusing on details of zoning or 
associated regulations (règlements). Mayors did not introduce or seem willing to discuss 
the non-physical elements of plan-making; in other words, the social and economic factors 
which are likely to affect the land use pattern. 
Moreover, given the attachment to their own localities, mayors were unwilling to recognise 
that their problems may be the same as those in neighbouring communes or that certain types 
of land use may generate problems for adjacent communes ; consequently, an almost 
isolationist and narrow focus seemed to be the typical pattern of discussion. A further point 
is that the main substantive issues at meetings related to growth of the commune. In 
particular, these issues included future residential development and the provision of public 
facilities. In this, there is a sense of promotional motivation. In terms of public facilities, for 
example, mayors would unashamedly pursue at length discussion of projects such as 
swimming pools or sports stadiums, which presumably would prove popular with the 
electorate. In respect of residential development, it is often the case that mayors, even 
Socialist and Communist mayors, are property owners. While it is not suggested that 
mayors publicly pursue their own personal interest at groupe de travail, it is not uncommon 
for these interests to be discussed at pre-meetings with DDE officials as a more informal 
aspect of the process. Such discussions were, in fact, witnessed immediately before 
meetings. As well as the mayors, there are other politicians who will defend their own 
individual property interests. This is particularly noticeable since these politicians rarely 
contribute much else to the discussion. It was also observed that even mayors who were not 
wholeheartedly committed to the idea of a plan recognise that the plan will determine 
regulations for development within their commune. In this respect, they see the POS as a 
way of removing away from themselves the onus of refusal of development applications. If, 
for example, subsequent decisions are unpopular with the electorate then the mayor can 
blame the DDE's intervention in the process. Finally, the mayor will often use the phrase 
"l'Etat doit prendre sa responsibilité" (the State must take its responsibility) in reference to 
expenditure on public facilities. Such references would usually precede the close of the 
meeting, which would correspond with the customary aperitif (either in the mairie (town 
hall) or local cafe). During this informal gathering, discussion centres on the more delicate 
issue implied by the above phrase, namely, the extent to which civil servants will be prepared 
to help promote finance for the development of public facilities. 
The contributions of DDE officials at groupe de travail can be sub-divided into those from 
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the contracted staff of the GEP and those from the fonctionnaires of the GEP, UOC and 
INFRA sections of the DDE. 
The contracted planner responsible for the plan made little contribution to groupe de travail 
and would only intervene if specifically asked for information. Generally speaking, such 
information related to a point of difference in discussion between the mayor and the 
fonctionnaire of the GEP. These differences often related to the most trivial information such 
as a field boundary - where the mayor said it was formed by a fence and the civil servant said 
it was formed by a hedge. The results of interviews with these planners indicated their 
agreement that the technical content of their work discussion at the groupe de travail was 
extremely limited, if not superficial. Given that most of these contracted planners have 
either a formal planning education or planning experience, they are familiar with the wider 
concerns that their work should include. However, their inputs to meetings were controlled 
by the senior civil servants whose concerns are very different. Many contracted staff said 
during interviews that their informal links with mayors were initiated in an effort to discuss 
with mayors the wider concerns that the plan should be attempting to address. 
The fonctionnaires of the GEP tend to view the plan-making process in a much less technical 
way than their junior contracted colleagues and are more inclined to be concerned with the 
administrative procedures laid down, whilst at the same time they display their knowledge of 
regulations jargon. This is hardly surprising since it is their responsibility to ensure that 
there are no administrative blunders in plan preparation. On the other hand, their motivation 
is somewhat dull and unimaginative. It was apparent during interviews that many 
fonctionnaires viewed the completion of POS as a positive statistic to send back to Paris. 
Although it has been suggested that fonctionnaires are "... ill-prepared intellectually for the 
task" (of plan-making) (9> it is evident that, although they may lack planning education and 
experience, their intellectual capabilities are considerable. However, their concerns in 
plan-making may also be coloured by their own personal interests: in particular, there is the 
whole question of remuneration for their work, which has been mentioned in the last chapter 
and has been discussed by Mény 0°). The basis on which civil servants are paid means that a 
high proportion of their incomes, often quoted in interviews with contracted staff as being as 
much as 50 per cent, can be accounted for by honoraria payable for public works which they 
are supervising for local councils. Clearly the figure of 50 per cent could be exaggerated but 
everyone mentioned a significant amount Given that there are no fixed amounts for public 
developments in each commune then fonctionnaires can effectively trade with mayors to 
make grant and loan applications for developments which the fonctionnaires can supervise. 
What is crucial here is that the supervisory work of fonctionnaires for communes may have 
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resulted from their suggestions in the first place! This system of honoraria applies to all 
fonctionnaires of the DDE, not only those from the GEP but also those from UOC and 
INFRA. 
The fonctionnaires from these two latter sections only take a small role in discussions at the 
groupe de travail. Interventions by them usually relate to implementation of development 
although they were not observed to mention strong technical constraints to development. 
Thus, their motivation was promotional of development Looking more seriously at the 
interventions oí fonctionnaires at meetings, it is quite possible for them, as a majority group 
in attendance, to actively connive to promote development which may ultimately serve their 
own interests. In fact, this is one of the main bones of contention between the contracted 
planner and the fonctionnaire. The contracted planners quite rightly scrutinise the 
judgements oí fonctionnaires in the meetings but they have litde effective power to influence 
those judgements. After all, their contracts are short term and they are also dependent on 
civil servants for extending their contract. 
The only remaining DDE official who is involved in the process is the sector engineer. This 
work in the field affords him close contact with the mayors in his sector and it was observed 
that these engineers had developed supportive links with mayors. In many instances, for 
example, mayors treated sector engineers as personal advisers. Clearly this relationship is a 
delicate one for the sector engineer, especially in circumstances where the mayor is not 
supportive of development proposals suggested by his colleagues in the GEP. Most sector 
engineers observed were well seasoned professionals used to this situation and they coped 
extremely well with it 
Essentially then, the contributions from the DDE at groupe de travail are dominated by the 
fonctionnaire of the GEP. Often most of groupe de travail discussion consists of a 
dialogue between this person and the mayor. Indeed, the meetings can be regarded as 
wasteful of staff resources, especially when most people do not, or are not in a position.to 
contribute. Tension is evident amongst participants at the meetings, especially between 
contracted planners and fonctionnaire planners. This arises for reasons stated above, but 
probably it is also a reflection of fears that what is not said at meetings, and what is agreed 
before and after meetings, may have a much bigger influence on the content of the final plan 
than what is said at the meeting. There arc also tensions evident between the mayors and 
fonctionnaires at the meetings. This may be a consequence of prior decisions not being 
articulated at the meetings or it may simply be a form of orchestrated behaviour. One of the 
difficulties of understanding this behaviour is not having full access to all of the contacts 
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between mayors and fonctionnaires over a period of time. Wright, for example, has 
described the conventional wisdom of the nature of these relationships, a nature which could 
hardly fail to find its expression at groupe de travail : 
"Paris bureaucrats and their provincial agents, prefects and locally elected 
politicians, are condemned to live together in a chaos of surreptitious 
bargaining, illicit agreements, hidden collusion, unspoken complicity, 
simulated tension and often genuine conflict"(11^ 
The remaining participants at the groupe de travail, the representatives of the Chambers of 
Commerce and Agriculture, may play a very active role in defending their respective interests 
at meetings, but their overall impact may be minimal Basically, their impact is a function of 
their role in the commune and, in particular, the extent of electoral influence they may have. 
The representatives of the DDA present involve themselves in direct argument about the 
protection of agricultural land and woodland and their judgement was observed to be sound 
and technically motivated. What was evident, though, was that they were regarded by GEP 
fonctionnaires as "public enemy number one". The interactions between these two 
participants led to the conclusion that there was clearly a 'pecking order', not only within the 
DDE itself but also between state services. The posture adopted by GEP fonctionnaires left 
the observer in no doubt that the DDA was regarded by them as an inferior service. Given 
that DDA are outnumbered at groupe de travail, they were often unsuccessful in their 
interventions. Whilst, in theory, we might expect them to be backed up by the Chamber of 
Agriculture, in practice the latter obviously attended meetings with a brief to pursue 
development rights for their members. Again, a promotional tendency is evident. 
The variety of contributions at groupe de travail demonstrates the complexity of these 
meetings - not only organisational but also behavioural complexity. These matters will be 
taken up in the next chapter. However, what is interesting to note is that the process of 
plan-making as described above does not appear to be an open discussion nor is it a 
discussion of the problems of a commune . In fact, the discussion of problems including 
the desire to respond to these problems in the fairest and most technically acceptable way is 
simply not on the agenda. Rather, observations would suggest that informal processes may 
contribute as much if not more to the final plan, and whilst interests are presented and 
reconciled at the meetings, these interests are distinctly skewed and will favour those whose 
power base is strongest. What is also evident is that no clear political/technical division of 
labour is apparent and that the administrative, professional and political roles of individuals 
overlap. Deciding on which hat people are using when they speak is perhaps the most 
crucial task for the observer of the interventions made. 
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Progress in POS Preparation 
In 1972, the Ministry of Environment issued an important statement about POS progress: 
"We shall make every effort to ensure that the deadline of 1975 is met for the 
preparation of the POS". (12> 
Evidently the Ministry was hopeful that completion of POS was possible. When the 
statement was issued, very few POS had been started let alone published or approved. 
Preparation rates over the period 1971-1981 show a steady increase in plan preparation 
progress but even by 1981, the preparation was far from complete. Table 4.3 below gives a 
general picture of approvals for both SDAU and POS over the period 1971-1981. 
Table 4.3 Total Number of SDAU and TOS Approved in France ,1971-1981 (cumulative totals) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
SDAU n/a n/a 20 31 44 51 87 119 132 149 167 
POS 0 10 46 115 208 300 603 981 1538 2278 3176 
Total number of communes approximately 36 600 over the period 
Sources: 1971-1974, (figures for variable months) Veltz, P. (1978) Histoire dllnr. ntformt Amhifue. 
Copideth, Appendix 5 ρ 215 
1975-1981, (all figures for 1st January each year). Recelai des Informations Statistiques sur 
l'Urbanisme, MECV (Annually) 
It is interesting to note from this table that SDAU continued to be approved over this period 
although from the interviews in 1981, planners suggested that no more SDAU were being 
designated. Thus, the figures of approval in the table relate to plans which had started and 
were already in the pipeline by 1981. Preparation of the POS was not legally prevented by 
the absence of an approved SDAU but, in practice, the same people prepared the two types 
of plans. So, the slow start on POS approvals may be accounted for by this factor. 
Generally, though, the table shows that in respect of POS, their progress was slow and only 
a small number of communes had an approved POS by 1981. 
Table 4.4 gives a more detailed breakdown of POS preparation over the same period. This 
table shows the total number of POS started, published and approved. The results 
demonstrate that steady progress was made on starting plans throughout the period although 
the differential between plans started and plans approved was extensive. This difference 
reflects the preparation time referred to already and indicated as being approximately 6 years. 
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Yet when we look at POS published and approved, a more encouraging rate of progress is 
evident, especially by 1980 and 1981. By 1980 for example, 41% of started plans were 
published or approved and by 1981 this figure had risen to 49%. Thus, the differential 
between starts and published/approvals was narrowing. The significance of including 
published as well as approved plans is the fact that legally the published plan can be used as 
the basis of development control (it is opposable aux tiers ; i.e. subject to legal objection). 
Whilst progress in the last two years of this period, 1971-1981, was encouraging and faster 
than in the early seventies, it should not be forgotten that of the total number of communes 
in France in 1981, 36 485, only 8.7%, had an approved POS and only 13.5% had a 
published or approved POS. 
Table 4.4 Numbers of TOS Started, Published and Approved in France ,1971-1981 (including overseas 
départements ) (All figures shown after 1971 are cumulative totals) 
1971 
Started 1808 
Published* 6 
Approved 
Total Pub'd 6 
& Approved 
1972 
3328 
32 
10 
42 
1973 
5243 
136 
46 
182 
1974 
6254 
318 
115 
433 
1975 
6612 
452 
208 
660 
1976 
6938 
662 
300 
962 
1977 
7580 
1149 
603 
1752 
1978 
8521 
1520 
981 
2501 
1979 
9371 
1791 
1538 
3329 
1980 
9636 
1720 
2278 
3998 
1981 
10059 
1784 
3176 
4960 
* Published figures are plans which are only published and not yet approved 
Sources: 1971-1974, (figures for December each year) Velu, P. (1978) Histoire d'Un* Réfnrm* 
Ambique. Copideth, Appendix 5 ρ 215 
1975-1981, (all figures for 1st January each year). Recelai des Informations Salistiques sur 
l'Urbanisme, MECV (Annually) ρ 46 
However, the above results can be misleading because they give the impression that all 
communes are equal and we know that this is not the case. Thus, given the difference in 
population size between communes, it is important to look at this aspect in relation to plan 
publication and approval. This is shown in Table 4.5. 
The table shows that the communes of more than 10 000 population were well advanced in 
POS preparation by 1978, when the average percentage for published POS (including 
approved POS) was 50 and, for an approved POS 20. By 1981, only three years later, 
further and substantial progress in POS preparation in those communes resulted in 
corresponding averages of 74% and 53%. Variations between communes with more than 
10 000 population, are not significant. By contrast, communes of less than 10 000 
population show significantly slower and, indeed, very small rates of progress over the 
period. 
Table 4.5 Published and Approved TOS Relative to Commune Size 1978 & 1981 
Commune sizes 
(by population) 
> 100 000 
50000-100 000 
40000-50 000 
30000^0000 
20000-30 000 
10 000-20 000 
Total > 10 000 
Total < 10 000 
Total (all sizes) 
1978 1981 
Published 
No 
23 
38 
21 
37 
77 
191 
387 
2114 
2501 
% 
59 
54 
48 
49 
49 
50 
50 
5.9 
6.8 
Approved 
No 
7 
16 
8 
10 
33 
76 
150 
831 
981 
% 
18 
23 
18 
13 
21 
20 
20 
23 
2.7 
Published 
No 
30 
56 
37 
57 
113 
272 
565 
4405 
4960 
% 
77 
80 
84 
75 
72 
71 
74 
12.3 
13.5 
Approved 
No 
22 
39 
26 
34 
77 
206 
404 
2772 
3176 
% 
56 
56 
59 
45 
49 
54 
53 
7.7 
8.7 
The published figures given in this table also include plans which have been published and then also 
approved. 
Source: Recelai des Informations Statistiques sur IVrbanisme. MECV, 1978 (p 41). 1981 (p49) 
A final point relative to plan-making progress is the funding of plan-making. As in the case 
of preparation itself, funding is a joint state/commune responsibility with financial 
calculations of contributions made on the basis of population numbers. Table 4.6 below 
indicates the amounts contributed by both parties over the period 1976-1981. 
Table 4.6 Financing of Planning Studies, 1976-1981 (in French bancs) 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
104 557 734 
72 383 746 
70 365 250 
59 775 500 
85 118 908 
85 069 800 
Sute 
% total 
contribution 
70 
61 
60 
70 
57 
47 
Municipalities 
44 669 753 
46 137 433 
49 778 640 
25 422 918 
63 549 696 
96 617 369 
% total 
contribution 
30 
39 
40 
30 
43 
53 
Source: Receuil des Informations Statistiques sur l'Urbanisme. DUP, Ministère de l'Environnement et 
du Cadre de Vie , 1977-1982, pp 18-22 
The table shows that state spending over the period has fluctuated, although its proportion of 
total spending remained between 60 and 70% until 1980. In 1980 and 1981 the proportion 
of state contribution fell to 57% and 47% respectively. By contrast, municipal spending over 
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the period has risen throughout the period with the exception of a drop in 1979 and, by 
1981, municipalities were contributing a larger proportion of the cost than the state. 
Conclusions 
In summary of POS preparation progress over the pre decentralisation period, it is evident 
that this has been slow and certainly slower than the Ministry would have liked. However, 
as has been shown, absolute numbers of plan approvals (or publications) do not necessarily 
clarify the fact that priority in POS preparation would seem to have been placed on the 
larger, more heavily populate communes . When looked at this way, progress has been 
reasonably good. Yet delays in preparation are inevitable, not least because of the large 
numbers of communes and the small numbers of DDE staff to prepare plans. Whilst six 
years was observed as the average preparation time for all plan stages taken together, 
variations between and amongst stages will be found in different parts of the country for 
various reasons. 
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CHAPTER 4 - NOTES & REFERENCES 
(1) The regulations are quoted as R123-1, for example. By contrast, legislative references are always 
¡refaced by L. The regulations applying to TOS include R 123-1 to R 123-14 inclusive (the 
legislative articles are L 121-1, L 123-3, L 123-5). 
(2) Local notables would include the mayor, councillors, well known businessmen, etc. 
(3) In addition to the membership of groupe de travail as shown in Figure 42, the Chambre de Métiers 
may also be invited where one exists as well as the Army where appropriate and any other public 
agencies where appropriale 
(4) This subject has been treated by the author elsewhere. See, for example: 
Wilson, I.B. " Grande-Bretagne " (Ch) in Delperee, F. and Molitor, F. 0985) Citoyens et 
Aiiminhtrntìon, Cabay Bmylant, Brussels, pp 131-155 
(5) Five examples of these manuals indude:-
POS - Tome 1, Recelai de Notes Techniques, May 1974 
Compte Rendu dTxpéricnces des Plans d'Occupation des Sols, November 1974 
Receuil des Principales Servitudes dVtilité Publiques affectant l'Occupation du Sol. 1973 
Urbanisme et Expropriation, Jurisprudence-Administrative , Etudes d'Urbanisme , June 1975 
All of the above were published by the: 
Ministère de l'Equipement, Direction de l'Aménagement Fonder et de l'Urbanisme - Service Technique 
de l'Urbanisme. 
(6) An example Crom Rouen is:· 
SORETUR: Ce POS en Question • Rffterinns Préambles à l'Etablissement d'un Plan d'Occupation 
des Sols: June 1972 (ref. PBC/FB - 72.6η 
(7) The DDE of Loire had 2 deputy heads of the GEP. One dealt with the communal grouping for St. 
Etienne whilst the other carried out the same duties in the rest of (he département. The département 
of Pas de Calais was organised into 26 area offices each of which comprised the GEP, UOC and 
INFRA functions. In addition, the headquarters in Anas had general research and intelligence functions 
of the GEP. 
(8) Thefiguresof GEP staff have been given in Chapter3. An example, though, of the 4 départements 
in this study is given below:-
Bouches du Rhône 
Loire 
Essonne 
Pas de Calais 
No. of 
communes 
119 
327 
195 
898 
No. of GEP staff 
Fonctionnaires 
9 
5 
5 
5 
Contractuels 
28 
3 
11 
19 
Source: Receuil des Informations Statistiques sur IVrbanisme, 1978, Ministère de l'Environnement et du 
Cadre de Vie , pp 9,28,29 
(9) D'Arcy, F. and Jobert, B. (1975) "Urban planning in France" in Hayward, J. and Watson, M., 
Planning. Politics and Public Policy: The British. French and Italian experience. Cambridge 
University Press, pp 295-315 
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(10) Mény, Y. (1980) "Relations between central and local government in France", paper presented at the 
SSRC/IPSA Conference on Inter-govemmental Relaüons. Brasenose CoUege, Oxford, September 
1980, ρ 
(11) Wright. V. (1979) The Government and Politics of France. Hutchinson, ρ 225 
(12) D'Arey, F. and Jobert, B. op. cit., ρ 315 and Wright, V. ibid 
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CHAPTER 5 - ANALYSIS OF POS PREPARATION PROCEDURE AND 
ANALYSIS OF THE PLAN 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to analyse the process of POS preparation described in Chapter 4 and to 
consider the role, significance and nature of the result, the approved plan. The analysis is 
made, in the first instance, in the context of Thoenig's model of cross-regulation/cross-
functioning controls, the view that centre/periphery relations in France consist of such 
controls and are inefficient, insensitive, mistrusting of public debate and that decisions are 
taken in secret In an effort to ensure that due significance is given to the consideration of the 
POS itself, the technical content of the plan will be discussed as well as the POS in relation 
to other plans or planning instruments. In this way, Lichfield's ^ view, that evaluation of 
planning instruments should include other possible courses of action, will be taken into 
account. 
Cross-Regulation / Cross-Functioning Controls 
The notion that cross-functioning controls exist between centre and periphery is confirmed 
by the POS preparation procedure. The fact that over the pre decentralisation period 
preparation was legally and practically a joint responsibility between DDE and the communal 
mayors, legitimates such controls. In theory, each of these actors in plan-making regulates 
the actions of the other. In practice, this is not necessarily clear cut and a series of factors 
which weaken the cross-functioning controls are evident 
Fint, mayors of large cities are likely to have accumulated public offices. They also, at least 
in twenty-five cities, have their own planning agency for plan preparation. In these cases, 
effective intervention by the DDE is likely to be considerably reduced, although the DDE will 
be able to retain power over the mayor by financing public projects if he/she has been unable 
to use his/her own contacts in Central Government to bypass local DDE officials. Yet any 
mayor with national political office has at least a chance to bypass fonctionnaires at the 
département level. Indeed, in the four départements studied, mayors with a cumul had 
much more attention paid to them by the DDE. In contrast to this, mayors of small to 
medium sized communes , irrespective of the cumul, are, from the first stages of POS 
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preparation, at a disadvantage in that they have to go cap in hand to the DDE for technical 
assistance to prepare the POS. 
Secondly, as D'Arcy and Jobert ^ amongst others have commented, if a mayor has been 
able to master the planner's jargon, the very clumsy acronyms of the règlement his or her 
effectiveness in the process will be increased. Such mastery would seem to be a prerequisite 
for participation at groupe de travail. 
Thirdly, the nature of development issues in the commune itself may weaken the control of 
the DDE. In particular, in those communes where there is scope for public works 
programmes which provide honoraria for fonctionnaires, the mayor may be in a stronger 
position to bargain for those developments which he/she personally wants to include in the 
plan. 
Fourthly, it is clear that tensions between fonctionnaires and contracted planners exist in the 
DDE. A skilful mayor could exploit the tensions between these two sets of staff to his/her 
own advantage. More especially, the mayor might be able to determine by manipulating 
these relationships what proposals would be likely to succeed for funding. Not all 
fonctionnaires were observed to be as insensitive to local needs as Thoenig suggests. 
Whilst they are moved from one département to another, often in a short space of time, 
some develop local sympathies and local knowledge. However, it is more generally the case 
that the contracted staff, who were observed to be much less mobile, knew the locality, the 
notables and the local needs much better. 
Fifthly, in some cases, sheer exasperation with the lengthy plan preparation process may lead 
to fonctionnaires supporting some proposals which are of no benefit to themselves and with 
which they are not fully in agreement The need to produce impressive POS approval rates 
for Paris may also lead to this outcome. 
The above factors are not necessarily the only factors which weaken the cross-regulation/ 
cross-functioning controls but they are factors observed in this study or discussed during 
interviews. Naturally, interpersonal relations between mayors and civil servants will depend 
on the personality of the individuals involved. Interestingly, the notion that "personality" 
was important in the plan-making process was mentioned extensively by mayors and civil 
servants alike. Whilst observation would indicate that individuals from both groups were 
indeed "characters", it is impossible, without access to their private meetings, to know how 
their personality traits contribute to the bargaining process. And what we see in the 
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preparation of the POS is a bargaining process between the state and the locality. Of course, 
we would expect a plan prepared by a committee to result in compromises; but what we 
would not expect to find is that the compromises are overtly skewed in favour of the personal 
interests of those whose power base is strongest As mentioned in the last chapter, the 
question of honoraria paid to fonctionnaires is of utmost importance in POS negotiations 
and, to mayors, the approval of electorally advantageous developments of concern. 
However, it must be remembered that in all dealings between mayors ana fonctionnaires the 
latter still seem, at least on the face of it, to hold the trump card because it is their 
responsibility to go back to negotiate all public spending in the POS with thepr^er. Thus, 
there is still recourse to higher authority. Similarly, the préfet has to go back to the 
Ministries in Paris to finalise agreements over spending. This question of financial control 
has been forcibly argued by Delfante(3) and cited by others(4), provides full control by the 
state over the plan-making process. Even if a mayor is powerful and has a cumul, it must be 
remembered that mayors will choose their battles carefully and details in the VOS may not be 
regarded as the most significant battles to choose. Further, powerful mayors are busy 
people and it may simply be impossible to find sufficient time for cutting through red tape in 
Paris Ministries. 
Generally then, the practice of cross - regulation or cross - functioning controls described in 
Thoenig's model seems to apply no less to POS preparation than to centre/periphery relations 
in general. Essentially, the Thoenig model describes a situation where none of the actors in 
the plan-making process holds all of the cards in the game. The crucial questions are 
whether or not they want to hold them all and whether or not the financial trump card can 
actually win the game. To some extent the latter question has been answered above and the 
answer is not a clear yes or no. Similarly, the answer to the former question cannot be 
categorical What seems to be the case firom the interviews is that allocation of mutual blame 
by mayors and fonctionnaires, on occasions when their own interests are not fully satisfied, 
is often a convenient mechanism . The former can use the latter as the excuse to the 
electorate for unpopular decisions in the plan, and the latter can use the former as the excuse 
for delays in plan preparation for choices of public spending which may not be liked by their 
superiors. 
Turning to the other elements of Thoenig's model, inefficiency, insensitivity and secrecy, the 
extent to which these apply to centre/periphery relations will be looked at in relation to POS 
preparation. 
It would be difficult to claim that DDE's and, more especially, GEP sections were inefficient. 
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These are well organised with clear lines of accountability and responsibility. However, 
given the lengthy time for POS preparation, some might argue that the system was 
inefficient Judgements of efficiency or otherwise have to consider the operational problems 
of the system which primarily relate to the large numbers of communes and the small 
numbers of planners to prepare plans. Evaluation has also to take account of other factors. 
First, the administrative procedure itself looks reasonably efficient but the lack of predefined 
timescales for some of the plan preparation stages is problematic. Secondly, and related to 
the first point, it must be remembered that local elections take place every six years and, on 
average, the POS takes about six years to prepare. However, if an election period falls 
within the preparation period of the POS, then it is likely that delays will result In fact, this 
was an often quoted reason for delays in preparation in the four DDE's studied. Thirdly, 
securing funds for public development can be a time consuming business. Fourthly, neither 
of the two main actors in the actual bargaining process are sufficiently educated in planning 
to conduct this process more quickly. Whilst the quantitative output of the process has 
improved towards the end of the pre-decentralisation period, a lot of plans still remained 
uncompleted by 1981. Given the increasing numbers of POS revisions in the late seventies, 
then the total workload of work on new plans was not actually increasing. In 1979, for 
example, 19% of POS approvals were revisions whereas by 1981, 30% of approvals were 
revisions. Taking all of these factors into account, then it is probably fair to say that the 
system was as efficient as it could be under the constraints it was facing. 
That the system of POS preparation is insensitive will be discussed more closely in a later 
section, which will look at the plan itself. However, beyond the substantive questions of the 
POS, it is obvious that the system is insensitive to the manpower needs for preparing plans. 
In particular, the status differentials within the DDE and the educational/professional 
background of individuals in the system would suggest the dominance of ascribed 
professional status over achieved status. In such a situation, it is difficult to envisage 
contracted planners with positive job motivation. Of course, by the same token, it is possible 
to envisage fonctionnaires feeling threatened by their junior contracted colleagues. 
Evidence of both phenomena was observed in the DDE's. 
Distrust of public debate is generally and clearly evidenced by POS preparation procedure. 
Participation in plan-making through representations to those on the groupe de travail is the 
expected procedure, although this is not advertised to be the case. Whilst the enquête 
publique is another route to make representations, it is not a form of participation. Indeed, 
it is a procedure which is against the principles of natural justice, since it allows the DDE to 
be judge and jury in their own case. Any individual or group of individuals with a 
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substantive objection has little chance of changing the plan. During attendance at one groupe 
de travail, a pressure group objecting to a road proposal were admitted to the meeting. They 
were given a short time, no more than ten minutes, to explain their case and they were 
heavily controlled by the mayor. The group was not well organised and their case was 
poorly presented. After they left the meeting, having completed their case, there was simply 
no discussion of it. Perhaps this was an unusual example, but, in general, pressure groups 
in France have been most successful in objecting to large, controversial development -
especially nuclear development - and to the negative environmental impact of development in 
scenic areas. In contrast to these sorts of objections, pressure groups against POS are poorly 
developed, show little continuity and have made little significant impact. This may be 
explained to some extent by individualism in France, by late urbanisation or simply it may 
reflect the traditional view that protest is registered in the ballot box. Certainly the 1977 
local election results, which were discussed in the last chapter and which demonstrated that 
urban problems and urban planning were of importance in the Left's election campaign and 
victory, would seem to indicate the belief in the ballot box as the main form of recourse. If, 
on the other hand, an administrative error has taken place in the preparation procedure, then 
there is recourse to an administrative tribunal, un tribunal administratif, and a fair chance of 
being heard (S'; but the procedure is both costly and time consuming. Nevertheless, the 
threat of recourse to a tribunal administratif perhaps explains the near neurosis of 
fonctionnaires and, to some extent, mayors, about attending to administrative procedure. 
Finally, the claim that decisions are taken in secret has been touched upon in the last chapter. 
As suggested there, the informai process of POS preparation conducted between the mayor 
and the GEP fonctionnaires is probably as important, if not more important, than the groupe 
de travail meetings. Lying behind these informal meetings might be the notion that it is 
better to lose face in private than in public. Given the weight both mayors and 
fonctionnaires attach to their status, this is not an unreasonable assumption. Beyond this 
may lie the belief that what goes on in private cannot be significantly affected by the public 
bargaining process of POS, since the mayors and fonctionnaires are the most powerful 
participants and since anticipation of their moves during the public groupe de travail is much 
more difficult for the other, weaker participants whose opposition is likely to fail. Thinking 
about Vincent Wright's description of mayors and Paris bureaucrats (meaning field service 
fonctionnaires ) mentioned in the last chapter (6\ the notion that the "unspoken complicity" 
between mayors and GEP fonctionnaires is "contrived" and often "simulated" behaviour 
quite possibly applies to the case of POS. Without being a mayor or a fonctionnaire we 
are unlikely to ever know the extent to which either or both, to use Wright's words, are 
"condemned to live together". 
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Evaluation of the Plan 
The observations made here about the technical content of the TOS are observations made in 
the 4 départements studied and, in addition, are based on review of ЮЗ from other areas. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting findings of the research into POS relates to the question 
of conformity to SDAU. Whilst the legal obligations exist for this, in practice few of these 
upper tier plans have been prepared and POS preparation is not hindered by the issue of 
conformity. The lack of enforcement of SDAU preparation and the observed indifference to 
these plans if they exist, simply reinforces the notion that POS are prepared for a single 
commune with little attention to the effects on neighbouring communes. Indeed, as noted 
earlier, the legal provisions for POS to cover only part of a commune or a grouping of 
communes have little effect on practice. This situation places heavy resposibility on the 
DDE to co-ordinate all POS within their wider geographic area, but it is doubted that this 
responsibility is felt, except in the case of finance for public developments and even then, 
extensive duplication of facilities is evident ^ . Indeed, there has been criticism of POS in 
respect of investment both long and short term. If, on the other hand, the DDE is quietly 
ensuring POS conformity to SDAU, then the POS are probably conforming to plans which 
are extensively out of date since little evidence of SDAU revision is available. In a sense, the 
question of conformity might appear to be saying "they (i.e. POS) are damned if they do and 
damned if they don't". However, unless plans are monitored and regularly reviewed, then 
there is little point in stressing conformity unless the timescales of preparation are dovetailed. 
This is not the case in law and, by and large, this is not the case in practice. The notion of 
hierarchy implied by the LOF envisaged a system which was flexible and subject to periodic 
review. Yet when we look at POS review procedure, it is generally subject to the same 
procedures as POS preparation (except in those few cases where only minor modifications 
are being made to the plans). Even the shorter method of review/modifications (as shown in 
Appendix 4.1) is a lengthy process. Thus, given a time consuming review procedure then 
variations in timescaling of SDAU and POS cannot reasonably and quickly be overcome to 
accommodate conformity and to achieve the necessary sensitivity to programmed budgeting. 
An interesting and related matter is that raised by Danan<8); his thesis is that in view of the 
POS being legally binding, (opposable aux tiers ) and in view of the POS being required, 
by law, to conform to the SDAU, then the latter is thus opposable aux tiers . This would 
seem to be the logical sequetur but the Ministry did not accept this argument ( 9\ 
The POS is universalistic in style and presentation; the result is that all POS look alike. A 
POS prepared in Essonne.for example,, can easily be understood by a planner in Pas de 
98 
Calais. This would suggest that the Ministry publications on how to prepare the plans had 
been well observed. The obvious advantage of universalism may be the benefit to those 
preparing the plans. Given the large numbers of communes and the few staff, then this 
standardisation might have helped to speed up the process. Also, it is of benefit to the GEP 
fonctionnaires moving from one département to another and it may be useful within a 
locality for mayors or the public to compare POS details for adjacent communes, although 
no evidence of this was found in this study. Obviously the content of the règlement varies 
from one commune to another in the presence or absence of certain regulations. 
Nevertheless, the universalistic approach reinforces the rigidity of these regulatory plans and 
allows little scope for specifically local planning issues; in other words, it is difficult from 
these plans to grasp the " couleur locale ", peculiarities of an area, and it is difficult to 
appreciate the overall changes likely as a result of the plan. 
The "art" of town planning is conspicuously missing and the "science" of town planning is 
somewhat limited and disguised in the complexity of règlement acronyms. The content of 
the plan appears to be derived almost entirely from physical and aerial survey of existing 
land use, whilst attention to social and economic change and the implications of these is 
almost ignored, save for mention of future expected population totals. Thus, the focus of 
the plan is population growth and more especially expansion of developable residential land. 
By contrast, in existing developed zones, the plan is distinctly negative in orientation, stating 
what is and is not allowed. For example, the plan contains no policy statements; thus, 
there is no allowance for discretion by decision-makers and no allowance for unforeseen 
circumstances. The impression is that what exists will stay more or less the same over the 
plan period. Yet these views have to be tempered with the requirements of the legal system; 
that is, the plan has to specify clear legal rights over the developability or otherwise of each 
land parcel. In theory, this is what the règlement seeks to do. In practice, two observations 
can be made about the success of this. First, the text is not easy to follow and it is not 
always clear. Secondly, dérogations (deviations) from the regulations are permissible. 
Classic examples of this are found in most urban areas. In Paris, for example, Montparnasse 
or Le Front de Seine excessively overstep the allowable COS of 1.5 (10\ Through payment 
of extra density tax a dérogation is legitimated. Similarly, as will be discussed below, ZAC 
provisions can cut right across POS règlement . Such legitimate departures from the 
regulations and illegitimate or simply illegal departures, as argued by Veltz (11\ create 
flexibility in the plan's provision. Naturally, regulations cannot anticipate every conceivable 
situation. Even so, it goes without saying that such dérogations impair the value of the 
regulatory approach. Furthermore, the possibility of dérogations must lead to a distrust of 
the document. Yet, even with allowance being made for dérogations , the regulatory 
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emphasis is very much to the fore in POS. Not surprisingly then, the content and style of 
the text (as described in the last chapter) do not emphasise overall land use and land 
management in the plan area. 
A final and important criticism of the TOS is the poor quality of the maps. This is especially 
true of the 1:2000 scale, printed by dyeline printer, with the map base (including contours) in 
complex built up areas overlain by cross hatchings and other text (see Appendix 5.1 as an 
example). Thus, these are extremely difficult to read. 
Turning to the question of perception of POS by those actors involved in its preparation, 
some interesting observations were collected during interviews. Almost without exception, 
mayors, fonctionnaires and contracted planners mentioned the notion of a "good" POS. 
This might suggest that they were implying "a best practice approach". Certainly the 
contracted planners had such notions, which essentially boiled down to a simplification of 
the règlement and a bigger concentration on the socio-economic context and effects of plan 
proposals. By and large, the attitude of contracted planners to POS was negative. Many 
even suggested that a "good" POS was an unpublished POS. Primarily this was the view 
because it gave decision-makers more freedom. Many suggested a simplified plan, as indeed 
was the subject of research in one of the départements studied (12). 
Fonctionnaires also, in general, suggested simplification of the POS. Their notion of a 
"good" POS related more to the efficiency of preparation than to the substantive content of 
the document. Nonetheless, many did discuss this issue in terms of the work output of their 
contracted colleagues. In particular, the view was expressed that the contracted staff had 
become so used to the repetitive, technically simple work that they were unenthusiastic and 
even incapable of doing more technically innovative or demanding tasks. Rather than 
discussing the matter in terms of job motivation and job satisfaction, the fonctionnaires 
appeared to adopt a disdainful, almost accusatory, attitude to their colleagues. Thus, the 
underlying tensions between fonctionnaires and contracted planners manifest themselves in 
these interviews. The general picture of a plan-making process as a necessary evil, a process 
of "painting by numbers" (13) seemed to emerge. Interestingly, few substantial suggestions 
for change emerged from these interviews and a passive acceptance of the statutory 
obligation to produce the plans predominated. 
By contrast to the planners, mayors were more positive about the plans. Generally they felt 
the plan-making procedure to be long but most felt it was important to take time. No 
attitudes emerged which were negative to the plans or which indicated that the publication of 
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plans should be avoided to escape their political commitment. 
It is difficult to know what the general public know or think about POS. No systematic 
research was done as part of this study and it is doubtful that any evidence of public opinion 
exists. As in the case of most local plans, it is those whose land is affected (or, in this case, 
is not developable) that would be familiar with the plans. Yet, there was considerable public 
disdain for the grands ensembles of the sixties and seventies. In large cities and suburban 
areas the build-up to the 1977 local election manifestos of the Left demonstrated the ' 
continued lack of attention to the problems of many of these peripheral areas. Moreover, in 
many of these areas the POS was criticised widely for not dealing with these matters. 
Schain(14), for example, provides a useful analysis of eight municipalities in the Paris region 
after 1977 when the Communist Party came to power. In seven out of the eight communes 
housing and urban planning had been an important election issue and subsequently, POS 
revisions were instituted in these communes. This situation was similar in many other urban 
areas after 1977. 
One report which set out to examine centre/periphery administration and which commented 
on urban planning after extensive research is the Guichard Report of 1976. After reviewing 
urban planning practice and procedures, the report makes the following point: 
" Localement, les décisions relatives à l'urbanisme sont souvent ressenties 
comme la conjugaision incontrolable de décisions des administrations techniques 
de l'Etat, de promoteurs divers, publics au privés, et les procedures en vigueur 
consistent à receuillir des avis insuffisants sur des projets parcellaires " ^ 
(Locally, decisions relative to planning often feel like the uncontrollable 
conspiracy of decisions of state technical administrators and a diversity of public 
and private developers, and the current procedures consist of collecting 
insufficient opinion on bitty and unco-ordinated projects). 
These views were subsequently reinforced at a Ministry organised conference in 1978 (16^ 
and whilst neither specifically discusses the role of POS in these matters, by inference the 
POS is criticised because it is the main planning instrument at the local level. 
In summary of the attitudes to or the perceptions of POS, the main finding of this study is 
that the plans are talked about and they are regarded as imponant even by those whose 
attitude to them was negative. This is a very different picture from that of the strategic plans, 
SDAU, and it is also a very different picture from the one which would have pertained ten 
years previously. Indeed, the indifference to the strategic plan emphasises the issue raised in 
Chapter 1: the shift away from strategic to local plans which was evident over the late sixties 
and early seventies. Thus, it would seem that, towards the end of the pre decentralisation 
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period, the POS had made a significant impact and it would also seem to have established 
itself as the foremost of planning documents. 
The POS and other Planning Instruments 
The relationship of POS to other planning documents and related instruments will be 
considered below in an effort to determine if alternatives to TOS existed, alternatives which 
would have made for a more effective land use planning system. Consideration will also be 
given to instruments which existed during (and many of which have continued to exist since) 
the pre decentralisation period from 1967 and which could be considered detrimental to a 
more effective use of ЮЗ. 
Table 5.1 provides a list of planning documents and instruments. Whilst this is not 
exhaustive, it is considered that it contains the most important documents and instruments. 
These have been divided into four types - plans and spatial designations which control land 
use, instruments to assist or guide implementation of development, development control 
measures and planning and related taxes. It is immediately obvious from this table that the 
range of planning instruments is both extensive and comprehensive. Each of the groups will 
be looked at in relation to POS in respect of the two issues raised above. 
Of the plans and spatial designations in Table 5.1, the first three, SDAU plans, have been 
already discussed in the text in terms of the shift away from these documents. However, 
even if there had been no shift, the strategic nature of these documents is, in any case, too 
general to be a basis for local planning and development decisions. As a study group on 
POS, appointed by the Ministry of Equipment to conduct an up to date evaluation of POS 
pointed out in 1974: 
" La rencontre operationeile des SD A U et des POS se solde pour l'instant par 
une déception. Source incomparable de renseignements, le SDAU n'est 
généralement pas la charte approuvée des grandes options d'urbanisme qu'il 
devrait être " W 
(The operational relationship of SDAU and POS results, at the moment, in a 
deception. Incomparable information source as the SDAU is, it is not generally 
the approved chart of strategic planning options it ought to be). 
The same group go on to provide two sets of reasons for the above remark; first, technical 
and secondly, political. The former comprise the fact that there are only a few SDAU, many 
are too small scale (generalised) and were not prepared with a view to providing linked 
102 
Table S.l List of Main Planning Instruments '17^ 
1. Plans» and spatial designations which control land use 
Schéma d'aménagement* (subregional structure plans for cities, mountain 
areas, coastal areas) 
Schéma directeur d'aménagement et d'urbanisme* (structure plans) 
Schéma de secteur* (structure plans for parts of the départements of the Pans region) 
Carte communale* (communal charters) 
Réserve naturelle (Nature reserves) 
Pares national (Nationalparks) 
Parcs régional (Regional parks) 
Plans d'aménagement rural* (rural management plans) 
POS* 
Plan d'aménagement de zone (part of a ZAQ 
Zone d'environnement protégé (plan for environmentally sensitive areas) 
Secteur sauvegardé (Conservation areas) 
Perimeters of protected or listed buildings 
Historic or 'Usted' sites 
Forest plans· 
Sectoral plans* (transport, mining, water etc.) 
2. Instruments to assist or finde implementation of development 
Zone d'aménagement concerté (Concentrated development zone) 
Lotissements (Subdivisions) 
Opérations de rénovation urbaine (Urban renewal schemes) 
Housing rehabilitation schemes 
New towns 
Aménagement du littoral (Coastal management) 
Zone d'intervention foncière (Compulsory purchase) 
Zone d'Aménagement digéré (Expropnauon) 
Remembrement (Rural land ownership ranonalisabon) 
3. Development control measures 
Permis de démolir (Demolition permits) 
Permis de construire (Building permits) 
Certificats d'urbanisme (Planning permissions) 
Arrêté de pénl, interdiction d'habiter (Oosure notices - for insanitary or unsound property) 
Autorisation de lotissement (Subdivision approval) 
Autorisation d'ouverture des installations classés (Permit to open classified installations) 
Autorisation d'exploitation de camere (Mining permit) 
Autorisation d'aménagement de terrain de camping (Camping site permit) 
Autorisation d'aménagement de terrain de caravanes (Caravan site permit) 
Various other permits (e g loppmg or cutting trees) 
4. Planning and related taxes 
Taxe locale d'équipement (Local services tax) 
Versement lié au dépassement du plafond légal de densité (Tax for exceeding legal density) 
Participation lié au dépassement du COS (Tax for exceeding COS) 
Taxe sur le défrichement (Tax on land clearing) 
Taxe départementale d'espaces verts (tax for green spaces) 
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coment for a local plan. Political reasons include the fact that the boundaries of SDAU were 
often arbitrary and often had no meaning to politicians, often politicians did not feel 
committed to these plans and placed little weight on the decisions made in this context, and, 
finally, politicians felt these plans caused problems in the relationship between local land use 
(the commune level) and investment in infirastracture (the département level). Taking into 
account the political factors alone, it is probably fair to say that these would militate against 
any notions which might have emerged for a unitary plan (strategic and local) at SDAU 
scale. 
Of the other plans and designations identified in Figure 5.1, many of the latter are 
designations for areas within SDAU and POS and their powers of control are generally in 
conformity to the POS if one exists. Naturally, in the absence of a POS, these instruments 
can be used in association with the Règlement National de l'Urbanisme (RNU) (national 
planning regulations) although it is recognised that these are generalised compared to TOS 
règlement. By contrast, of the remaining plans on the list, some mention should be made of 
ZEP, PAZ and carte communale because these are plans which could potentially be used as 
replacements for POS. Since the PAZ is part of the ZAC, this will be considered below. 
The ZEP, Zone d'Environnement Protégé , is a fully fledged statutory plan covering the 
same geographic area of the commune(s) as POS. The main distinctions between the two 
documents, ZEP and POS, are that the ZEP is a plan for areas of environmental conservation 
and protection, involves much less detailed règlement than the POS for existing built up 
areas and, is a plan in the preparation of which the "field services" of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (DDA), are much more involved than in the case of POS. In rural areas, small 
communes are offered the option of POS or ZEP and whilst many have chosen ZEP, 
relatively few ZEP had been approved between 1977 (when they were introduced) and 1981 
- in fact, 81 in total (cf. 274 started by 1981 and 90 subject to inquiry). 
From the interviews in 1981, the view of planners was that these ZEP plans were not an 
"improvement" on POS because they identified what was not developable but not what was 
developable. Yet ZEP is quicker to produce than POS although the planners felt that two 
other factors were in its disfavour, first, the money provided for the planning study was 
much less than POS and secondly, the DDA's role in plan preparation caused delays. It 
would be impossible here to evaluate this latter view without having a direct involvement in 
ZEP. However, there can be little advantage in having a range of plans at the local level. 
Rather, it would seem much more pragmatic to have one type of plan which was adaptable 
for different types of communes . Indeed, during 1981, the author witnessed at least two 
long meetings of DDE staff and communal councils tat which the differences between POS 
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and ZEP were explained. It was felt that these were not fully understood at the end of the 
meetings, and the prevailing view of ZEP was that somehow the commune was being 
short-changed by choosing this plan. 
The carte communale, unlike the ZEP or POS, is not a statutory document ^19^  and thus was 
not " opposable aux tiers" (20). These plans were produced in small, rural communes as a 
quick guide to areas which were and were not developable. These were much less detailed 
than ZEP and not at all comparable to POS. However, they probably provided support to the 
notion that POS could be simplified. Indeed, the simplified POS experiments mentioned 
earlier, at Vitry and Samer in Pas de Calais, may have arisen from these documents. 
From the above discussion it would seem that no other comparable or suitable alternative 
plans to POS exist - plans which would provide for more effective land use management 
Rather, on review of the other available plans, the view taken is that POS is the best there is 
at present. Yet there are instruments listed in Table 5.1, which might reduce the 
effectiveness of the POS. 
The ZAC is by far the most serious threat to POS; at least this was the case from the early to 
mid seventies. The question of the POS/ZAC relationship and the point raised in Chapter 3 
that the latter" efface le POS " is crucial in this evaluation. Essentially the ZAC is an area in 
which a municipality or a public development corporation ( un établissement public ) makes 
all the arrangements for land use management including acquisition of land, servicing of land 
and plan preparation. Then, the land can be used in two ways. First, a public ZAC can be 
developed directly by the public agency, ( a commune , grouping of communes, or an 
établissement public ) or the latter can tum over the development to a société mixte , a 
public/private partnership. The public agency keeps the financial control of development 
and covers any deficits. This type of ZAC, the public ZAC, corresponds to the former Zone 
à Urbaniser en Priorité (ZUP-priority urban development zone). The second type of ZAC, 
known as the private ZAC, is one where the public agency (commune, grouping of 
communes, or établissement public ) takes the initiative but finds a private developer for the 
implementation and for underwriting part of the costs of infrastructure (21). In both cases, 
the documentation of the ZAC includes the PAZ ( le Plan d'Aménagement de Zone - zone 
plan) and the detailed implementation programme. The contents are development details. 
The preparation is primarily a technical exercise and does not involve a groupe de travail. In 
essence, up until 1976, the ZAC could be prepared entirely at the expense of POS 
provisions. A circular in 1973 for example, states: 
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" La ZAC ne doit pas, en général, être prévu au plan comme l'un de ses 
éléments de réalisations " 
(The ZAC need not in general be predetermined in the plan (POS) as one of its 
implementation elements). 
The same circular also says that a ZAC should, " normalement ", be in a NA zone of the 
POS; i.e. normally be in a zone for future development. The word "normally", of course, 
was interpreted liberally. A second circular in February 1974 says that a ZAC cannot be 
designated without either a POS being started or a SDAU being approved and that ZAC must 
be developed in NA or U zones. However, the circular goes on to point out that: 
" Il faut rappeler ... qu'aucun texte réglementaire ne vient limiter la portée 
générale de la règle 'la ZAC egace le POS '" (23> 
(It must be remembered that there is not a single text which limits the rule that 
the ZAC takes precedence over the POS) 
Thus, the circulars had not changed the practice which was that a ZAC could be produced 
which had not been included in the POS provisions for services and infrastructure. By 
1976 the situation appeared to have changed and the ZAC became subject to an enquête 
publique . In addition, as pointed out in Chapter 3, a private ZAC could not go ahead 
without it being compatible with the POS, and a public ZAC could not go ahead until the 
POS was complete. Moreover, if the POS was in the process of public consultation, a ZAC 
had to be delayed until the POS was published. These new arrangements seemed to have 
involved a tightening up, but there was still an important anomaly; that is, the PAZ was to 
be integrated into the POS before the ZAC was, in fact, approved; a legal departure some 
may say. Nevertheless, it was evident that, in housing ZACs for example (which accounted 
for the biggest number of ZACs) the number of completions fell from 31% of total house 
completions in 1970-1972 to 12% of house completions in 1976. Thus, even the earlier 
circular of 1974 may have begun to deter development by ZAC and the ZAC seemed to 
become less popular than in the early seventies. Set within the context of social and 
economic change, the relative decrease could also be explained by the first effects of the 
economic recession and its impact on housing starts. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the changes in the nature of housing subsidy may also have been responsible for 
fewer housing ZACs. Irrespective of this decreasing number of ZAC, the instrument was 
favoured by many mayors and it was also favoured by the new town development 
corporations. In the latter, the whole town was developed on the basis of a master plan 
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which outlined roads, services and infrastructure, and within this area the plan identified 
ZACs for detailed implementation. This process was highly successful in the new 
towns (24). Yet an individual commune , often without a SDAU or POS, is hardly 
comparable to a new town with a master plan. It is conceivable that ZAC could replace POS 
in situations where a continuously monitored and updated SDAU existed, provided the 
SDAU was of a scale sufficiently detailed to guide a number of action-oriented ZAC plans, 
and provided its content was not too generalised and was fully given the support of the 
commune(s) in its area. Given the poor record of intercommunal agreements and given the 
poor record of SDAU approvals, the latter would be difficult to achieve. 
By the late seventies, housing ZAC were few, as noted above. By contrast, another 
instrument, the lotissement (plot subdivision) was on the increase. This instrument is often 
described as a mini ZAC but it is usually much less onerous to acquire a subdivision 
approval than to achieve approval of a ZAC. Indeed, the lack of public accountability by 
way of even an enquête publique has made this a more favoured vehicle for private housing 
development in urban and future development zones (U and NA zones) - especially for small 
developments. By contrast to the ZAC, provisions for lotissement have to be included in 
the POS if one exists. In the absence of POS, lotissement approval and subsequent 
permissions for each of the housing units in it are more easily achieved. 
The two instruments for expropriation of land, ZIF, Zone d'Intervention Foncière and ZAD, 
Zone d'Aménagement Différé, are worthy of mention in relation to POS. Essentially these 
arc two very different instruments. The ZIF are possible in U zones (urban zones) of the 
POS in communes of greater than 10 000 inhabitants and if they arc requested by the 
Municipal Council. These can be asked for in three sets of circumstances: first, for the 
implementation of social policy such as social housing or collective facilities(25), secondly, 
for the rehabilitation of older housing and thirdly for public open space schemes or for public 
land banks. Price for pre-empted land in these areas is market value or a price that can be 
based on arbitration using prices which were current the previous year. There is no time 
duration for the ZIF. This latter factor is a problem in respect of urban blight and in respect 
of uncertainty in potential POS provisions. The ZAD tends to be used for large areas of land 
( e.g. it was used for the new towns and other large development schemes), purchase price is 
at current use value and the instrument has a duration of fourteen years. The main 
implication for POS adjacent to a ZAD area is the rise in land values that tends to occur on 
ZAD peripheries(26). Whilst the ZAD timescale is at least fixed, the implications of a ZAD 
could cause extreme pressure on POS zones in the vicinity. 
The development control measures listed in Table 5.1 are all subject to the provisions of the 
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POS. As discussed earlier in terms of dérogations, departures are often made and this casts 
doubts about the relationship between development control and development plan. Through 
monitoring the former, review and/or amendments to the latter can be made. Unfortunately, 
information systems or formal linkages (or even informal linkages) were not evident in this 
study. 
Finally, the list of planning and related land taxes. This contains an interesting set of 
measures. Taxes designed to recoup a proportion of the development value of land (and 
sometimes the non development of land), could affect the implementation of the POS. If the 
taxes are different, for example, in the various POS zones, then the likelihood of 
development actually taking place might reflect the extent to which the tax acts as a deterrent. 
In the départements studied, the formal survey of land developability for POS appeared to 
consider only physical (technical) feasibility (27). Yet the relationship of availability, 
(whether or not owners would wish to maintain the existing use of land) to developability of 
land is a crucial issue. However, this relationship was not observed in the formal survey 
stage of plan preparation. On the other hand, this is a matter which was discussed before 
and after groupe de travail meetings. 
More generally though, on the question of land and property tax, there has been considerable 
debate since the early sixties as mentioned briefly in Chapter 3. A recent conference and 
publication reviews this whole question (28) and comes to the conclusion that the land tax 
system in the pre decentralisation period was "archaic" and "unacceptable" (29>, but that it had 
not seemed to cause extensive problems for availability of development land. Discussing 
inquiries from clients about developability of their land, one private planning consultant has 
pointed out: 
" On peut dire aujourd'hui que le développement n'est dans la plupart des cas, 
absolument pas motivé par l'impôt foncier sur le terrain à bâtir en raison de son 
insignifiance notoire "(30) 
(Today one can say that in the majority of cases, development of land is not at all 
motivated by land tax on developable land because of its notorious insignificance) 
In the pre decentralisation period a dual system of land and property tax pertained as shown in 
Table 5.2: 
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Table 5.2 Subjects of Land and Property Tax and Payments by Ownen/Occupiers C1) 
Subjects of Tax* 
Property 
Housing 
Industrial/commeicial 
Agricultural buildings 
Undeveloped land 
* % rental value paid 
Owners' Payment* 
Land built on (50%) 
Land built on (50%) 
none 
Land not developed (80%) 
Occupants' Payment* 
Habitation tax (100%) 
Professional tax (100%) 
none 
none 
The percentages shown above relate to the percentage of rental value paid @2\ Whilst taxes 
raised locally, taken together, form the biggest single part of the commune revenue, these 
nevertheless account for only one third of the total commune revenue. Table 5.3 below 
provides a breakdown of communal revenues: 
Table 5.3 Sources of Communal Revenue, 1978 (in thousand million bancs, in percentages) 
Land tax 
Habitation tax 
Porfessional tax 
Other taxes 
Subtotal 
Subsidies 
Loans 
Other revenues 
Grand total 
Amount of Revenue 
7.0 
7.5 
14.6 
6.2 
35.3 
32.5 
16.8 
12.9 
% Total Revenue 
72 
7.7 
14.9 
6.4 
36.2 
33.4 
17.2 
13.2 
97.5 100 
Source: Part of table from Legrand, J M. " Les impôts fonciers et immobiliers en France " in 
Derycke, P.H. (ed) (1983) Les Enjeux de la Fiscalité Foncière , ADEF, Paris, ρ 141. 
As Legrand points out ^ 3 3^ revenue from professional and habitation taxes between 1958 and 
1978 increased and kept pace with communal expenditure, whilst land tax grew much less 
rapidly. In 19581 land tax accounted for 12.6% of total revenue whilst it only accounted for 
7 .2% in 1978.0ne of the problems of taxing land is the way in which it is classified: 
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" ... la plupart des 50 000 hectares de terrains construits chaque année et les 
dizaines de milliers d'hectares constructibles des POS échappent à l'imposition 
comme terrain à bâtir et sont imposés dans une autre catégorie à la valeur 
locative plus faible. Pour ces terrains, le rapport de l'impôt à la valeur vénale 
est négligeable - de l'arder de 0.01% a 0.0002% suivant la catégorie retenue 
(terres agricoles, friches, etc.). Indépendamment de l'inéquité du système 
(deux terrains constructibles de même valeur vénales peuvent être imposé de 
façon très différente suivant leur classification) une aussi faible imposition ne 
permet pas de décourager la rétention de terrains inutilisés ou sous-utilisés par 
leur propriétaires ".(34) 
(... most of the 50 000 ha of land developed each year and the tens of thousands 
of hectares of developable land in POS, escape the levying of taxes as 
developable land and are placed in another category where the rental value is 
much weaker. For these land types, the relationship between tax to sale value is 
negligible - of the order of 0.01% to 0.002% depending on the category 
(agricultural land, derelict land, etc.). Independent of the iniquity of the system 
(two pieces of developable land of the same sale value can be treated very 
differently depending on their classification) such a weak levy does not 
discourage the retention of unused land or underused land by their owners) 
The above situation is particularly evident, as might be expected, in the NA zones of the 
POS. Also, as Trapitzine has argued (35\ the difference in the way POS treat NA regulations 
are often significant. For example, he points out that the" réglementations précise" (precise 
regulations) exist in NA zones in what he calls "strict POS", whereas in other POS, no 
details whatsoever are given in NA zones. Thus, in the latter case the owner has no way of 
being able to calculate potential value. It is his view that the situation could be cleared up by 
inclusion of regulations and programming in NA zones in all POS. From a technical point of 
view, this suggestion would seem to be useful because it might lead to a more realistic 
amount of land being earmarked for future development (more of an equality between supply 
and demand than at present) and more realistic future programming of associated services, 
facilities and indeed, revenue raising. 
Land and property tax might have been expected to have played a significant role in reducing 
the effectiveness of POS during the predecentralisation period. In particular, such taxes and 
the relationship between these and land availability is often a close one and could have been 
an issue which might have let to more dérogations of the POS. This has not been the case. 
Nevertheless, if the tax system were to be updated as it could be, then this is a factor which 
could affect development and, in turn, the effectiveness of the POS. However, designing a 
land tax system and putting it into practice is very difficult. As Reynard (36) has rightly 
pointed out, four Ministries are involved in land and property tax in France, the Ministries of 
Finance, Planning, Interior and Agriculture and the degree of co-operation amongst these 
leaves a lot to be desired ! 
no 
Conclusions 
This chapter has completed the review and analysis of TOS and the preparation of POS. It 
has shown that Thoenig's model of centre/periphery relations would seem to apply to the 
case of POS preparation. It has also shown that despite the weak planning content of the 
POS, the plan would appear to be the most effective tool at the present time in France for the 
control and management of land use. The preparation of these plans over the pre 
decentralisation period is not only a technical process but it is also a political one. These 
plans, jointly prepared by the state through the Directions Départementales de l'Equipement 
and by the periphery through the communal mayor, are one of the few instruments which 
employ formal, joint preparation meetings and are considered an effective way for the 
observer to study and to gain an understanding of these two processes. 
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CHAPTER б - THE CHANGING CONTEXTS OF LAND USE PLANNING 
IN FRANCE AFTER DE GAULLE AND BEFORE MITTERRAND 
Introduction 
The resignation of de Gaulle in 1969 followed by his death one year later marks the end of an 
important era in France this century. Interestingly, the statement that, 
" Un grand homme est celui qui laisse dans un grand embaras ceux qui viennent 
après lui " W 
(a great man is someone who leaves those who come after him in a quandary), 
when set within the context of the seventies, is more ironic than the reader might imagine. It 
is true that substantial achievements had been made in the post-war period up to the late 
sixties but, as Ardagh points out, the troubles of 1968, albeit a complex set of protests, 
nevertheless reflected the "failure of economic change to be matched by social and structural 
changes" ^ . Out of the protests in the seventies emerged a new mood in France, a mood 
which, even in the early part of the decade, bore witness to the scepticism of growth and, as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 1, scepticism about national and strategic planning associated 
with growth. More generally, less stability in social, economic and political life was 
apparent 
By 1981, the victory of a Left wing President and Government was seen by many as the start 
of another new era in the country but, today, one might question this belief. The third part of 
this book will address this question, especially in the field of land use planning whilst this 
chapter will focus on the contexts of planning between the death of " un grand homme " in 
1970 and the rise to power of another in 1981. 
The seventies are viewed here as a period of transition; a transition not only between Right 
and Left wing political control, but also between the heady days of buoyant economic growth 
and the cold grip of recession; between the quest for modernism and gigantism and the 
revival of nostalgia and "small is beautiful"; between an "overdose of centralisation", to use 
Hoffman's term W, and a seeking of release from the state and its bureaucratic apparatus. 
France of the seventies was clearly as Hoffman describes, "a series of delicate balances" ^4). 
However, the balances and transitions are more easily seen in retrospect than during the 
period itself is also true. Thus, a "tranquil revolution", to borrow Kesselman's phrase (5\ 
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seemed to take place in the period. 
The Economy in the Seventies 
The economy inherited by Pompidou in 1969, whilst not without problems, was indeed a 
modernised economy with continued growth of tertiary sector employment(6). Also, the 
spatial distribution of industry and employment over the early seventies showed much less 
regional imbalance than demonstrated in earlier decades. Nevertheless, large sectors of 
agriculture and industry were still out of date, some areas remained untouched by economic 
development, inflation had begun and an unstable foreign trading balance was evident ^\ 
These characteristics continued into the late seventies when, after the quadrupling of oil 
prices in 1973, unemployment became a phenomenon hitherto unknown in post-war France. 
The impact of sectoral employment change and unemployment was particularly great for the 
simple reason that the late sixties to early seventies corresponded with a marked increase in 
the total economically active population, the result of increased birth rates and immigration 
after the war and during the sixties respectively. Moreover, as Tuppen points out, a rise in 
female activity rates during the sixties swelled the economically active population and, in 
tum, the unemployment totals O. Table 6.1 below describes the changing sectoral 
employment position 1954-1981. 
Table 6.1 Percentage Sectoral Distribunon of the French Labour Force, 1954-1981 
1954 1962 1968 1975 1981 
Primary 28 20 15 10 9 
Secondary 36 38 40 39 33 
Temaiy 36 42 45 51 58 
Source: Tuppen. J. (19831 The Economic Geography of France. Croom Helm, ρ 6 
From the table, the most significant changes in the seventies are the decline of the secondary 
sector and the continued growth of the tertiary sector. Although the broad breakdown by 
sectoral distribution conceals the subtleties of changes within sectors, the emerging 
employment pattern was the continued disappearance of the farmer and the rise of the white 
collar worker. 
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In industry, the early seventies saw the thrust of Pompidou's policy directed towards 
restructuring the steel, shipbuilding, electronics and data processing industries. Mergers, 
common over the period, were encouraged by government aid and, in some instances, with 
government as participant. During the late seventies, Giscard's policy was more specifically 
geared to support for high technology industries. In parallel with these policies over the 
seventies, medium sized towns, villes moyennes , (towns of 20-100 000 population) were 
granted state aid for industry, environmental improvement schemes and schemes to improve 
the quality of life, in an effort to have them fulfil a role as receivers of migrating rural 
populations and to curb the further drift to the regional metropoli or Paris. In the late 
seventies, aid for even smaller towns and villages was introduced as part of rural planning 
policy through a contrat de pays - a rural planning contract - for towns of 5-15 000 
population. Generally the objectives of this scheme were the same as the villes moyennes 
scheme; diversify employment, assist local service provision and improve the quality of life. 
Taken together, these two spatial policies over the seventies completed a process of aid to 
towns which had been started earlier in the sixties by La DATAR with the métropoles 
d'équilibre strategy. 
The growth of unemployment over the seventies shows distinct periods of rapid increase; in 
1970, the unemployment total stood at 250 000 whereas by 1974 it had risen to 420 000 and, 
by the end of that year, it had nearly doubled compared with 1970 . A further surge was 
evident over 1980 (after the second oil price increase in 1979) when the total increased by 
500 000 in that one year. Then, by 1982, the total stood at 9% of the economically active, 
just over two millions O. 
Interestingly, Ardagh describes the reaction in France to the changing circumstances as 
almost one of disbelief to begin with: 
"The French had become so used to a steady 5 or 6% annual growth rate that a 
drop to 1 or 2% now seemed a calamity. You could even argue that they have 
been reacting like spoiled children, deprived of some luxury toy, for, in fact, 
real incomes continued to rise 1973-79, if at a slow rate"(10) 
Yet perhaps the French can be forgiven their reactions; they were not the only country to be 
caught out by oil price increases and, even in 1973, the Hudson Institute was projecting 
optimistic economic forecasts for France. For example, prognostications of short-lived 
recession were made and prospects of GNP parity with W. Germany by 1985 were 
suggested (4 \ 
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National and regional plans were seriously undermined by the exogenous factors of the 
economy. Whilst the Sixth Plan ran its course, its objectives were never achieved and the 
introduction of the Barre Stabilisation Plan in September 1976, at a time when the Seventh 
National Plan was due to be implemented, was viewed as: 
"... another in a long line of counter-inflationary packages interrupting the 
development path predicted in the Plan and rendering its objectives 
redundant" (12> 
Actually, the redundancy of the plan was the expression of a new philosophy in the political 
economy of the country. Bane's predecessor as Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, promoted a 
"defensive" approach to the economic crisis and "evinced the same mixture of protectionism 
and selective entrepreneurship which has traditionally characterised the French approach to 
industrial problems" №\ In other words, Chirac espoused the traditional Gaullist, post war, 
Keynesian state capitalism. In 1976, when Chirac resigned after clashes with D'Estaing 
over the introduction of reflationary measures, the Giscardians, with Barre as Prime 
Minister, introduced the classic liberal monetarist approach including price freezes, pay 
restraint, credit restrictions and severe limits on public expenditure. Although the Barre 
Stabilisation Plan was scheduled to last one year, it was extended and lasted for three years. 
Most commentators agree (14* that the track record of the Barre approach was mixed. In 
addition, the notion that there was a return to a free market or laissez faire has been shown to 
be untrue (15\ Over the period 1976-1979, inflation increased, unemployment increased, 
trade imbalances increased and some support was given to firms with problems. In contrast, 
investments and growth held up over the same period. National planning over these same 
years moved closer to multi-annual state budgeting. Thus, it was not surprising that the 
Eighth Plan, due to begin in 1980, was viewed as a rather futile exercise and "... threatened 
to be a further stage in the un-planning of National Planning" ( 1 6 ) . Further, it is not 
surprising that, when faced with uncertainty of the nature and scale experienced from 1973 
onwards, land use planning was seen politically as much safer, more certain and a more 
credible activity than national or regional planning. 
The Social Context of the Seventies 
In the same way as the economy experienced radical change in the seventies, so the 
population changed very differenuy to the previous decades. Total population grew over 
the decade but between 1975-1982 ( the last intercensal period ) the total increase was only 
1.7 millions (from 52.6 millions in 1975 to 54.3 millions in 1982 cf. 49.9 millions in 
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1968). Growth of population was increasingly caused by natural increase rather than 
natural increase and migration. Table 6.2 shows the variation in growth 1962-1982. 
Even although natural increase slowed down over the seventies, it should not be forgotten 
that, compared to neighbouring countries, 0.4% was still a high figure (cf. UK and W. 
Germany at 0.17% and 0.15% in 1980 respectively). In part, the natural increase remained 
high over the seventies as a result of continuing and favourable social benefits to families 
with three or more children, the post war policy mentioned in Chapter 1. 
Table 6.2 Percentage Variation in Population Growth and Components of Growth, 1962-1982 
1962-68 1968-75 1975-82 
Population growth: 
Total increase 1.2 0.8 0.5 
Natural increase 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Net migration 0.5 02 0.1 
Source: Ogden, P. (1985) "Counterurbanisation in France, the results of the 1982 census", Geography. 
Vol 70, Part 1, ρ 25 
Apart from the above demographic changes, three important spatial changes in population 
distribution were evident over the seventies. First, and generally, urbanisation (i.e.the share 
of people in towns of greater than 2 000 total population) reached 80% by 1976 (compared to 
66.2% in 1968 and 70.6% in 1970). Secondly, decentralisation of population from city 
centres to suburbs took place and thirdly, the déconcentration of population to smaller towns 
and to peripheral areas was also evident Together the last two mentioned patterns have been 
described by Ogden ^17^ as countemrbanisation. 
His study of population change over the last intercensal period, 1975-82, mainly at the level 
of the département provides some interesting findings. Most of his findings, in fact, 
confirm trends which had begun in the previous intercensal period, 1968-1975. The 
départements which showed population decline in the 1975-1982 period included the rural 
départements in the Massif Central and Pyrenees, départements in the north and north-east 
and the inner départemets of the Paris agglomeration. The départements which showed 
population growth over the period were those outer départements of the Paris 
agglomeration, those in the southern Rhône Valley, Languedoc, Provence/Côte d'Azur, the 
Alpine areas, Normandy and the west Littoral. Thus, many départements which had 
traditionally been associated with net out migration saw a reverse of the trend. 
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Ogden's study also quotes the findings of Boudoul and Faur (18\ a study of rates of change 
in urban as against rural areas, which provides a more detailed picture of change. The study 
divided all rural communes into three types; those lying within a ZPIU (Zone de 
Peuplement Industriel ou Urbain - zone of industrial or urban population) (19), those near to 
or adjacent to a ZPIU(20) and those outside a ZPIU. Of all rural communes in this latter 
category, 61% lost population and 39% gained population. These communes are said to 
represent the "pure" rural heartlands. Of the rural communes near to a ZPIU, 55% 
increased their population. By contrast, of rural communes within a ZPIU, 74% grew. 
Further, it was noted that the ZPIU's of 50-100,000 population were the fastest growing 
group. The ZPIU's with more than 100,000 population grew less rapidly. Thus, Boudoul 
and Faur demonstrated that a rural heartland with classic decline of population still existed, 
but the extent of these and the rate of decline had decreased. As Ogden says, rural 
depopulation seemed almost at an end by 1982. This pattern of change may suggest success 
of the villes moyennes policy but may also reflect a tendency that would have existed 
without such a policy. 
Boudoul and Faur also looked at population for all communes W over the same period, 
1975-1982, and showed that communes at the core of urban areas with greater than 50,000 
and greater than 100,000 population were declining; of the 109 communes in the former 
category, 86 lost population and of the 39 in the latter category, 34 lost population. Paris 
was also shown to have lost population for the second successive intercensal period. In 
1975, the population of Paris had fallen to 2.3 millions, by 1982 it had fallen to 2.17 
millions, with eighteen of the twenty arrondissements (urban neighbourhoods) suffering a 
decline. Table 6.3 shows the percentage population change in selected urban areas and their 
urban core communes over the 1968-1982 period. 
Of importance in the table is that over the 1968-1975 intercensal period the urban core 
communes of only four large cities showed decline, Paris, Lyon, Nantes and Lille. 
However, over the 1975-1982 period, all urban core communes of cities declined and, in 
addition, the whole urban areas of Paris, Lyon and Lille also declined in population. Loss of 
population from cities, and especially the core communes of cities, can be accounted for by 
several processes and policies relating mostly to housing throughout the seventies. Ogden 
cites two explanations(22); first, decline in available land for building, and secondly, decline 
in household size. 
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Table 6.3 Percentage Population Change in Major Cities, 1968-1982 
Urbani 
Paris 
Lyon 
Marseille 
Lille 
Bordeaux 
Toulouse 
Nantes 
Nice 
% change 
1968-75 
3.6 
7.5 
5.9 
5.1 
7.5 
14.1 
11.8 
11.4 
% change 
1975-82 
•05 
-0.1 
0.9 
-0.1 
2.6 
2.5 
2.5 
2.7 
Source: 
Urban core 
% change 
1968-75 
-11.1 
-13.5 
2.3 
-8.8 
17.5 
0.7 
-0.9 
6.5 
: the 1982 census", 
% change 
1975-82 
-5.8 
-9.6 
-3.9 
-10.7 
-6.7 
-8.1 
-6.2 
-23 
Geoeraphv. 
Vol 70, Part 1, ρ 29. (The above table was adapted by Odgen from Tables 5 and 6 of 
Boudoul and Faur (1982)) 
In support of the former explanation, it is worth remembering the effects of rent freeze from 
World War I to 1948 and the lack of incentive to build new property. Thus, old, high 
density inner city property continued into the early seventies. In 1974, for example, as 
much as 43% of all dwellings were pre first World War ^\ 
Pre 1915 43% 
1915-1948 16% 
1949-1967 26% 
Post 1967 15% P*) 
Most of this old property was in the inner city. At the same time, new housing development 
up to the early seventies was largely suburban development and whilst urban renewal began 
in Paris in the sixties, other towns and cities have seen a slower start. Under the 
circumstances, in urban areas land for new building is limited. Allied to this, and in support 
of Ogden's second point, rent freeze meant that families tended to stay in the same apartment 
over the family life cycle rather than move as the family expanded then contracted. 
Consequently, apartments which had been over-occupied in the post war decades 
increasingly became under-occupied in the sixties and seventies or, at least, were occupied 
by fewer people. Other explanations of population decline in inner cities, however, are 
rehabilitation of old properties, urban renewal, decentralisation of employment, substantial 
rent increases post 1979, change of taste in housing requirements and changes in the 
financial incentives for housing. Urban rehabilitation, for example, has meant not only the 
gentrification of inner city residential property, and thus higher rents: it has also, in many 
cases, led to the combination of several small apartments to form one larger apartment. 
Urban renewal has often resulted in the construction of new property at lower densities than 
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the cleared property . Both processes have resulted in lower population numbers living in 
some inner city areas and both processes have also resulted in forced moves to suburban 
locations. A clear consequence of forced residential moves has been long commuting time, 
in Paris especially, but also in the larger cities. Even Delouvrier, the Director of the Paris 
District and responsible for the 1965 SDAU, has admitted that in the seventies this has 
caused problems: 
" Le plus grand défaut que l'on puisse reprocher en effet aux dernier plans qui 
ont été faits en France est de n'avoir pas établi de cohérence entre le nombre de 
logements que le pays veut construire et les infrasturctures de transport 
nécessaires. Il s'ensuit un retard dans la réalisarion des équipements de voirie 
traduisant par un encombrement des centre-villes et un éloignement en distance · 
temps des banlieues qui commence à être insupportable " ^ 
(The most serious fault one can blame on the last plans produced in France is 
not having made the link between the number of housing units the country 
wanted to build and the necessary transport infrastructure. A delay in the 
completion of roads, resulting in clogging up of town centres and a long 
commuting journey from suburbs, begin to become insupportable) 
As a consequence of the above problems, many offices and industries also decentralised 
from inner cities to suburban locations №\ Increases in rentals after legislation in 1979 may 
have further accentuated decentralisation and inner city population loss. It is estimated that, 
after abolition of the rent controls which had been introduced in 1948 ^ 6 \ rentals increased 
by between 30-90% despite the fact that Government had agreed with landlords a maximum 
increase of 19% . Yet it is said that even the public sector exceeded this limit ^27). 
Finally, it has already been mentioned in Chapter 1 that the trend in housing moved away 
from flatted property to maisons individuelles (single family dwellings) over the seventies. 
Figures in Table 6.4 of house completions show this trend. As well as showing the change 
in taste in house types, these figures are also a reflection of the changes in state housing 
subsidies which were introduced in 1976. Before 1976, government subsidy for the 
housing sector took the form of aide à la pierre, aid to the constructor. This helped to boost 
construction rates during the late fifties, sixties and early seventies. Then, in 1976, aide à la 
personne , aid to the consumer, became the dominant method of housing subsidy. The 
subsidy is called aide personalise au logement (personal housing subsidy) because the 
amount of tax relief for purchase or rent is calculated on the basis of income, loan (if 
appropriate), rental (if appropriate) and number of dependants. In other words, the amount 
of subsidy is calculated to fill the gap between actual rent or monthly repayment and the 
minimum rent or repayment that is "tolerable" in the light of family income and family 
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circumstances (28) 
The fìgures in Table 6.4 also show the slowing down of construction of multi-family 
dwellings. This is also a reflection of Bane's cutback in public expenditure and the much 
reduced subsidy to HLM organisations, the most active agencies in this category of housing 
provision. Funded by the Ceùsse des Prêts (Loan Fund), the HLM organisations had seen a 
steady erosion, from 1961 onwards, of their privileged position receiving of low interest 
loans over a long repayment period. In 1961, for example, Central Government loans from 
the Caisse des Prêts were repayable over 60 years at 1% interest whereas, by 1970, loans 
were payable over 40 years at 2.95% interest. In addition, tthe interest rate for the 
supplementary Caisse des Prêts loans required as top up to the loans, also increased. 
Table 6.4 House Types Buut. 1957-1980 
Year 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 (e) 
1980 (p) 
One family 
Dwellings 
108 000 
99 000 
87 000 
86 000 
96 000 
107 000 
121000 
129 000 
134 000 
137 000 
139 000 
169 000 
195 000 
103 000 
206 000 
241000 
246 000 
247 000 
238 000 
256 000 
273 000 
278 000 
270 000 
270 000 
%of 
total 
35 
32 
27 
25 
28 
31 
32 
30 
30 
32 
32 
39 
39 
38 
40 
43 
44 
45 
46 
52 
57 
63 
65 
64 
Multi-family 
Dwellings 
198 000 
209 000 
232 000 
252 000 
243 000 
237 000 
256 000 
300 000 
311000 
288 000 
297 000 
265 000 
304 000 
298 000 
310 000 
314 000 
312 000 
302 000 
277 000 
241000 
202 000 
162 000 
145 000 
150 000 
%of 
Total 
65 
68 
73 
75 
72 
69 
68 
70 
70 
68 
68 
61 
61 
62 
60 
57 
56 
55 
54 
48 
43 
37 
35 
36 
Total 
306 000 
308 000 
318 000 
338 000 
339 000 
344 000 
377 000 
429 000 
445 000 
425 000 
436 000 
434 000 
499 000 
481000 
516 000 
555 000 
556 000 
549 000 
515 000 
497 000 
475 000 
440 000 
415 000 
420 000 
(e) estimate 1957-67 and 1979 
(p) projection 1980 
Source: Reynard, V. "France: urban land markets - a problem of equity and efficiency" in Laconte, P. 
and Strong, A. (1982) Land Taxation and Land Use. Lincoln Institute Monograph 82-3, ρ 12 
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As well as the changes described above in relation to population and housing, over the 
seventies, other less "visible" social changes have been discussed by French scholars. 
Ardagh, for example, talks about nostalgia being in fashion when "... the novelty of 
modernism wore off' (29). The rise in green parties in Europe in general was also felt in 
France. This tied in with the political criticisms of the Gaullist years, the anti-gigantism 
philosophy and it also related to the interest in conservation and preservation. 
A further change in the seventies was the rise in consumerism, especially related to the new 
interest in housing. Table 6.5 below gives a rough guide to the ownership of a few key 
domestic appliances: 
Table 6.5 Percentage Owneiship of Selected Consumer Durables, 1954-1979 
1954 1970 1979 
68 
93 
23 
13 
76 
88 
31 
Passenger cars 
Re&igeratois 
Deep Freezes 
Dishwashers 
Clothes Washers 
TV (all kinds) 
TV (colour only) 
Source: Ardai 
21 
7 
0 
0 
8 
1 
0 
gh, J. (1982) France in tire Eighties, Pi 
56 
79 
0 
2 
55 
69 
0 
:nguin, 
The figures above illustrate Ardagh's point raised earlier that real incomes continued to rise 
over the period and consumer expenditure was healthy despite the shock and gloom of the 
recession. 
What most of these changes seem to add up to is a picture of a more dull, less energetic 
society in the seventies than soceity evident in the days of Monnet after the War or in the 
days of de Gaulle when enthusiastic young technocrats promoted social policies to an eager 
and receptive public. Coping psychologically with economic recession and its associated 
evils has been no easier in France than in her neighbouring states. The interesting difference 
in France compared with most of her neighbours was that the "tranquil revolution" of the 
seventies resulted in significant political change to the Left in 1981; the first time in 
twenty-three years that alternance had happened. The success of the Socialist party in the 
1981 elections will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, however, it is worth 
commenting on changing centre/periphery relations over the seventies, as a prelude to the 
123 
decentralisation which the Socialists introduced. 
Political and Administrative Changes in the Seventies 
De Gaulle's referendum of 1969 had included substantial proposals for regional reform. 
After the referendum defeat, a period of three years elapsed before the Pompiduou 
government presented new regional reforms. The de Gaulle proposals would have given the 
regions legal authority and responsibility for transport and infrastructure, for housing aid 
and for land use planning. In practice, the régions of the 1972 reforms did not receive any 
of the powers proposed in 1969. Whilst the 1972 reforms laid down that there would be 
more regional involvement in regional investment by Central Government, only modest 
revenue raising powers were, in fact, introduced (through driving licence fees, vehicle 
registration fees and a supplementary regional tax on property transfers). The regional 
préfet continued as chief executive officer responsible to the Minister of the Interior and to 
two regional bodies, the Regional Council and the Consultative Economic and Social 
Committee. 
At the communal level, the seventies saw much more activity by way of a series of studies 
and proposals for change. Indeed, even earlier, almost immediately after the last of the 
arrangements for communal groupings had been introduced in 1966, debate on communal 
reform continued through Fouchet, the then Minister of the Interior(30). His report in 1968 
suggested compulsory mergers for small communes (3I) and suggested that arrangements for 
mergers and decisions on them should be the responsibility of the préfet. Both Pompidou 
and Marcellin, Fouchet's successor in 1969, were against these suggestions, which had been 
postponed for debate in 1968 because of the troubles. In his inaugural speech, Pompidou 
was explicit in his defence of communal autonomy: 
"The French remain profoundly attached to their municipal life, and the 
commune constitutes the foremost living expression of this collective 
confidence which finds its expression in national unity". (32) 
The subsequent communal Reform Act of 1971, the Marcellin Act, gave considerable 
concessions to small communes allowing them to veto proposed mergers and Fouchet's idea 
of intercommunal sectors was abandoned. The Act, however, provided for a survey of 
possible mergers to be conducted by préfets and a Commission d'Elus (committee of 
councillors) (33\ The latter went on to suggest 1 992 mergers (i.e. a reduction of 3 516 
communes or approximately 10% of all communes ) whereas ¡he préfets who also studied 
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the possibilities, suggested 3 589 mergers (i.e. a reduction of 6 186 communes or 
approximately 18% of all communes ). The outcome of these proposals was disappointing 
for several reasons; first, the préfets failed to notify at least one third of the communes 
involved in the merger plans; secondly, many communes resisted merger and thirdly, many 
communes simply ignored the merger notification. The results of the exercise were initially 
encouraging and in 1972,1328 communes merged to form 526 new communes. However, 
by 1975 progress had tailed off and by that year, only 1957 communes had merged to form 
about 800 new communes (34\ The 1971 Act also provided for limits to the tutelle(35). 
Whilst the threat of the tutelle persisted throughout the seventies, the decade saw the 
reduction in its use and prefectoral intervention was only likely in cases of illegality rather 
than in cases where the préfet felt that decisions had been unwise ^6). 
Over the seventies investigation of the reform of subnational administration continued and, in 
1976, the Guichaid Report was set up: 
"To improve the capacity of the communes to bargain with the administration 
by removing the necessity for previous approval of communal plans and 
projects"(37) 
The report recommended that the tutelle of the préfet be abolished (although he would 
remain chief executive officer) and that a stronger committee structure responsible for 
communal functions would be created at the departmental level. The report was not acted 
upon and the poor results for the Government in the communal elections of 1977, followed 
by legislative elections in 1978, resulted in Giscard's manifesto proposals for a national 
debate on communal reform. This matter figured prominently in the elections and after 
success in these, the Government launched the promised debate. This resulted in three Acts 
during 1979 and 1980 which included some reform of local taxation(38), further measures to 
encourage communal merger, and provision for more financial benefits to mayors and 
communal employees. 
Thus, increasingly over the seventies, debate over centre/peripheral power shifted away from 
the idea of regional reform especially to reform of the commune and to a lesser extent, the 
département.. Allied to the changmg emphasis was, as Ashford points out, "an accumulation 
of political compromises"(39) which, at least in part, is a reflection of the changing internal 
dynamics of the political parties and their coalition partners. As Cemy says: 
"What has become clear in the late seventies is that the party system has not 
settled into a pattern of stable competition, despite the realignments of the first 
decade and a half of the 5th Republic"(40) 
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Cleavages in the Right revolved round economic policy whilst cleavages in the Left reflected 
the Communist Party's fear that the Left alliance had obscured its distinctive identity. By 
1979, the Right wing parties found themselves with a near constitutional crisis when the neo 
Gaullists threatened to refuse to vote for the Giscardian budget in the Assemblée Nationale. 
The re-emergence of a multi-party system at the time was said to have been possible by "the 
most constraining constitutional mechanisms", and coalition partners seemed to be spending 
more time at odds with their partners than with the opposition (41\ Despite the fact that the 
Communists had publicly criticised the Socialists since 1978 of being unreliable and possibly 
untrustworthy to the French workers (42\ the strength of the Socialist party at the local level 
continued through to the Presidential election, and the PC supported them in the second 
round of voting. 
Thus, on May 10th 1981, François Mitterrand, leader of the PS since 1971, was elected 
President of the Republic with 51.75% of the votes (cf. V. Giscard d'Estaing, 48.2%). In 
the subsequent legislative elections, the PS and allied Left parties gained just over two thirds 
of the seats in the Assemblée Nationale . In the choice of President and in the choice of 
party, the French voted for change and progress. Ardagh, citing Bernard Cathelat, the well 
known sociologist, on the PS victory, specifically mentions the nature of change and 
progress: 
"I think we have now come to the end of a thirty year cycle when the idea of 
progress was identified with economic expansion, technology and 
internationalism. In these elections it is likely that many people voted for 
another concept - a progress based more on a prudent return to the repository of 
past experience; related more to private quality of life than to distant adventures; 
linked to notions of ecology, mutualism, self-help" ^ 
The pressures on the Mitterrand government to satisfy these desires, the desires of a society 
still steeped in economic recession, were no less great in France than in neighbouring 
countries. If and how a particular brand of French Socialism could achieve this was clearly 
the challenge for the eighties. 
When we look at the election promises of the Socialists and of Mitterrand, only some of the 
desires mentioned above appear to be recognised. More particularly, the Presidential 
election campaign did not, in fact, relate to the PS manifesto, the Projet Socialiste (44\ 
Rather, Mitterrand chose to pursue a campaign based on his own propositions which he 
presented in a calm, shrewd and statesman-like manner. Indeed, Cemy expresses the 
Mitterrand campaign style well when he says: 
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"He presented himself as a force tranquille · calm strength - in contrast to the 
increasingly arrogant style of Giscard d'Estaing, the populist campaign of the 
neo-Gaullist Jacques Chirac (whom Giscard had referred to in April 1979 as un 
aginé ) , and the rather strident justificatorv tone of the Communist candidate, PC 
General Secretary, Georges Marchais"(45^ 
After the euphoria of the May victory and during the period which Mitterrand described as 
his "state of grace", the new Mauroy Government, which could almost be described as the 
first "party" Government of the Fifth Republic ^46), were faced with implementing a mixed 
bag of proposals. These proposals not only included the President's propositions and the 
Projet Socialiste propositions, but a range of policies and proposals which had been drawn 
up to accommodate the factions within the PS itself and within the PS, PC and minor Left 
wing parties. 
Essentially, there were two main thrusts to the reforms proposed: first, reforms which were 
specifically socialist in character and which tried to reduce inequalities in society or tried to 
weaken the role of capitalism in the State; secondly, there were reforms which were not 
particularly socialist in character but which tried to liberalise and modernise public life. Into 
the first group fell the following: nationalisation of most of the private banks and several 
large industrial groups; tax reform and introduction of a wealth tax; raising of minimum wage 
levels; improved benefits for early retirement; an extra week of holidays and subsidised 
holidays for the poor, more planning; improved civil liberties. In the second category, the 
following can be identified: decentralisation of state functions to local administration which 
would be transformed into local government; liberal improvements to the police and justice 
systems. 
Commenting on the above reforms, Cerny '47^ points out three major problems with such a 
set of proposals. First, it would place a heavy strain on the policy making capacity of 
government and the policy implementing capacity of the state. Secondly, some of the 
elements were mutually contradictory, and thirdly, government financial resources were 
limited. These views will be investigated in the next two chapters, which will look at the 
propositions and outcomes in the field of land use planning within the general context of 
reorganised centre/periphery relations. 
Conclusions 
It was obvious that a colourful political leader with the stature of de Gaulle would leave a 
certain flamess in French society. But the irony mentioned at the beginning of this chapter is 
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surely reflected in the evidence presented here. No one could ever have imagined such a 
turnaround a country in the space of only one decade. The chapter has shown that, over the 
seventies, the then almost traditional or classic pattern of Paris and the provinces no longer 
applied; it has also shown that this situation, combined with the greater uncertainty in the 
external context of the country, caused primarily by changes in the oil price, created a much 
more complex environment for national and regional planning. By the end of the seventies, 
it was clear that much more innovative and imaginative approaches would be required in 
national and regional planning in the eighties. It was also clear that growing pressure to halt 
the piecemeal and interminable compromises in the reform of sub national government would 
necessitate a programme of change. Finally, it was clear from the mood of French society 
that to treat land use and environmental matters simply as one aspect of economic 
management had failed and that a more rigorous, sensitive and locally based approach to 
these issues was required Land use planning had become a matter of social and political 
concern over the decade and a central theme in the PS programme for the eighties. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE NEW LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXTS OF 
LAND USE PLANNING - SOME INITIAL REACTIONS 
Introduction 
When we look at the period from 1981 to 1985, it is clear that the new Socialist government 
introduced a significant number of changes. Important landmarks can be identified in the 
context, procedures and substance of land use planning. The period May 1981 to March 1983 
can be characterised as the period of maximum Socialist influence in government, with the 
PS having the majority in power at both central and local levels. This period saw the 
introduction, in March 1982 and in January 1983, of the first two decentralisation Acts. 
Then, in March 1983, the PS suffered heavy losses in the communal elections^. 
Notwithstanding this setback, a third de-centralisation Act, essentially a text completing the 
provisions of the January 1983 Act, was approved in July 1983. 
During the following two yean government concentrated on the means for implementing the 
decentralisation texts, the décrets d'application (decrees for applying legislation), and began 
to formulate a new Land Use Planning Act, which emerged in July 1985. Over the same 
period, a third ministerial reshuffle took place in July 1984 when Pierre Mauroy was replaced 
as Prime Minister by Laurent Fabius . This third part of the book divides these four years, 
1981 to 1985, into two phases each of two years. The first post decentralisation phase, 
covering the period May 1981 to July 1983 and the subject of this chapter, saw the statutory as 
distinct from the administrative lead taken in respect of decentralisation. The legal provisions 
for land use planning and the post decentralisation system of local government will also be 
discussed. Then, through a presentation of the findings of an empirical study conducted in 
the summer of 1983 ( 2 \ the initial reactions of actors in the plan making process to 
decentralisation will be examined. Chapter 8, describing the second phase of the post 
decentralisation period, August 1983 - December 1985, will focus on the consequences of the 
changes described in this chapter and will explore what these have meant for the progress 
and practice of land use planning. Together, Chapters 7 and 8 provide the evidence for an 
overall discussion of land use planning in the post decentralisation period, for comparison 
with the discussion of the pre decentralisation period which has been the subject of Part 2 of 
the book. This comparison will form the basis of the last chapter, in Part IV of the book. 
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The Political Window and the Decentralisation Strategy 
The new Mitterrand/Mauroy government was quick to seize the opportunity to capitalise on 
its political majority in the Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat. Thus, in the first months of 
office, they tackled the most politically sensitive part of the manifesto promises, 
nationalisation. This substantial programme was completed by February 1982 ^3\ During the 
same period, they focussed also on the second strand of their policy, decentralisation or the 
transfer of responsibilities from the state to newly formed sub national governments. The 
process of decentralising the state was masterminded by Gaston Deferte, the Minister of 
Interior and Decentralisation, who described the process as ¡a grande affaire du septennat" 
(the big issue of the 7 year period of Presidential office). The first of the Déferre 
decentralisation Acts was quickly put on the statute books, by January 1982. The third strand 
of the government's manifesto policy, planning, was discussed over the same period^ and 
the Projet de Loi (Draft Act) covering the responsibilities (including economic planning and 
land use planning), for each of the new levels of sub national government completed its 
passage through the Assemblée Nationale by June 1982. 
The Government's strategy in presentation of the decentralisation Acts is an interesting and 
unusual one. First, the strategy adopted a legal lead. As we have already seen in the 
predecentralisation discussion earlier, administrative lead or initiative had hitherto been the 
dominant approach to policy change over the 5th Republic. Secondly, decentralisation was 
to proceed by a series of Acts and not by one single Act This strategy, called "cascade 
legislation"^ or "salami tactics"^, describes a situation where government chose to start 
decentralisation by one Act which provided (he broad principles then, gradually, details were 
to be provided by successive texts. 
Several considerations may have contributed to the choice of this strategy. After the 
Guichard Report and the subsequent proposals for decentralisation of the late seventies, 
Government recognised that politicians of all colours had generally accepted the principle of 
decentralisation^. By contrast, government must have taken into account that much more 
doubt was likely to be cast on the details of the decentralisation process and especially on the 
means necessary to implement the principles. Moreover, it was likely that such doubts and 
questions could delay the passage of a single text and, taking into consideration that the 
period of their overall majority was a political window which could close after the March 
1983 communal elections, government opted for some legislation rather than none. Another 
consideration, of course, was the extensive pressure which had already been placed on state 
legislative preparation, even simply in terms of the onerous and difficult task of drafting the 
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legislation. As a result, Government may have chosen to hold back the politically sensitive 
pans of the decentralisation proposals. Finally, it is possible, given the extensive nature of 
change which their modernisation and re-organisation of the Napoleonic system of local 
administration entailed, that they had simply not worked out the details to go with the 
principles. Irrespective of which consideration or combination of considerations influenced 
Government in adopting this legislative strategy, the fact is that they saw it as the most 
appropriate at that time to achieve their aims. 
Turning to the aims of decentralisation, these have been articulated as, first, providing greater 
local democracy, secondly, clarifying the responsibilities of elected members to provide for 
ease of administration and, finally, relieving the state of the management of certain local 
affairs so as to permit more efficient handling of national issues (8). Essentially then, 
through the cascade of legislation, these aims would lead to the establishment of a system of 
"local government" in France, rather than the previous system of local administration 
described earlier in this book. Worms, député (MP) for Saône and rapporteur (reporter) on 
the second Defeire Act, describes the new system as, 
"Moins de règles mais plus de décisions; moins 'admimstration' mais plus de 
gouvernement" M 
(Less rules but more decisions; less'administration' but more government) 
Kesselman sums up the changes in the following way, 
"Henceforth, local governments are no longer considered, in effect, administrative 
arms of national bureaucracy but autonomous institutions possessing their own 
democratic legitimacy and proper powers" 0") 
Thus, the Napoleonic system of local administration was finally being reorganised and the 
reorganisation had adopted clear, guiding principles. The first of these, as Kesselman righdy 
points out d), is that France would still be a unitary state even although local governments 
would enjoy increased legal autonomy. In other words, decentralisation does not alter the 
Constitution. Secondly, decentralisation is not the opposite of centralisation as Chapuisat 
forcefully points out when he says, 
"On ne répétera jamais assez que la décentralisation n'est pas le contraire de la 
centralisation. Elle en est une manière d'être, un état plus ou moins sophistiqué 
en raison même des transfers qui rompent l'équilibre précédent et portent en eux 
le germe d'une certaine disharmonie par rapport au modèle antérieur. "W 
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(One can never repeat enough that decentralisation is not the opposite of 
centralisation. It is a state of being, a state more or less brought about by virtue 
of the transfers (of responsibilities) which break up the preceding balance 
(between the state and the communes) and which then give the germ of a certain 
disharmony compared to the former model). 
Thirdly, the functions of local governments and the responsibilities of elected members would 
be "transferred" along the following lines: 
(i) the transfer to communes is made as they exist at present, and there is no obligation on 
them to regroup or rationalise their boundaries; 
(ii) the transfer does not imply any executive or administrative hierarchy in the discharging 
of responsibilities; 
(iii) the transfer of responsibilities is paralleled by the transfer of resources; and 
(iv) different local authorities will have different specialisations^13 .^ 
There is no doubt that the decentralisation legislation was innovative in terms of the cascade 
strategy and it was also innovative in terms of the ends it was aiming to achieve. Through 
examination of the content of the legislation and then the initial reactions to it, we can, at least, 
begin to understand the differences in the context, procedures and practice of land use planning 
in post decentralisation France as against the pre decentralisation experience. 
The First Déferre Act 
The first Defeire Act deals with the rights and freedoms of the communes, départements and 
régions 0*). Given that this Act is the first in the series, the subjects to be treated in the 
subsequent texts are listed. These include the following: division of responsibilities; local tax 
and local finance; organisation of the regions; local government staffing; elections and the 
status of councillors; co-operation between communes, départements and régions; participation 
of people in civic life. Thus, as stated earlier, the first Act provides the principles whilst the 
remaining Acts begin the process of operationalising these principles. 
Turning to the provisions of the Act, the text provides for three levels of local government, 
départements, régions and communes each of which to be freely administered by councils 
elected by universal sufferage. The second main provision is the suppression of a tutelle, 
a priori supervision of the actions of mayors by the préfet, and its replacement by 
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self-executory powers for mayors and presidents of the Département Council and Région 
Council. Under the new arrangements, the préfet, renamed by the Act as the state 
representative (later renamed by decree as the Commissaire de la République), has the right of 
a posteriori intervention in the execution of decisions and recourse to a Tribunal Administratif 
(Administrative Tribunal) in cases of illegality. Under these circumstances, the Commissaire 
de la République relinquishes his former role as the principal channel between centre and 
periphery, to elected members of local governments. Allied to the change in role of the 
Commissaire de la République is the change in the role of civil servants already employed by 
the state in the régions and in the départements. Until sequential legislation was introduced, 
some staff were to be transferred to the service of subnational government without loss of 
benefits, pending legislation for the division of staff and their conditions of service. Similarly, 
some buildings and equipment were to be transferred to the subnational governments. 
The third provision of the Act with respect to the Commissaire de la République is some 
compensation for the loss of role described above. Previously, the préfet was appointed by 
the Minister of Interior with a remit to "co-ordinate" the other field services of the Ministries. 
By contrast, this Act bestows on the new Commissaire de la République the right "to direct" 
all State field services and his/her appointment is henceforth by the Council of Ministers. 
Thus, any future DDE would be responsible to the Commissaire de la République. 
A fourth provision is the suppression of the financial tutelle previously exercised by the state 
over local government budgets and its replacement by a posteriori financial control 
All pans of the texts relative to communes, départements and régions provide for greater 
powers for each authority. The commune under certain circumstances, and subject to financial 
availability, is allowed to provide subsidies and loans to private businesses and co-operatives 
and thus take a bigger part in economic development. The département is empowered to create 
a technical agency for the assistance of local governments which require technical aid. The 
agency would reduce the dependence of communes on the DDE. The région has authorised 
powers for co-ordination of public investment and for the development of regional, social, 
economic and cultural development plans. 
Both Danan № and Kesselman № point our attention to the initial reaction of the opposition to 
the first Act, which they describe respectively as being considered a "cheque on blanc" (blank 
cheque) or "an empty shell". The feeling was that the Act could do little harm since it contained 
nothing about the degree of decentralisation at different government levels nor the means by 
which this could be implemented. By contrast, the next legislative step in the sequence 
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provided much more political debate and whilst this step saw much more compromise, it did, 
nevertheless, achieved a substantial number of significant changes. 
The Second Déferre Act 
The main text of the second Act was passed on 7th January 1983 ^ and, together with the 
complementary text of 27th July 1983 Q8), dealt with the roles and responsibilities accorded to 
each level of local government As a starting point, the transfers will be looked at generally te 
terms of the general provisions and then, within this context, land use planning provisions 
will be considered more specifically. 
Consistent with the principle of creating specialisations, the région becomes responsible for 
economic planning, preparation and co-ordination of the regional input to the National Plan and 
assistance to industry through agreements with the state. In addition, the région is responsible 
for vocational training, continuing education and apprenticeship schemes. The région will 
prepare a transport plan and is involved in the programme of school development (with the 
département ). 
The department is responsible for environmental planning protection and control, health, the 
co-ordination and running of public transport, welfare functions and the programme of school 
development (with the région ). In addition, public investment is to be co-ordinated by an 
annual conference of the département.. 
The commune becomes responsible for all land use planning and development control, ports 
and navigable waterways, school construction, and local employment committees to increase 
employment opportunities. 
The state retained the housing function entirely. Also, those parts of the public health and 
welfare functions setting the minimum levels of payment were retained. The state is also 
responsible for those parts of the education function relating to hiring, paying and training of 
teachers. 
Looking at the above responsibilities and their allocation there are clearly some overlaps of 
functions between different local authorities, viz. education, transportation and environment. 
Moreover, die continued exclusive role of the state in housing, social welfare and public health 
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is evident. Government had also intended to introduce a major tax reform which would have 
included the financial arrangements of local governments but, the economic crisis led to this 
being abandoned, along with proposals for housing reform. 
However, some new financial measures were introduced to deal with decentralisation. These 
included, first, the dotation générale de décentralisation, a new direct grant payable for the cost 
of the responsibilities transferred; secondly, the dotation globale de fonctionnement, a bloc 
grant to cover the revenue costs of local authorities was maintained; thirdly, a new bloc grant, 
the dotation globale d'équipement for capital expenditure was introduced Φ>. Transfer of 
these funds was to take place progressively over the three year implementation period decided 
for the transfers in general(20). 
In addition to housing and tax reform, another casualty of the reform was the proposal to limit 
the cumul des mandats . But apart from its popularity, which would have led to extensive 
opposition, this was a complex matter to unravel quickly. Indeed, what was evident in these 
omissions from the text was that they all fell foul of the political window, the period after May 
1981 and the next set of elections in March 1983, when the PS held the majority at both central 
and local levels. Then, in these communal elections, government fared badly and lost their 
majority in the Sénat. Moreover, these were extensive legislative texts which took up 
considerable Parliamentary time, so some pruning of content was inevitable. The second 
Déferre Act of 1983, for example, took up 16 pages and 123 articles of law in the Journal 
Officiel. Of this total, 10 pages and 66 articles of law dealt with responsibilities only . As 
Chapuisat and Bouyssou note, this was a " volume visiblement impressionante" (21) (a clearly 
impressive quantity) 
By contrast to the omissions from the text mentioned above, the government's commitment to 
more priority for economic and social planning and for land use planning, is prominent in the 
legislation. Most commentators on the second Act would agree that land use planning had 
become a central theme of decentralisation. Worms, for example, commenting on this says, 
"C'est sans doute de toutes les réformes de cette législature celle qui marquera le 
plus l'avenir de notre pays" 
(Of all the reforms of this legislature, it is without doubt the one which will have 
the biggest effect on the future of our country). 
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Government Ministries in a joint publication to elected members in the summer of 1983, 
which discusses their new powers, went a stage further than Worms and state, more 
specifically, that the POS "est la clef de la décentralisation" (is the key to 
decentralisation)^). Chapuisat, in an interesting review of the second Act, points out that 
Government viewed land use planning relative to the decentralisation policy as, 
"Un mirroir assez saississant des problèmes qu'induit cette politique" 
(a pretty touching minor image of the problems which this policy induces) 
He goes on to identify three concerns in land use planning which echoed the situation in 
other policy areas: 
(i) the unsuitability of the structural and financial means of communes; 
(ii) the entanglement of responsibilities; 
(iii) the use of exceptions for the legal control of decisions. 
Thus, the provisions for land use planning in the legislation can be seen as an example of the 
extent to which the state had addressed these general issues and the extent to which the state 
had relinquished its role. After a long history of central control and intervention, serious 
doubts and scepticisms were inevitable. Taguy, for example, addresses these matters when 
he says, 
"Mais faut-il y voir une conversion sincère à l'idée de décentralisation, une 
adhésion sans partage à une démocratie locale, un démembrement de 
l'administration au profit d'associations qui constitueraient de nouveaux pouvoirs 
et contre-pouvoir? Il serait sans doute naif, en tout cas téméraire, de la penser" ^ 
(But can one see a sincere conversion to the idea of decentralisation, complete 
commitment to local democracy, a breaking up of the administration in favour of 
associations which will constitute the new power base and counter-power base? It 
is, without doubt naive, and, in any case, rash to think it) 
This view is not an isolated example and Taguy, amongst others ^6) is simply providing the 
normal reaction to a change in the conventional wisdom of centralisation. Under these 
circumstances, decentralisation is almost viewed as a breach of a cultural trait 
The transfers of responsibilities in land use planning will be looked at below under the 
headings of plans, development control, and related land management instruments. The 
description of these will be followed by a preliminary review of the new centre/periphery 
dynamics as seen immediately after the legislation was enacted. 
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Plans and Decentralisation 
The commune, or an établissement public for a grouping of communes becomes 
responsible for starting a plan then preparing and approving it. The Schéma Directeur 
d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (SDAU) is retained and renamed Schéma Directeur (SD). 
There is no change in the legal status of such plans which remain indicative. A significant 
change, however, is that the SD are no longer obligatory in urban agglomerations of more 
than 10 000 inhabitants; they are now to be prepared, "... à l'initiañve des communes 
présentant une communauté d'intérêts économiques et sociaux" (27) (at the initiative of 
communes which have a community of economic and social interests). Another new feature 
is that communes opposing the content of a SD can withdraw from it(28). Allied to this 
and indeed a step towards withdrawal, in cases of disagreement, the matter can be referred to 
the councillors group on a new Commission de Conciliationn (Reconciliation Committee/29^ 
by the Commissaire de la République. The SD is prepared by an établissement public 
which must consult with all public agencies (30\ In addition, the plan will be available for 
public consultation for one month(31) after its completion. Finally, the SD is not published 
until after it has been checked by the Commissaire de la République, who is given 45 days 
to ensure that the plan conforms to national planning guidelines and public projects of'intérêt 
général" (general interest)*32 .^ 
Turning to the TOS, a number of changes have been introduced. Two types of POS are now 
possible, or, as has been said "des POS à deux vitesses" (POS at two speeds). Through the 
new provisions, the POS may be "à contenu minimal" (minimal content) or "à contenu 
entier" (full content/33'. The former have been introduced to compensate for the 
disappearance of the carte communale in the small, usually rural, communes whilst the latter 
POS are expected to contain the standard content of previous POS. The POS is no longer 
obligatory in communes of more than 10 000 inhabitants, and no spatial limits for POS are 
defined. The commune becomes fully responsible for starting and preparing the POS and the 
state is only "associé à l'élaboration du plan" Ρ4) (associated in the preparation of the plan). 
The groupe de travail ceases to exist as part of plan preparation procedure and the commune 
is asked to choose the form which the state and any other agencies may participate in plan 
preparation. The state, however, continues to have a role in POS irrespective of the choice 
of association. The role is: 
(i) The Commissaire de la République is responsible for giving communes all 
information to ensure that the POS is compatible with the SD, if one exists, with 
public development projects for infrastructure, and with the details of all public 
projects of "general interest"(35). 
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(ü) The state retains an a posteriori check on the finalised plan. This check is the 
responsibility of the Commissaire de la République. This is in the interests of 
legality and in the interests of future development and co-ordination between and 
amongst adjacent communes (36\ If, on the basis of this check, the state is against 
the content of the plan, this must be made known within 30 days and, under these 
circumstances, the enquête publique will not take place - in other words, 
opposabilité will be limited. 
The mayor or the president of an établissement public for grouped communes is now 
responsible for the enquête publique if one takes place and the Municipal Council or Council 
oí uit etablissement public will approve the plan. Arrangements for modification and review 
of the POS remain unchanged. A new provision*37) states that if the POS is annulled on the 
basis of a judicial vote after a Tribunal Administratif, the commune or the établissement 
public are obliged to prepare a new plan without delay. 
Finally, the former ZEP plans disappear altogether and so the procedure of allowing 
approved ZEP to be subsequently prepared as POS also disappears*38). 
Development Control and Related Provisions of Land Management 
The approval of development applications, permis de construire is the first major issue of 
the new legislation. The responsibility for these has been transferred to the mayor "au nom 
de la commune" (in the name of the commune ) if and only if the commune has an approved 
POS*39). If the mayor has a personal interest in a development application then, under the 
new provisions, he/she has to delegate the responsibility for that application to another 
named individual*40). Certain applications are to be issued by the mayor in the name of the 
state*41). These include: 
(i) Developments by the state itself, the région, the département, or foreign 
governments or international agencies. 
(ii) nuclear developments. 
(iii) developments of national interest*42). 
In communes with no approved POS, the state retains the responsibility for development 
applications. Also in communes with no approved POS, an important article, article 38, 
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discusses the issue of "inconstructíbilité" (no right to develop). The new provisions do not 
allow development in the absence of a TOS except in the following circumstances: 
(i) The principle of no right to develop applies outside of the"parriej actuellement 
urbanùées de la commune" {pans of the commune already bunt up). 
(ii) Extensions to the bunt up parts of the commune are not allowed. 
(iii) Development allowed outside of the existing built up area includes public 
developments, agricultural developments, developments connected with natural 
resources and projects of national interest 
(iv) Developments which are not suitable adjoining existing built up areas^43). 
Finally, the development control responsibilities of a mayor are introduced to be effective six 
months after the approval of the POS of that commune(44'. 
In respect of land management instruments, significant deletions include the ZIF and the 
ZAD which are replaced by "le droit de préemption urbaine" (the law of urban pre-emption). 
Changes have been made to the Plafond Légal de Densité (PLD) (legal density limit). These 
were not introduced through the second Déferre Act, but in the 1983 Finance Act and were 
incorporated into the Urban Code, the national land use planning regulations. A new 
article^45) of the Code releases public development from the payment of tax due as a result of 
development which exceeds the PLD. Another change is the distribution of PLD tax; the 
commune in which the development takes place will receive 75% of the tax and the 
département will receive 25%. 
Two other provisions of the Second Déferre Act not included in the Urban Code are first, 
those in articles 29 and 30 of the Act which introduce Chartes Intercommunales and 
secondly, the provisions of article 40, which discusses the availability of DDE services for 
communes. Articles 29 and 30 introduce voluntary intercommunal charters, Chartes 
Intercommunales de Développement et d'Aménagement (США). These documents can be 
prepared by groups of communes and they include medium-term economic, social and 
cultural development, a programme of action and an identification of the means required for 
implementation. The legislation states that the interested communes should specify the 
nature and extent of consultation procedures with the state, région, département and any 
other agencies. Article 40 provides for the free services of DDEs to communes which 
require technical assistance, "mis gratuitement à la disposition des communes qui le 
demandent". 
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To accommodate the implementation of the legislative measures above, the following 
timetable was provided: 
Summer 1983 - publication of the décrets (i.e. the decrees giving 
the implementation rules) 
1st October 1983 - decentralisation of SD and POS 
1st April 1984 - decentralisation of development applications 
1st October 1984 - application of the "no development" rule in 
communes with no approved POS (except 
for communes with a ZEP and communes 
which had started a POS) 
1st October 1985 - the final date for legal use of ZEP 
1st October 1987 - the final date for thosecommunci in which the 
Municipal Council had began to prepare a POS, 
(before October 1984), to publish it. 
Initial Reactions to the Legislation 
The initial reactions to the legislation were, in general, mixed. There arc considered here; 
first, initial views in the planning literature, secondly, results of empirical research conducted 
in the Nord région in the summer of 1983 and, thirdly, results of a survey of mayor's 
attitudes conducted by the Association des Maires de France (French Association of Mayors) 
(AMF) carried out from June to September 1983. 
The first Act and the proposals for the second Act, taken together, have been described as a 
process of "robbing Peter to pay Paul" and "a sort of administrative Yalta"(46). The last 
remark refers to the fact that both the state and the local authorities, for example, will have 
their own local services, buildings and agents. In this respect, a dualism remains in the 
centre/periphery responsibilities at local level. The former statement takes this idea a stage 
further and suggests that, what is given by one hand is taken away by the other, or, as Danan 
suggests in the title of an article at the time, "L'urbanisme en décentralisation surveillé; 
chassez la tutelle, elle revient au galop!" (47) (Planning under supervised decentralisation; 
having got rid of the formal tutelage system, it just bounces right back!). Such a return of 
tutelage was widely discussed as a tutelle technique (technical tutelage) or even asa tutelle 
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a priori again(48\ Professor Moderne, in making this claim of a priori tutelage, referred 
especially to the large numbers of ornali communes unable to prepare plans themselves and 
thus forced to rely on the DDE for technical assistance. Another commentator on the 
distribution of responsibilities in planning described the situation as a "zero sum game"(49). 
The initial reaction in the planning literature to the transfer of responsibilities was negative 
and sceptical. An important reason for this is that it was unknown how DDE's and the 
Commissaire de la République would act towards communes engaged in land use planning 
activities. The situation was probably exacerbated by Gaston Deferre's own, very clear, 
statement on this in 1981: 
"La vraie liberté suppose que les études ne soient pas conduites par ceux qui 
jusqu'à maintenant étaient les tuteurs"(50) 
(Real liberty supposes that studies will not be earned out by those who, up until 
now, have been tutors) 
In addition to doubts about the transfer of responsibilities, doubts were also expressed about 
the legal process of decentralisation, implementation of the planning powers and procedural 
and substantive aspects of planning practice. Whilst the main advantage of cascade 
legislation is that it can order the enormous number of problems to solve, it can also create 
legal problems between and amongst successive texts and within one text Summing up a 
review of the advantages and disadvantages of the legal approach adopted, Chapuisat and 
Bouyssou point out, 
"Les contradictions éventuelles entre les lois seront d'autant plus difficiles à 
résoudre qu'elles n'apparaîtront que progressivement"(51) 
(The potendal contradictions between the Acts will be much more difficult to 
resolve as they will only appear progressively) 
In addition to the legal issues perse, the cascade approach raised fears that the remaining 
enabling legislation might not follow. Thus, concerns surrounding implementation of the 
planning powers accorded to communes revolved mainly round money and manpower. 
Whilst these issues were expressed in general terms, small communes were singled out as 
being seriously disadvantaged. Obviously, the availability of central government funding in 
a period during which the Mitterrand administration had imposed a far-reaching general 
austerity programme was of concern (52). Manpower resources, in terms of sufficient 
qualified planners, were also discussed extensively (53\ In addition, the mayor, as layman, 
is expected to take on a set of very complex and technical roles and responsibilities yet, as 
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has been noted, 
" le 'pouvoir expert' ne s'acquiera pas en un jour et les élus locaux ne sont 
pas omniscients"(5* 
( the "expert power" will not be acquired in a day and the local elected 
members are not omniscient ) 
In planning practice, initial reaction to procedures focussed on two main issues. First, a 
larger number of people and agencies could be involved in plan making, and with the 
disappearance of groupe de travail this might be difficult to organise. Secondly, and related 
to this, were doubts about the relationships with the DDE for both plan malting and 
development control. It was felt that these procedural concerns, already regarded as being 
cumbersome, would get worsen. 
Initial attention to substantive issues focussed on the inherent social and economic linkages 
between POS content and other public planning documents, not the responsibility of the 
commune. In this respect Chapuisat (56) likens the POS to a single Russian doll and refers 
to the wider system of dolls in the département and région. Thus, to suggest that the 
commune can be self-contained appeared somewhat naive. 
Finally, and of political importance, doubts were expressed about the acceptance of mayors 
to take up their responsibilities, 
" Tout le débat au Sénat a montré la réticence des élus ruraux à prendre 
véritablement en main la responsabilité de l'urbanisme " (57) 
(All of the discussion at the Senate showed the reluctance of rural mayors to 
really take up the responsibility for planning). 
This question of willingness or political will was important in the interviews with politicians 
in the summer of 1983 (58\ (For numbers and types of resondents see Appendix 2.2) The 
results of the investigation are outlined below. 
All of the politicians interviewed in the Nord/Pas de Calais were positively in favour of the 
transfer of planning powers and, in particular, of the right to make executive decisions 
concerning development applications. The question of POS preparation was not regarded as 
a high priority, although the belief was widespread that those communes without an 
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approved plan would simply have to ensure that one would be prepared in the near future. 
None of the politicians interviewed expressed concern or displeasure at being given these 
new powers, although non-Socialist politicians were rather more critical of the resources 
which would be made available to implement the powers. Considering that communes of up 
to 10 000 population would find it difficult financially to employ technical staff of their own. 
Socialist politicians, by contrast, felt that resources would be forthcoming and sufficient for 
this purpose and that some form of technical service department responsible to the 
Département Council would be developed to assist mayors of the smaller communes. The 
Socialist politicians also saw the transfer of responsibilities in planning along with the new 
financial arrangements, as a method of crushing the power of the DDE. Concern was 
expressed by many, however, that since the publication of the Act in January 1983, the DDE 
had been attempting to take on a new role as political and technical educators. This was 
evidenced by numerous publications for mayors and various series of seminars which had 
been held by the DDE's in the two départements. Clearly the DDE's were attempting to 
establish their position as "experts" who would continue to prepare plans and deal with 
planning applications. 
The question of moving towards regroupements (functional groupings) of communes was 
discussed at length in interviews because it seemed reasonable to assume, especially in 
communes of up ω 10 000 population, that technical assistance might be sought on a shared 
basis. This view did not seem to have been actively considered by the rcpondents. Nor was 
the question of participation in chartes intercommunales considered at that time. In the case 
of communes which were part of a communal grouping in 1983, the view was that they 
would probably remain in it, but only for plan making purposes and not for the treatment of 
development applications. However, given the political changes which had taken place in the 
Nord région in the communal elections of March 1983, the view was widely expressed that 
in those Councils in which the Right wing national opposition had gained control, the new 
majority coalitions, once they had gained some political experience with the new system, 
might question the future of such functional groupings. 
A small minority of the politicians made the point that many mayors might not be happy to 
have these new responsibilities. They felt that some mayors would hate to see themselves 
being directly accountable for decisions. In other words, mayors could no longer hide 
behind the DDE when unpopular decisions had to be made. 
In general, the interviews with politicians suggested that they had made very few 
preparations for how they would implement the legislation. No clear decisions or 
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documented approaches had been produced or arrived at even by the Socialist party, although 
they had two committees working on the issue (59). It seemed that the party in the Nord 
région were making no effort to assist mayors, although there was a general view that the 
DDE would no longer maintain its former role. Given that the legislation was to be 
implemented only two months after this investigation, this finding was surprising. 
Planning officials interviewed included both contractual staff and fonctionnaires. As in the 
previous interviews of 1981, these two groups had different views. Fonctionnaires took the 
view that the legislation was too rushed and too complex for the average mayor to 
understand, let alone implement. In addition, they felt that their role would continue as 
before, as planning "experts", and that communes would not have sufficient money to 
employ their own staff. It was clear that they felt threatened by the legislation, but 
nonetheless it allowed them some continuity and they saw a future for themselves. 
Uncertainty and related lack of staff motivation did seem to be a problem, but they were 
devoting their efforts towards political/technical education. Interestingly, neither of the two 
DDE's seemed to have any difficulties with their new administrative masters, the 
Commissaires de la République, despite the fact that traditionally the Ministries of the 
Interior and of Equipment had differed from eachother overtly. However, this traditional 
conflict was mentioned by both politicians and contracted staff as an issue likely to lead to 
difficulties in the future should the DDE be substantially modified after technical departments 
accountable to elected members had been established. 
Contracted staff viewed the transfer of power more as an issue with specific implications for 
planning administration and practice. Most viewed the transfers positively and felt they 
would lead to greater democracy, many felt that the determination of applications for 
development would become much more laissez-faire than in the past. They felt that if 
mayors refused to use the DDE's technical services, then decisions could be made for 
personal political gain and not necessarily in the best interests of the commune. 
Many contracted staff were optimistic of working solely for local authorities. Also, they felt 
that the small number of approved POS would lead to a high demand for preparing more. 
However, like fonctionnaires they were sceptical of sufficient financial resources being 
made available. In connection with their desire to work for politicians, they felt that they 
were better equipped professionally than foncrionnaires to provide technical assistance. 
However, none of the contracted staff felt that the technical quality of the POS would 
improve and few were optimistic of the future of communal groupings for land use planning 
purposes. 
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Clearly then, the two types of planners interviewed both viewed the outcome and 
implications of this transfer of power as being heavily dependent upon the evolving relations 
between the DDE's, whose future role was uncertain, and the willingness and capacity of 
mayors to strike out on an independent path. That path, in tum, could lead either to a neglect 
of technical expertise (and a further increase in the influence of political and personal 
considerations) or to the development of independent local planning staffs. Yet all of these 
possibilities were crucially dependent upon financial resources, for which no details were 
available. 
The willingness and capacity of mayors to strike out on a course of action was investigated 
by the Association des Maires de France (AMF) over the same period as the above 
investigation(60). The results are presented here as further evidence of mayor's reactions and 
intentions in 1983. 
The survey elicited 4 873 responses from communal mayors (approximately 13.5% of total 
communes. ) The responses were reduced to a sample of 1 647 to ensure a geographic 
distribution and size distribution similar to France as a whole. The first topic surveyed was 
chartes intercommunales (CI) ; in response to a question asking if communes would 
produce a CI, 14% said YES, 66% said NO and 26% were undecided. Of the total number 
of communes in the sample, 866 had no POS (52.3%). When asked about plans for POS 
preparation the results were ; 56.2% wanted to prepare a POS, 32.2% did not want to 
prepare a POS and 11.6% did not know. Further questioning of those wishing to prepare a 
POS revealed various of motives for doing so. These are indicated in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Mouves for TOS Preparauon 1983 
%*menüonmg this item 
Had already started a TOS 6S.1 
Agricultural protecuon 63 9 
Rationalisation of extension 60.0 
To limit construction 55.6 
Management of land values 52.6 
To execute development application decisions 48.5 
Because of increased development applications 33.7 
Conservanon 29.2 
Tounst development 27.7 
*n = 487 (These aie communes without a POS which wished to prepare one) 
Source: Pesce, S. 0984) " L'avts des maires," Urbanisme. 202, ρ 113 
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It is interesting that the treating of development applications was mentioned less frequently 
than might have been expected in view of an approved TOS as being a condition to gain these 
powers. In the responses, no differences were observed amongst communes of different 
sizes (by population). However, the next two questions show more of a difference. 
The first question where more of a difference was observed relates to the choice of agency to 
prepare a POS in the 487 cases with no approved POS and wanting to prepare one. The 
results are shown in Table 7.2. To a great extent the results are a reflection of the large 
number of small communes (>90%) and the correspondingly small numbers of large 
communes. It is clear, however, that the DDE is favoured by most respondents although 
it is interesting that more than 10% of the very smallest communes had considered other 
possibilities. 
The second question related to the treating of development applications and the choice of 
agency to assist The results are found in Table 7.3. They show a pattern of responses very 
different from the previous question. In particular the choice of the DDE is considerably less 
frequent even in the small communes, and this choice is made less as commune size 
increases. Inversely, the choice of communal services only increases as population size 
increases. The choice for other local services, such as another commune or intercommunal 
technical agency, does not appear to vary by commune size, and the role of the private sector 
is negligible. In looking at the responses, it is worth noting that they were made without 
reference to costs and, in addition, they were preliminary views. 
It is interesting to point out similarities and differences between the author's interview results 
and the results of the survey of mayors. The responses in the former study showed a higher 
priority given to the treating of development applications than in the latter. Both, however, 
showed that preparation of POS was far from being a top priority. The politicians in the 
Nord/Pas de Calais area questioned the ability of small communes to afford technical staff 
of their own for plan preparation and the AMF respondents made the same point. However, 
whereas a high proportion of the AMF respondents chose the DDE as the plan preparation 
agency and a low proportion opted for a departmental technical agency, in the interviews of 
politicians many chose a departmental technical agency. Both studies also showed the 
minor role of prospective intercommunal technical agencies and chartes intercommunales.. 
Having looked at these initial reactions in 1983 it will be interesting to see how these were 
realised in practice over the subsequent two years. 
Table 7.2 Choice of Organisation to Prepare POS 
Population 
0-700 
700-2 000 
2-5 000 
5-10000 
10-30000 
>30 000 
TOTALS 
No of 
communes 
33 
111 
32 
4 
3 
-
487 
Only Municipal 
Services 
6 
2 
1 
-
-
-
9 
%* 
1.8 
1.8 
3.1 
-
-
-
1.8 
Other Т-огяІ 
Services ·• 
24 
14 
2 
1 
-
-
41 
% 
7.1 
12.6 
6.2 
25.0 
-
-
8.4 
Departmental 
Technical 
17 
9 
-
-
-
-
26 
% 
5.0 
8.1 
-
-
-
-
5.3 
DDE 
258 
77 
25 
3 
1 
-
364 
% 
76.6 
69.4 
78.1 
75.0 
33.3 
-
74.7 
Private Sector 
20 
8 
2 
1 
2 
-
33 
% 
59 
7.2 
6.2 
25.0 
66.7 
-
6.8 
Unleaded 
21 
3 
2 
-
-
-
26 
% 
6.2 
2.7 
6.2 
-
-
-
5.3 
* % relates to the % of that size category 
** includes services of an adjacent commune or intercommunal agency 
Source. Pesce, S. (1984) "Les ans des mares". Urbanisme No. 202, p. 114 
Table 7.3 Choice of Organisation to Assist with Development Applications 
Population 
0-2000 
2-5000 
5-10 000 
10-30 000 
30-80000 
>80 000 
TOTALS 
No of 
communes 
with 
approved TOS 
172 
154 
74 
81 
29 
7 
517 
Only Municipal 
Services 
9 
15 
17 
32 
19 
3 
95 
%· 
5.2 
9.7 
23 0 
39.5 
65.5 
42.9 
18.4 
Other Local 
Services ** 
18 
21 
8 
5 
1 
2 
55 
% 
10.5 
13.6 
10 8 
6.2 
3.4 
28.6 
10.6 
Depanmental 
Technical 
с 
5 
8 
3 
1 
-
-
17 
% 
2.9 
5.2 
41 
1.2 
-
-
33 
DDE 
93 
65 
26 
15 
3 
-
202 
% 
54.1 
42.2 
35.1 
18.6 
10.3 
-
39.1 
Privale Sector 
5 
6 
7 
8 
-
-
26 
% 
2.9 
3.9 
9.4 
9.9 
-
-
5.0 
Undecided 
26 
25 
9 
13 
5 
1 
79 
% 
15 1 
16.2 
12.2 
16.1 
17.2 
14.3 
15.3 
* % relates to the % of that size category 
** includes services of an adjacent commune or intercommunal agency 
Source: Pesce, S. (1984) "Les ans des maires". Urbamsme. No. 202, p. 114 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the PS decentralisation Acts insofar as they reorganised the 
anachronistic system of local administration into local government, and insofar as they 
affected the division of responsibilities between each of the tiers of local government and the 
state. The approach to the legislation of decentralisation was innovatory but the content, in 
connection with land use planning, was less innovatory compared with legislation of the pre 
decentralisation period and, in some respects, shows distinct relaxations. In particular, such 
relaxations include the SDAUandPOS no longer being obligatory in communes of greater 
than 10 000 population, the revocation of the carte communale and the ZEP which were 
popular and used in small communes (which form the largest majority of French communes ) 
and the deletion of the PLD tax for public developments. 
Whilst the Déferre Acts appear to have provided greater local democracy this may be more 
imagined than reaL Yet this view should be tempered by consideration of the approach to the 
process, i.e. legal lead as against administrative. Given that the latter was the usual approach 
then it was inevitable that administrative means attracted the attention in the absence of the 
décrets d'application. What was real in the Acts is that land use planning most certainly was 
central in the decentralisation process. In comparison to land use planning, the fate of 
national and regional planning over the 1981-1983 period was disappointing and reflected 
their contiuing unpopularity. National planning, for example, was to have been administered 
through a new Ministry of Planning established in 1981. However, even Rocard, described 
the task of national planning before he was relieved of this Ministry in March 1983, as "... a 
theatrical exercise in psycho drama" (61). His successor, Jean Le Garree, echoed the same 
sentiments soon after his appointment, "Today, given that nothing is predictable any more, 
one wonders how to plan" (62\ Regional planning, similarly, did not develop along the lines 
envisaged for two main reasons; first, it was inherently tied to national planning and 
secondly, the regional elections which were due to take place in the spring of 1983 did not 
materialise. Together, these two factors reduced the legitimacy and support for regional 
planning. Finally, in considering land use planning at the commune level, the POS stands 
out more than ever before as the only legal plan and, for mayors it becomes the carrot and 
maybe even the stick in the decentralisation of land use planning. 
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CHAPTER 7 NOTES AND REFERENCES 
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CHAPTER 8 - DECENTRALISED PLANNING PRACTICE 
Introduction 
The main focus of this chapter is the practice of land use planning after the second Déferre 
Act and, more especially, the preparation of POS. Given the limited time which has elapsed 
between the enactment of the law and the end of 1985, the review here is necessarily 
preliminary. Nevertheless, certain issues of practice which were raised in the last chapter 
are found to be of importance here, whilst some new issues of practical importance have 
emerged over the period 1983-1985. Many of these issues spring from the publication of 
the décrets d'application of the second Déferre Act, whilst others relate to the way in which 
the actors in the plan-making process, mayors and planners, perceive their new roles and the 
development of these roles and associated procedures. Over this same period, plan 
preparation has progressed and a review of this as well as other measures of change will be 
considered. Then, a review of the important political changes of the period is given to 
demonstrate the increasing difficulty faced by of the PS in 1983 after the end of the "political 
window"; the years between 1981 and 1983 when they lost their overall political majority 
after the commune elections. Finally, in the absence of micro-behavioural evidence of plan 
preparation since decentralisation was implemented, the chapter will examine how far, on the 
basis of known contextual changes, the Thoenig model of cross-regulation/cross-
functioning controls is still an appropriate framework for analysing POS preparation. 
The 1983 Décrets d'Application and Plan Preparation Procedure 
Following on firom the Déferre Acts, the décrets d'application (decrees for implementation of 
the laws) were issued, later than expected, in three waves from September 1983 to March 
1984. Only the first four décrets (1) are of interest here. These deal with the Committee of 
Reconciliation, the Project d'Intérêt Général (PIG-Projects of General Interest), Schéma 
Directeur (SD) and TOS. The remaining eight decrees deal with development control(2). 
The four décrets listed above provide for substantial alterations in POS preparation 
procedure. Figure 8.1 provides a diagrammatic representation of the new formal procedure. 
Both preparation and revision procedures are longer than those during the pre 
decentralisation period (see Figure 4.1 and Appendix 4.1 for the pre decentralisation 
procedures). 
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The new plan preparation procedure is used for both minimal and complete ЮЗ and follows 
set stages. Differences from the pre decentralisation procedure are apparent First, the 
Municipal Council is now the central decision-making body and the Commission Mixte 
(Mixed Membership Committee) which replaces the groupe de travail is the deliberative 
body. The mayor acts much less on his/her own in major decision-making, although he/she 
retains the chair for all meetings and is now responsible for all of the administrative actions 
connected with the plan preparation. A second difference is the number of actors involved 
in POS preparation and the way in which they are involved. These matters are subject to the 
decision of the Municipal Council. In the case of state involvement, however, this is defined 
through a joint discussion between the mayor and the Commissaire de la République . 
Thirdly, the public may be invited to participate in the process, especially if they are members 
of interest groups. On the question of public involvement more generally, newspaper 
advertisements and notices in the Town Hall are new features of publicity throughout POS 
preparation. There is also much more opportunity for the public to object to the plan and the 
report of the enquête publique is now available for public scrutiny. A fourth innovation is 
the introduction of the independent Committee of Reconciliation, which is introduced after 
the first consultations if there any disagreements to the draft plan. A related modification is 
the use of the Tribunal Administratif (Administrative Tribunal) rather than the DDE as the 
nominating body for reporters to conduct the enquête publique ^ . The enquête publique 
itself is now a much longer process, occupying up to six weeks instead of two weeks. 
Similarly, initial consultations with public agencies on the draft plan have been extended 
from two to three months. Indeed, some attempt has been made to introduce fixed 
timescales for, at least, parts of the plan preparation process. However, as in the past, 
neither the meetings of the Commission Mixte nor the Municipal Council are given set 
timescales. 
Informed Opinion and Reactions to the New Plan-making Process 
As might have been expected, the major issue of interest in the new plan preparation 
procedures has been the nature of state and commune power relationships. In particular, 
three aspects of this will be discussed; these include the nature and the role of the Committee 
of Reconciliation, the question of conformity and compatibility of POS to other documents 
and the information-providing role of the DDE in this matter. 
The Reconciliation Committee is associated with plan preparation and with plan revision, but 
not in the case of minor plan revisions ^ . It is made up of twelve members. 
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Figure 8.1 The Decentralised POS preparation Procedure 
1st Discussion by Municipal Council (2) 
- Starts preparation of POS 
Decides who will be involved other 
th« th. .tat.
 и г з 3 Я 1 2 3 ^ 
Documentation sent to С de la R (Э) 
A natica ia posted at the town 
hall and an advertisement placed 
In 2 newspapers 
L123 3 RL23 3 
The С de la R d a t a n l A a e with < 
•ayor (4) how the s t a t e w i l l 
be Involved 
DDE ensures collection of 
Information and maintenance of 
documentation 
Institution of sistLnj 
for developatent applications 
If necessary 
1123 5 
The mayor notifie» the following of the 1st 
Oiacussion 
- Regional Council 
- General Council o f the Mpartemant 
- Pres* lent of I л tercommuneal 
Etabi isa e Tient Publ ic 
- Pres idents of the Chamber* o f Trade, 
Agriculture 
- Mayors of adjacent communes R123.6 
Th· С de l a Я 1л focas nayors of 
n a t i o n a l planning gu lda l lnea, ser­
v i e Inq, p r o j e c t s of general 
I n t e r a s t and any other useful 
information 
R123.3 RL23.5 
Presidents of Regional 
and General Councils and 
Chamoers nominate 
representatives 
Hayors of neighbouring comnunea 
and President of intercommunal 
Etabl.ssenenc Public can ask 
to be consulted 
The mayor publishes a list of all 
those to be involved in plan 
preparation. The notice is 
posted in the town hall and in 
2 newspapers R123.7 
I The mayor may 
requei 
other 
aaeoc 
ts for 
cake account 
involvement 
interested parties 
atlone 
U23 3 
r 
of 
-om 
or 
Rl 
any 
3 В 
PLAN PREPARATION by the Coemlssion Mixte 
2nd Discussion by the Municipal 
Council. Draft plan is finalised 
Committee of Reconcil-ation 
prepares views 
1С there is a 
disagreement 
Sent to С de la R 
L123 3 ai23 9 
Consultation the draft plan is sent to 
those public agencies associated 
- neighbouring connunea and I E P 
aaaoctac.ons consulted 
I L123 3 R123 9 
3 months ^ to provide vie 
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3rd D i s c u s s i o n by the Municipal Counci l t o d laeuaa 
view« and make changea „ . _ , Sent to С de la R 
PUBLICATION OF THE POS by the Kayor L123.3 
И123.10 
Notice in town hall 
Advert in 2 newspapers and sent to С da la R 
POS Ьесояев effective 
Mayor asks President of Adnmistrative Tribunal to noalnate 
a reporter or an enquiry committee R123.il 
POS subject to ENQUETE PUBLIQUE 1 1 2 3 . 3 . 1 
Я12ЭЛ1 
Mayor n o t i f i e s t h e p u b l i c o f the enqueca p u b l i q u e 15 days 
b e f o r e i t s t a r t s and every day f o r t h e f i r s t θ days in 2 
newepapers R 1 2 3 . i l 
Sent t o 
С de l a R 
ENQUÊTE PUBLIQUE R 1 2 3 . U 
f o r a max. o f one month 
An β*tra 15 days can be 
a l l o w e d i f necaaaary 
Committee o f R e c o n c i l i a t i o n s 
v i e w s 
The r e p o r t e r o r 
enquiry come, r e p o r t s 
t o the Mayor 
_ Report a v a i l a b l e t o the 
^ p u b l i c H 1 2 3 . i l 
I f m o d i f i c a t i o n s r e q u i r e v i e w s then the 
s t a t e and o t h e r p u b l i c a g e n c i e s are aaked 
for them R123.12 
4th D i s c u s s i o n by Munic ipa l Counci l L123.31 
The POS I s approved by t h e Munic ipa l R123.12 
Counci l incorporat lnH any m o d i f i c a t i o n s 
Counc i l d i s c u s s i o n l a p o s t e d In t h e town 
h a l l for one month 
N o t i c e i s p l a c e d in two newspapers в і ? з i-> 
THE POS IS DECLARED APPROVED BY THE MAYOR 
R123.12 
(1) This is also applicable for the revision of POS ежсері for those steps indicated thus - * 
(2) Or Council of the établissement public for a cooaunal group 
(3) С de la fi • Commissaire de la République 
(4) The term "Mayor" can also refer to the President of an XntsrcoHunal Etablissaa·ηt Publique 
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Six of these are to be councillors ( representing at least 5 communes in the département ) 
and the other six are to be" personalités qualifiés en matière d'aménagement, d'urbanisme ou 
d'environnement " (well known people with qualifications in spatial management, planning 
or environment)(î). The members should be chosen on the basis of their impartiality and 
should have a varied and balanced background (6\ This is clearly a committee which will be 
important in plan preparation and will be required to reconcile any differences of opinion 
between the state and the communes if they arise, but also between the communes and any 
of the other of participants in plan preparation. In the absence of a reconciliation, the 
Committee is entitled to prepare counter proposals itself. Léna, amongst others, takes the 
view that: 
" Mais même si les désaccords subsistent, la publicité assurée aux 'propositions 
nouvelles' que fera la Commission est de toute évidence destinée à leur donner 
une sorte de 'poids moral' qui pourrait mettre en position délicate celle des 
parries qui resterait figée sur ses propositions initiales. Ainsi, les Commissions 
pourraient acquérir une autorité allant bien au-delà de leur strictes 
compétences " Q> 
(But even if disagreements remain, the publicity assured to the 'new proposals' 
made by the Reconciliation Committee will give them a sort of 'moral weight' 
which will put those whose views remain the same in a delicate situation. 
Thus, the committee might acquire an authority which exceeds their strict 
competence) 
Clearly, given the larger numbers of participants in POS preparation, the need for public 
compromise will be much greater than in the past and, in addition, given that POS are open 
to the scrutiny of neighbouring communes, the need for more intercommunal co-ordination 
will be increased. Under these circumstances negotiation, compromise and co-ordination 
become central matters in plan preparation and, if they are not carried out successfully, the 
Reconciliation Committee could become bogged down in conflicts. However, this might be 
alleviated to some extent by the new measures which ensure that POS preparation has to 
relate to other documents. A sort of hierarchy exists; first, the POS must conform to and 
rigorously respect public service orders (8). The text of the POS must justify how this 
conformity has been achieved. In tum, both POS and public service orders must conform to 
the dispositions necessary for the implementation of a Projet d'Intérêt Général (PIG-Project 
of General Interest) or an Ouvrage d'Intérêt National (OIN-a Development of National 
Interest). Both the PIG and the OIN are the responsibility of the DDE. A number of 
commentators have pointed out that not only are these two projects difficult to define but, at 
the end of the day, they could result in a technical tutelage ( 9 ) . Sauvez(10), for example, 
subscribes to this view of a technical tutelege and whilst describing what the PIGs and OINs 
will generate vs"la petit bataille" (the little battle), he considers these conflicts as only part of 
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the wider set of conflicts which the requirement of conformity will generate. 
The TOS must also be compatible with the National Planning Code and the Schéma Directeur 
(SD) if one exists (11\ This latter compatibility is simply a continuation of the previous 
legislation. Despite extensive discussion in the past about whether this compatibility has the 
effect of making the SD legally binding and opposable aux tiers , the SD still remains a 
purely indicative plan. Léna describes this compatibility as " un dégré de subordination plus 
souple "(12) (a degree of more flexible subordination) than that of the first category already 
discussed. Finally, a third category of documents must be "taken into account" or "taken 
into consideration" by POS. These include, for example, the chartes intercommales (13)· 
Léna describes this compatibility: 
" La relation de subordination atteint son intensité la plus faible "(14) 
(the degree of subordination reaches the weakest level) 
By and large, the reaction to the requirement of conformity/compatibility has been negative. 
Attention has also focusscd on the décret prescribing the new information-providing role of 
the state fulfilled by the Commissaire de la République and the substantive implications of iL 
The décret says that what the state is required to provide to the commune preparing the 
POS: 
"... toutes informations utiles à leur élaboration, des projets d'intérêt général et 
le cas échéant parmi les dispositions relative au contenu de documents de celles 
qui sont nécessaires à la mise en ou euvre du projet d'intérêt général "(15) 
(all useful information for plan preparation, projects of general interest and, in 
the case of the latter, the related dispositions of documents the content of which 
is necessary for the implementation of PIGs) 
Effectively, the questions of compatibility and of the information giving powers of the 
Commissaire de la République could thus control the content of the POS. For example, if 
a commune decided on a 'POS minimal', and there is no legal impediment to it so doing, 
the Commissaire de la République could impose the need for details to ensure that the plan 
conforms to PIGs, OINs and SD. This might result in a complete POS being required. And 
although three months have been allowed for the passing on of relevant information to the 
commune, the process of conformity is, in fact, continuous throughout POS preparation. 
Although a PIG becomes null and void if, after three years, no action on it has been taken, 
several of these could exist in a POS area (16\ What is evident about this information-giving 
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process is that there are no legal rights of objection by the commune to any information 
passed on which it might regard as unnecessarily onerous or constraining. By contrast, the 
rights of the state are very clearly laid down. As Léna points out(17), once a commune has 
prepared a POS and within one month of publication, the Commissaire de la République has 
the right to notify the commune of the modifications which it is required to make to it if the 
POS does not conform to the other documents. Further, in cases where a POS is already 
approved and where subsequent approval of a SD or the introduction of a PIG or an OIN 
renders the POS incompatible, the Commissaire de la République will notify the commune 
of the revisions or modifications which they are "required to make to the POS" within six 
months. If, after that period, these have not been carried out, he may submit the revisions 
or modifications to an enquête publique before any approval has been made by the Municipal 
Council <">. 
Views on decentralised TOS preparation were the subject of a survey in 1984 (19). This was 
conducted by Urbanisme , which investigated the views of actors in the plan-making 
process - politicians, fonctionnaire planners, contracted planners, private planning 
consultants and a number of well known personalities in French land use planning. Three 
general observations are evident firom the survey responses. First, there was no observable 
similarity of views within any of the groups of respondents except within the category 
described as" Urbanistes ", (State planners.l/rbonmes d'Etat or contracted planners). 
Secondly, across all groups, the means to implement the new procedures were still the most 
important single issue and thirdly, a larger number of substantive issues were raised in 
respect of plan-making than might have been expected. It is worth looking at these views in 
some more detail 
Since the responses of the group of "Urbanistes" were unifonn, it is interesting to observe 
that, without exception, all of them were concerned about the manpower resources. Their 
concerns demonstrated also their disappointment that few jobs had become available at the 
municipal level and that mayors had continued to use the services of the DDE. To a lesser 
extent, finance was mentioned, although this issue was raised more extensively by 
fonctionnaires and politicians. 
Poudsson, mayor of Villefianche sur Saône, makes a crucial summation of the finance issue: 
" Côté porte-monnaie, une tentation: l'Equipement continue m'offrir ses 
services. Mais le bon sens me rappelle: remettre le total de mes nouvelles 
compétences à l'administration, c'etpeut-être remettre le diable dans le bénetier 
et créer l'équivoque décisionelle. Alors? Créer les emplois, embaucher du 
personnel: c'est dit, l'option est prise mais, dites-moi, où trouver 
l'argent? " (20) 
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(On the money front there's a temptation: the DDE continues to offer me 
services. But I remind myself of good sense: Why give all my new powers 
back to the Administration. It's perhaps a case of putting the devil in the 
baptismal font and creating ambiguous decision-making. So? Create 
employment, take on staff: it's said, the option has been taken ... but tell me, 
where do I get the money?) 
The problem of money was regarded as generally being more severe in small communes : 
" Les petites communes déjà vivent les premiers illusions de la décentralisation: 
démunies de moyens financiers pour réaliser leur plan d'occupation des sols, 
elles doivent ranger leur rêve de liberté dans la file d'attente du service gratuit de 
la DDE - dont les moyens ont été par ailleurs affaiblis ".(21) 
(The small communes already live with the first illusions of decentralisation: 
without financial resources to do their POS, they must put their dream of 
freedom on the waiting list of the DDE - and the latter's finances are much less 
than before) 
Personnel resources also continued to be of general concern and, more specifically, the 
unsuitability of DDE fonctionnaires to do the new work and, more generally, the higher 
professional planning standards which the new tasks would entail. On this last point, several 
people expressed the view that planners will have to demonstrate the highest possible 
professional standards and provide complete objectivity in their advice ^ . Moreover, new 
planning courses and new training were suggested ^23'. On the former concerns about DDE 
fonctionnaires, Sauvez echoes views of the past when he points out the nature and problem 
of their role: 
" Ce travail est en totale opposition avec le travail des techniciens habitués à 
réaliser un seul projet se déduisant de façon univoque des normes imposés par 
des guides de conceptions fournis par l'administration centrale " ^24) 
(This work is totally the opposite of the work of a technician who is used to 
dealing with the implementation of a single project unequivocably deduced from 
a set of norms provided by the guides produced by the central administration). 
The last set of views highlighted in the Urbanisme survey related to the substantive concerns 
of plan-making. Delfant t25) raised the important point that, henceforth, POS content will 
have to be more selective than in the past and more sensitive than the universalistic approach 
referred to above by Sauvez. Sauvez also pointed out that the introduction of projects of 
general public interest would demand much more justification through social cost benefit 
analyses. Other commentators stressed the need for greater intercommunal cooperation(26). 
Indeed a fonctionnaire has made the point that it would be difficult to prepare POS in a 
single commune located in a heavily populated metropolitan area, given the requirement for 
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neighbouring communal involvement(27). 
The above views taken from the Urbanisme survey and the previous views based on the 
décrets d'application confína that many of the doubts about decentralised land use planning 
described in the last chapter continued to remain once the system was in force. Clearly these 
are qualitative views based on the experience of those who are practising in the system. 
Other equally important aspects of planning practice over the post decentralisation period are 
the progress made on POS preparation, the choices made by mayors for help in preparing 
plans and in treating development applications, changes in staffing levels of planning 
agencies and financing of plan-making. These quantitative measures of change will be 
considered below. 
Plan-making progress, 1981-1985 
Despite the fact that in 1972, the Ministry of Planning had set a deadline of 1975 for the 
completion of the first round of POS, only 8.7% of communes had an approved POS when 
the Socialists came to power in 1981 and, by 1985, only 19.7% had an approved POS. The 
rate of progress over the post decentralisation period for both schéma (SDAU and SD) and 
POS is shown below in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1 Total number of SDAU/SD and POS approved in France 1981-1986 (cumulative totals) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
SDAU/SD 167 171 173 182 187 190 
POS 3176 3847 4695 5710 6829 7214 
Total number of communes approximately 36 600 over the period 
Sources: 1981-1984, (figures for January each year) Recelai d'Informjtions Statistiques sur l'Urbanisme 
(RISU) (DUP). Ministère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie et Ministère de l'Urbanisme 
et du Logement 
1985/1986, (figures for January each year) Provisional figures from the Ministry made 
available before the publication of the RISU 
Whilst progress in the approval rate of SDAU and subsequently SD was slow and indeed 
slower than in the pre decentralisation period, TOS approvals increased throughout the post 
decentralisation period up to 1985. During the last two years of the pre decentralisation POS 
regulations, an increase of 661 and 848 POS approvals per annum was evident and this rate 
of approval continued until 1983. Thereafter, 1119 approvals were issued for 1984 and, 
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surprisingly, only 385 were approved for 1985. Interestingly, and unusually, the figures 
for 1985 and 1986 have not yet been officially published in the RISU ( Receuil 
d'Informations Statistiques sur l'Urbanisme ) and the provisional figures from the Ministry 
have been used here. It is regrettable that the RISU has not been available and even by mid 
1987, it had not been published. This delay in the publication may be due to the fact that 
the Ministry relies on the DDEs for the annual plan progress statistics and they, in turn, may 
be having difficulty collecting them from the communes which are now responsible for 
plan-making. 
What seems to be evident from these figures is that after 1983, when communes with an 
approved POS could determine their own development applications, those communes which 
were in the course of preparing POS were quick to finalise the plans. In 1983, when the 
new regulations came into force, 17.6% of communes could enjoy the right to treat 
development applications. It is quite possible that the subsequent decline in POS approvals 
between 1984 and 1985 reflects the queues awaiting DDE assistance to make plans. Indeed, 
Table 8.2 below gives a more detailed breakdown of POS preparation over the post 
decentralisation period and shows the rapid increase in numbers of POS started after 1983. 
Table 8.2 Numbers of POS started, published and approved 1981-1986 ¡л France (including overseas 
départements ) (All figures shown after 1981 are cumulative totals except for published POS) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 1986 
Started 
Published 
Approved 
Total Published 
andAppmved 
10 059 
794 
3 176 
3 970 
10 223 
1828 
3 847 
5 675 
10405 
1748 
4 695 
6443 
11 111 
2 518 
5 710 
8228 
13 856 
1583 
6 829 
8 412 
15 474 
1294 
7 214 
8 508 
Total number of communes approximately 36 600 over the period 
Published figures refer to plans which are only published and not approved 
Sources: 1981-1984, (figures for January each year) Receuil d'informations Statistiques sur IVrbanisme 
(RISU) (DUP). Ministère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie et Ministère de l'Urbanisme 
et du Logement 
1985/1986, (figures for January each year) Provisional figures from the Ministry made 
available before the publication of the RISU 
The table suggests that, after 1983, greater energy was devoted to starting plans than to either 
publication or approval and the difference between POS started and POS approved narrowed 
from about 70% in 1981 to about 50% in 1985. Less significance can now be attached to 
the publication stage than in the past, although the plan's provisions are still legally binding 
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once the plan is published but the use of POS by a commune for the right to detemüne 
development applications is more important and only becomes effective six months after the 
plan is approved. 
POS approval rates in communes of different sizes over the post decentralisation period are 
shown in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 Published and Approved TOS relative to commune size 1981 & 1986 
Commune sizes 
(by population) 
> 100000 
50 000-100 000 
40000-50 000 
30 00040 000 
20 000-30 000 
10000-20000 
Total > 10 000 
Total < 10 000 
Total (all sizes) 
1981 
Published 
No 
30 
56 
37 
57 
113 
272 
565 
4405 
4960 
% 
77 
80 
84 
75 
72 
71 
74 
12.3 
13.5 
Approved 
No 
22 
39 
26 
34 
77 
206 
404 
2 772 
3176 
% 
56 
56 
59 
] 
45 
49 
54 
53 
7.7 
8.7 
Published 
No 
37 
68 
121 
148 
377 
751 
7 757 
8 508 
1986 
% 
98 
96 
93 
90 
86 
92.6 
21.6 
23.2 
Approved 
No 
36 
61 
116 
130 
347 
690 
6 524 
7 214 
% 
96 
86 
89 
79 
79 
85.8 
18.2 
19.7 
Published figures here also include plans which have been approved. Percentages refer to the percentage of 
communess in each size class. 
Sources: 1981-1984, Receuil d'Informations Statistiques sur l'Urbanisme (RISU) (DUP). Ministire de 
l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie et Ministère de l'Urbanisme et du Logement 
1985/1986, Provisional figures from the Ministry made available before the publication of the 
RISU 
All figures are for January each year. 
The Table shows a significant increase in the figures for the numbers of published and 
approved POS in communes of all population sizes. The communes of more than 10 000 
population were of more significance before 1983 because it was then compulsory for these 
communes to produce a POS. This is now no longer the case. However, it is clear that 
these communes have continued to be active in POS preparation over the post 
decentralisation period. Moreover, there is little difference evident between the rates of 
increase in each of the population categories. 
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Whilst information on the expenditure on plan-making over the post decentralisation period is 
limited, it is nevertheless worth looking at the information which is available. This is 
provided in Table 8.4 : 
Table 8.4 Financmg of Planning Studies 1981-1984 (in French francs) 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Slate 
85 069 800 
72 463 600 
74 517 000 
23 426 475 
% total 
contribution 
47 
42 
45 
21 
Municipalities 
96 617 369 
101 003 259 
92 495 090 
87 908 160 
I 
% total 
contribution 
53 
58 
55 
79 
Source: Recelai des Informations Statistiques sur ¡"Urbanisme, DUP. Ministire de l'Environnement et 
du Cadre de Vie et Ministère de l'Urbanisme et du Logement, ppl8-24 (1981/82). pp 20-24 
(1983/84) 
In Chapter 4, Table 4.6, it was observed that during the pre decentralisation period, the 
proportions of state to municipality expenditure on planning studies had been, on average, 
70:30 until 1979 and that, by 1981, municipalities were contributing more than the state. 
Over the subsequent two years, as this table shows, this trend continued. Thereafter, in 
1984, a significant increase in the contribution of municipalities is evidenced. The 
progressive introduction of the new dotation globale de l'équipement over three years from 
1983, may account for the larger contribution. 
A useful review of POS preparation progress as well as other issues connected with the 
decentralisation of land use planning is contained in the report of a government working 
party chaired by. Alain Richard (28). This group was charged with the responsibility of 
monitoring and reviewing " Les conditions d'exercise des compétences transférées aux 
collectivités territoriales " (The conditions for the operation of the transferred responsibilities 
to local governments), and reported in September 1985. Generally, the report was positive 
about the decentralised land use planning responsibilities, saying that no major 
disfunctioning of the system had been identified. Yet with reference to the means to 
discharge these responsibilities, the report echoes many of the views expressed in the 
survey by " Urbanisme" . About POS preparation, the question of queues was forcefully 
expressed: 
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"L'existence de cette file d'attente est peu favorable à la diversification des 
études de planification et source de mécontentement " (29) 
(The existence of this queue is hardly favourable for the diversification of 
planning studies and is a source of discontent) 
The queue was estimated as being of 3-4 years duration in most départements and as much 
as 8 years in a département like Hérault which had had a poor record of POS approvals. 
The report went on to look at the organisational and financial means for POS preparation. 
The choices of organisation to prepare and revise POS are shown below in Table 8.5 and 
demonstrate the overwhelming dominance of the DDE. 
Table 8.5 Choice of Organisation to Prepare POS, 1985* 
% % (1983 sample survey) 
DDE 87.0 74.7 
Private Sector 9.0 6.8 
Intercommunal Planning Agency 3.8 8.4 
Commune service 0.2 1.8 
Total 100.0 90.7** 
* The 1985 figures are the results of a census carried out by the Ministry of Planning and 
Housing 
** The remaining 9.3% in 1983 included those opting for a département technical service (except 
DDE) or those undecided 
Source: "L'Urbanisme à la croisée des communes " (1985) Le Moniteur. Enquête Section , 18th 
October, ρ 37 
Apart from the DDE increasing its share of practice between the 1983 sample survey results 
and the 1985 census results, the private sector was used more than envisaged whilst 
commune based services were used less. Of course, differences between 1983 and 1985 
might reflect the choice of sample in 1983 as against the 1985 census. The report suggests 
that the 1985 results are a reflection of the financial difficulties of communes employing their 
own staff. Thus, unlike M. Poutisson, the mayor of Villefranche sur Saône quoted above 
about being "tempted" to use the free services of the DDE but nevertheless hesitating, it is 
obvious that many of his colleagues succumbed; willingly or unwillingly. 
The review of the finances for POS studies *30) showed that, whilst the total budget increased 
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from 47 million French Francs in 1983 to 53.14 million French Francs in 1984, these 
amounts were inadequate and, on average, a département received only 500 000 FF per 
annum. Interestingly, the cost of POS preparation was quoted as 10-30 000 FF - depending 
on the size - when the commune chose to use the services of the DDE. By way of 
comparison, 40-60 000 FF was quoted as the equivalent cost when a commune chose to 
prepare the POS itself (either by using its own service or an intercommunal service or 
private consultants). 
Turning to the choice of organisation to assist with the treating of permis de construire , the 
results of the 1985 census of communes with an approved TOS are shown in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6 Choice of Agency to assist communes with permis de construire, 1985 
DDE 
Commune Service 
Intercommunal Service 
Total Communes 
Number of 
Communes 
6 019 
264 
88 
6 381 
% Total 
Communes 
94.5 
4.1 
1.4 
100 
1983 sample 
survey choices 
39.1 
18.4 
13.9 
71.4· 
The remaining 28.6% in 1983 included those undecided and those mentioning the private sector 
at & département technical service 
Source: "L'Urbanisme à la croisée des communes " (1985) Le Moniteur. Enquête Section , 18th 
October, ρ 36 
As in the case of POS preparation and revision, the choice of the DDE to assist with 
development applications was overwhelming. The Richard report points out, however, that 
in communes with more than 10 000 population, almost 25 treated their own applications. 
Nonetheless, reliance on the DDE in this area of assistance has been much greater than 
envisaged in 1983 and a difference which is unlikely to be the result of the composition of 
the sample survey of 1983 . The report concludes by saying that mayors said their choice of 
the DDE was only a "temporary measure" ^ 1 ' . The above results, and indeed the review of 
progress from the Richard report, represent the national picture: regional variations are, of 
course, likely, but as yet there is only limited information about them ^ 2 \ 
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A final point on the manpower resources to prepare POS and to deal with development 
applications is the numbers of planning personnel in the various agencies. Since this matter 
was not covered by the Richard Report and since no overall manpower study is available, a 
clue to staffing is provided from the annual planning statistics in Table 8.7. 
Table 8.7 Numben of Civil Servants and Contracted Staff 1981 and 1983 in GEP and UOC Sections of 
the DOE's 
G E P U O C 
Civil Contracted Civil Contracted 
Servants Staff Servants Staff 
1981 352 954 527 2 819 
1983 319 257 449 63 
Source: Receuil d'Informations Statistiques sur l'Urbanisme, 1981, DUP, Ministire de 
l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie, pp 34/35; ала Ministère d'Urbanisme et du Logement 
1983 , ρ 58 
The table shows a reduction in numben of staff in ail grades and especially in the contracted 
staff grades after decentralisation in 1983. This could be an indication that contracted staff 
have moved to work for the Département Council instead of the Ministry and, in some 
cases, they may have moved to work for Commune Councils. It is unfortunate that no 
further information is available on these changes since 1983. 
Other Changes in Land Use Planning , 1983-1985 
Aside from the 1983 Acts and the subsequent décrets , there are other legislative and 
contextual changes during the period 1983-1985 relating to land use planning. Preparations 
for a new planning Act were in hand and widespread discussions on the changing nature of 
land use plans, land use planning and implementation began to take place. The major area of 
attention was the implementation of plans, development projects and the associated 
instruments such as ZAC, rights of pre-emption of land, and finance for developmenL All of 
these elements which are collectively termed urbanisme operationeile (operational planning), 
were discussed from 1982 onwards in the context of two new ideas. The first of these was 
the projet de quartier (neighbourhood project) and the second was the notion of renouveau 
d'aménagement (renewal of spatial management) ^33 .^ The guiding principles for this 
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renewal provided the basis of the outline Act and were articulated by Yves Dauge, Director of 
Planning and Countryside at the Ministry of Planning as: 
(i) simplifying procedures for the development of small areas 
(ii) clarifying financial responsibilities of public and private participants in 
development 
(iii) better organisation of public debate 
(iv) ensuring that POS was the main document for identifying areas of future 
redevelopment, urban renewal, rehabilitation and the associated requirements for 
public expenditure (34\ 
The administration of the new approach to urban management was to be decentralised to the 
communes. This would, as Lanza points out, complete the decentralisation of planning 
instruments and, in view of the above principles, raise the quality of the content of 
planning P5). Interestingly, when the new Act, La loi relative à la définition et la mise en 
oeuvre des principes d'aménagement (the Act relative to the definition and the 
implementation of the principles of spatial management) was issued in July 1985 @6\ the 
notion of projets de quartier had disappeared completely ^7). Instead, Colly points out that 
it was replaced by the notion of " besoins locaux " (local needs) (38\ 
Despite the fact that both Colly <39) and Lanza(40) in their respective reviews of the 1985 Act 
conclude that the degree of decentralisation which it contains is no greater than, and indeed is 
the same as, that embodied in the 1983 Acts, the new Act nevertheless contains the following 
definition of aménagement in the urban context: 
" L'ensemble des actions ou opérations ayant pour l'objet de mettre en oeuvre 
une politique locale de l'habitat, d'organiser le maintien, l'extension ou l'accueil 
des activités économiques, de favoriser le développement des loisirs et du 
tourisme, de réaliser des équipements collectifs, de lutter contre l'insalubrité, de 
sauvegarder ou de mettre en valeur le patrimoine bâti ou non bâti et les espaces 
naturels "(41) 
(Ail actions or operations having as an objective the implementation of a local 
housing policy, organisation of the maintenance, extension or implantation of 
economic activities, the favouring of recreational activities and tourism, the 
realisation of community facilities, the fight against insanitary conditions, 
conservation or improvement of built or unbuilt heritage areas and open spaces) 
This definition represents an entirely new way of thinking about urban planning. In the 
context of such a definition, we might expect much more emphasis on the social and 
economic aspects of land use or spatial planning, more of a policy rather than a blueprint 
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approach to planning and a style of planning which relates much more to the former activity 
of La DATAR, aménagement du territoire, at the urban scale than to the more static and 
physical style of planning connected with POS. 
The provisions of the Act provide for public participation throughout the planning process 
and imply that planners would be more involved in social and economic processes. Thus, 
for example, in housing, the former mechanisms for housing rehabilitation, OPAH's 
Opérations Programmées d'Amélioration de l'Habitat -Planned Housing Improvement Areas 
become the responsibility of planners in the context of the ZAC. 
The 1983 Act presents ambitious ideas which could contribute to the development of more 
selectivistic as against universalistic plans. Such changes place more responsibility and more 
work on commune mayors, and finance and manpower resources will be the crucial for the 
success of this new approach. Yet, as mentioned earlier in the context of the 1983 Acts, the 
continued austerity during the last year, 1985, of the Socialist government gave little hope for 
these resources. 
Apart from financial difficulties over their period of office, the Mitterand government was 
increasingly having to face opposition on a number of their policy fronts. Thus, the more 
general political context of the 1981-1985 period is looked at below. 
The Political Context of Land Use Planning , 1981-1985 
Earlier, in Chapter Seven, the first two yean (1981-1982) of PS Government were described 
as the "political window" allowing of the major decentralisation texts through Parliament 
relatively easily. Nineteen eighty-three can be viewed as a watershed in the post 
decentralisation period. In that year, the party lost its majority in the commune elections as 
the " déçu du socialisme " (the disappointment of Socialism) had set in. In part, the loss of 
popularity must relate to errors in economic policy (42), but it can also be attributed to the 
archaic social class analysis of the PS. Phrases used by Mitterrand such as "let the rich 
pay", "the wall of money" or "the men from the château have departed" bear witness to this. 
Subsequent strikes and demonstrations by middle income groups, doctors and lawyers, in 
1982 resulted from the drop in disposable income. These groups, as well as some blue 
collar workers, suffered from the government's redistribution of income. It is interesting to 
note Bimbaum's remark about the PS election defeat in March 1983: 
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"It is not the right that won; rather, it is that the sociological majority no longer 
coincides with those in political authority"(43^ 
Indeed, political authority in the PS governments was different in the first two years than in 
the second two years of office. Table 8.8 provides a profile of the occupational background 
of government ministers in the first two years of the PS and compared it with the period 
1974-1980. The table shows the particularly large percentage increase of teachers in PS 
ministers in 1981 and the corresponding drop in the percentage of other higher civil servants. 
(Teachers in this case refers to university professors who are civil servants in France). The 
remaining categories show only minor differences, except that industrialists disappeared 
altogether from the PS group in 1981. 
Table 8.8 Occupational Background of Government Ministeis, 1974-1982 
Civil Servants 
(Higher Civil Servants) 
(Teachers) 
Industrialists 
Higher Managers 
ShopkeeperVArtisans 
Farm Owners 
Blue Collar Workers 
Journalists/Writers 
Liberal Professions 
No Profession 
CWiersC44) 
Source: Birnbaum, P. 0985) The socialist élite, '¡es gros' and the state" in Cemy, P.G. and Schab, 
MA. (eds) Socialism, the State A Public Policy in France. Pinter, ρ 131 
In addition to the dominance of teachers in ministerial posts, teachers also formed the biggest 
group of MFs in the Assemblée Nationale, accounting for 48% of all MFs, with secondary 
school teachers forming more than half of this number(45). By contrast to the dominance of 
teachers in both ministerial posts and in the Assemblée Nationale , blue collar workers 
formed only 4.3% of Ministerial posts and 2.1% of the Assemblée Nationale ( 4 6 \ Whilst 
these figures present only a crude picture of the occupational structure of politicians they do, 
nevertheless, cast doubts on the PS rhetoric of more worker participation and controL 
1974-1980 
% 
48.9 
40.2 
8.7 
13.0 
6.5 
2.1 
1.1 
1.1 
3.2 
14.1 
2.1 
7.9 
1981-1982 
% 
63.8 
25.5 
34.0 
-
6.4 
• 
2.1 
43 
6.4 
14.9 
. 
2.1 
March 1983 saw the start of national political changes with the Right wing gaining control of 
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the Sénat . Their success was especially strong in the larger towns, the traditional 
strongholds of the PS. The Right wing parties gained control of 93% of the 220 towns of 
greater than 30 000 population as compared with 64% in the 1977 elections (47\ 
During 1984 and 1985, the PS continued to show a lack of popularity; their election promise 
to curb the independence of private schools, for example, was overwhelmed by immense 
Catholic demonstrations and this, in part, led to a cabinet reshuffle which resulted in a 
different ministerial profile from July 1984 onwards. Laurent Fabius' appointment as Prime 
Minister, for example, was typical of the return to a more Right wing cabinet composed of 
former higher civil servants. This reshuffle, along with contiuing conflict and tension, led 
to the PC withdrawal from the majority in the same month. The PC had in the May 1984 
European elections suffered their worst election results since the second World War, with 
only 11.2% of the votes. This result must be compared to that of the National Front with 
11%, 20.7% for the PS and 42.8% for the Right wing parties (48). Hall, summarising 
these events says: 
"By the end of 1984 Mitterrand was presiding over a socialism besieged. 
Paradoxically, a government that stressed decentralisation of decision making 
and consultation with social groups more than any preceding French 
administration had been singularly unsuccessful at mobilizing consent for its 
policies The profound étatìsme of Mitterand's socialism led many to see 
it as 'Socialism trapped within the State' " (49) 
By the end of 1985, the annual PS conference at Toulouse raised the major problem the party 
had faced in government, namely the difference between party policy and party rhetoric, 
which difference was described as having become "impossibly wide"(50). Paradoxically 
1985 had seen the increasing popularity of Mitterrand himself notwithstanding the downward 
fate of his party. As has been pointed out: 
"... Mitterrand's effective use of the media has helped to maintain the aura of the 
office which de Gaulle wanted to be second nature to the French people and 
which is crucial to the legitimacy of the regime itself'(51) 
Another observation about the President in his earlier years demonstrates that his strength 
during a rough period of office is a personal characteristic of long standing, 
"If there was one thing that Moorland (Mitterand's name during the years he 
spent in the Resistance) and the Mitterrand of the Fourth Republic knew, it was 
how to survive in adverse conditions" ^ 
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By the end of 1985 it was clear that Mitterrand would survive at least until the Assemblée 
Nationale elections of March 1986(53), but there were no positive signs that the PS would 
survive. The implications of national political change for decentralised land use planning 
will be discussed in the final chapter, whilst the section below will analyse decentralised POS 
preparation up to the end of the study period in 1985. 
Analysis of Decentralised POS Preparation 
The analysis of POS preparation, in the pre decentralisation period, presented in Chapter 5 as 
an example of centre/periphery relations concluded that the general model of Thoenig was 
applicable and valid. The question of concern here is whether or not, in the light of 
decentralised land use planning and POS preparation to date, the Thoenig model retains its 
applicability as an analytic framework. As a starting point in answering this question, it is 
important to recall the nature of the Thoenig model and the reasons for its choice. 
The model is a macro model which describes the nature of behavioural relationships between 
the state officials , the préfet and the commune mayors as a set of cross-regulating or 
interlocking or cross-functioning controls. In the analysis of plan-making, the state, as 
represented by its agents, the civil servants of the DDE, were unable to take decisions which 
affected land use plans without recourse to the préfet and their superiors in Paris, especially 
in respect of finance for public development proposals; administrative procedures, arrêtés, 
also required the higher authority of the préfet.. Many local politicians could, through the 
cwmd des mandats, circumvent control by DDE officials and have direct access to the prefer 
or politicians at the centre when decisions had to be taken. Preparation of the POS, legally 
a joint responsibility of the State and communal mayors, incorporated the control of the 
State a priori in the formal preparation process, whilst the informal processes connected with 
POS preparation allowed scope for compromise and mutual satisfaction of the personal 
interests of the two main plan-making actors, mayors and fonctionnaires of the DDE. It 
was observed that neither of these two actors held all of the cards in the plan-making process 
and each actor could blame the other if their role in the process was criticised by superiors or 
voters. 
In addition to the cross-functioning controls/cross-regulation, Thoenig also described 
centre/periphery relations as inefficient, insensitive, secretive and distrustful of public debate. 
Whilst it was concluded that POS preparation, given a context of limited manpower 
resources, could not be described as inefficient, all of these other characteristics were found 
176 
to apply. 
The model was regarded as providing a more appropriate analytic framework than British or 
American models of planning process because of the presence of certain characteristics of the 
planning system specific to the French milieu. These included, amongst others.the dual and 
sometimes multiple role of actors in the plan-making process, secondly, the a-typical nature 
of French "planners" and thirdly behavioural characterisdcs conditioned by the historic 
culture of French administrative process. 
With respect to these characteristics, decentralisation has made no changes in the cumul des 
mandats and although there has been a lot of discussion about "planners", the composition 
of the profession is little changed. The dual or multiple roles of plan-making actors continue 
to exist but they are not, as will be discussed below, necessarily the same as they were 
before, in the pre decentralisation period. However, they are still sufficiently distinctive to 
France to rule out the application of analytic frameworks devised in other countries. Thus, 
the general conditions for the applicability of the Thoenig model are still regarded as valid. 
Now it is important to consider the details of the model as an analytic tool to see if it is still 
appropriate for explanation of plan-making. 
In terms of the model, the first major difference between plan-making in the post as against 
the pre decentralisation period is the fact that the action space is shifted to subnational level 
and whilst recourse back to Paris is still possible it is less likely to be useful than in the past. 
This is the case because money for plan preparation studies has been shifted and is now 
distributed through the région and through the département, and money for public 
developments is allocated to the mayor directly and to the President of the Département 
Council. Politically, it is much less likely that central government ministers, for example, 
would become involved in local matters given the strengthened role of départements and of 
Municipal Councils. Thus, Thoenig's notion of recourse to a higher authority now refers to 
a subnational rather than central higher authority. 
The second major difference in terms of the model relates to who makes the plans, the state 
or the periphery. Both sets of actors still exist but within each group relationships have 
changed. On the side of the state, the formerly powerful DDE fonctionnaires are now 
accountable to a new master, the Commissaire de ia République. Some DDE contracted staff 
are also accountable to him, whilst in those cases where départements have been able to 
develop technical aid services responsible to the General Council of the départements, some 
contracted staff will be accountable to that body. On the side of the periphery, the mayor is 
still the central actor in plan-making but he/she is now much more accountable for the 
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process. Also, the mayor is now subject to greater contact with a wider range of actors, 
some of whom are new and some of whom are pre-existing. New actors in plan-making are 
the public, interest groups, neighbouring communes and possibly a commune planning 
staff. In addition, the President of the Département Council is important being responsible 
for about one-third of the budget for public development (54). Pre-existing actors are the 
Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture and Trades, Municipal Councils and the State. The 
role of the Municipal Council has been substantially strengthened in POS decision-making, 
whilst the role of the state is subject to negotiation between the mayor and the Commissaire 
de la République . Thus, within both the state and the periphery groups of plan-making 
actors.the key actors are now subject to greater checks and balances . This makes it much 
more difficult for informal personally advantageous compromises between mayors and DDE 
fonctionnaires to be arrived at. 
A third major difference is the relationship between the two groups of plan-making actors, 
those of the state and those of the periphery. Irrespective of the way in which the former 
group are involved in the process, the Commissaire de la République has the right to 
intervene a posteriori in matters of illegality, and there is a clear technical tutelage exercised 
by the DDE through the requirement that POS conform to the PIG, OIN and public servicing 
provisions. Moreover, there is no legal right of appeal for communes against such 
conformity when they are notified of it The state thus appears to retain its upper hand in 
control of POS content. The extent to which the state's control will be exercised strongly 
relates, in the first place, to whether or not a commune already has an approved POS, in the 
second place to the relationships within the state group of plan-making actors, and in the 
third place to reactions from the commune. 
Communes without an approved POS are generally the smaller, poorer communes with 
mayors of limited cumul. As the evidence earlier tells us, 87% of communes with no POS 
have willingly or unwillingly used the services of the DDE for plan preparation, and many of 
them still await these services. These communes are vulnerable to control by the DDE from 
the outset of plan preparation, not least because they have no experience in the plan-making 
process. Many of them will have had no relationship with neighbouring communes , and 
few of them will have had such an administrative load as POS preparation before. By 
contrast, the communes with an approved POS are in a stronger position. Some of these 
already have their own technical staff, some of their mayors are experienced in planning and 
their administrative capacities are much more extensive. Even for those communes which 
do not employ their own staff and have limited possibility of being able to do so, their 
general familiarity with planning will assist them to counter any excessive control by the 
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DDE. Whether a commune has an approved plan or not, and it is important to remember that 
the majority of communes , approximately 80% in 1985, had no approved plan, the 
observations below will also be important 
The nature of relationships between the Commissaire de la République and DDE 
fonctionnaires, and between the Commissaire de la République and the President of the 
Département Council is the second factor which will detennine the possibility of strong 
technical tutelage being exercised. More especially, the extent to which the Commissaire de 
la République is prepared to engage in conflict or make compromises with these actors is 
crucial. Two other factors will be crucial; first, the technical ability of DDE staff to cope 
with the new work, especially if they are faced, as they are at present, with substantially 
increased workloads; secondly, the extent to which that workload may, in tum, be 
transferred to the commune if money becomes available for them to employ staff. 
On the commune side, the possibility of countering the technical tutelage will depend on a 
number of variables: 
(i) The degree of success in going to the Committee of Reconciliation with a well 
argued case against objections to the POS. This in turn is dependent on 
technical expertise from commune's own planning staff, or experience of the 
mayor in planning. 
(ii) Gaining support from the other plan-making participants, which in tum requires 
the mayor to have good negotiating skills and possibly local party political 
connections (e.g. with adjacent communes of the same political colour) 
(ili) Ability of the mayor to anticipate areas of potential technical tutelage and to 
negotiate with département politicians and/or DDE officials how to reach 
compromises. In turn, these possibilities might rely on party political 
connections with the politicians, former linkages with DDE officials, and 
possibly the ability to exploit tensions between DDE officials and the 
Commissaire de la République, от tensions between the Commissaire de la 
République and the President of the Département Council. 
(iv) The possibility of more communal groupings with shared technical departments 
to prepare POS. Whilst little evidence of this exists, this is clearly the way to 
strengthen thecommune against technical tutelage. Another, albeit 
Machiavellian possibility, is for commues without a POS to sit tight and leave 
the DDE to do everything; i.e. nothing. 
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De Courson's views are a useful summary of the above discussion: 
" Chacun devra donc, par nécessité, réorganiser son jeu, repérer les nouveaux 
circuits, mettre en place de nouveaux filières, convaincre d'autres interlocuteurs, 
parfois même changer de patron ou de métier "(50) 
(So everyone must, out of necessity, reorganise their game, seek out new 
circuits, put in place new strings, convince other actors, sometimes even change 
one's boss or one's profession) 
Under the above, complex sets of centre/periphery relations, it is unlikely that the Thoenig 
model of cross functioning controls can explain plan preparation as in the past Even in 
communes where there is no POS and where they are more vulnerable to technical control, 
the mayor will, in addition to the DDE, have to treat with new actors in the process at 
commune level and with the President of the Département Council at the département level. 
As has been suggested: 
"The web of complicity between le préfet et ses notables is being replaced by le 
président du Conseil Général et ses notables "(56) 
However, it is worth pointing out, as an aside, that the Thoenig model of centre/periphery 
relations could retain its applicability for those functions such as housing which were not 
subject to decentralisation. 
In addition to the Thoenig analysis that centre/periphery relations are based on 
cross-regulation and cross-functioning controls, there is his suggestion that the system was 
inefficient, insensitive, secretive and distrustful of public debate. These elements also will be 
considered. 
First, the question of efficiency. Given the extensive changes in the preparation of POS 
which were shown earlier as lengthening the preparation procedure, it is possible that the 
system will become much more overburdened, at least in the short term, while mayors and 
other officials in large numbers become willing to begin the plan preparation procedures 
and/or try to deal with the whole range of related changes in land use planning introduced by 
the 1985 Act The excessive and additional demands placed on the services of the DDE have 
resulted in lengthy queues for POS preparation to begin. This further burdening of 
manpower resources is likely to lead to delays and possibly inefficiency. 
The question of sensitivity of POS content will be looked at in the next chapter, but clearly, 
the more the content of the plan takes into account the couleur locale and thus respond to the 
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spirit of the 1985 Act, the greater the time required to prepare iL Moreover, the planners 
who are preparing TOS, whether DDE or others, have little experience in preparing plans 
which do not follow the format of Ministry guidebooks. Thus, the learning process for the 
new plans will take time. 
The introduction of the public and interest groups in plan-making suggests that there is now 
much more openness and much less secrecy. However, if public involvement is taken up 
seriously by mayors and the public alike, and there is little experience of this in France to 
date, then participation could slow down plan preparation and/or could result in the 
overburdening of the Reconciliation Committee with objections, as suggested earlier. 
Nevertheless, an effort has been made to de-mystify the plan-making process and allow 
some more time for it.With respect to these characteristics which Thoenig used to describe 
the system of centre/periphery relations, it is unlikely, when they are looked at as a whole, 
that the system will show any improvements in the short term. The only way short term or, 
indeed, longer term improvements could be envisaged is through substantial transfer of 
funds to communes for plan preparation. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has considered the context, practice and progress of land use planning and POS 
preparation over the post decentralisation period. The discussion produces, de facto, a 
rather different analysis of centre/periphery relations in POS preparation than an initial review 
of the 1983 Acts alone might have led us to believe. Organisationally, the legal and practice 
arrangements for plan preparation show that it is now a more complex process than in the 
past Also, from the above dicussion of the additional actors involved in the process and the 
various possibilities of their likely behaviour then it is also likely that plan preparation will be 
more complex. 
Lack of resources for plan preparation is a central concern to almost everyone involved in 
POS preparation or commenting on it. To starve communes of money and personnel to 
make their plans denies them the freedom to choose the path they wish to pursue in 
development of their commune. 
The last chapter described the POS as a carrot and possibly even a stick for the mayor of a 
commune. This statement, based on the first post decentralisation years, still applied by 
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the end of 1985. The carrot is the right of the mayor to take all development decisions once 
he has a POS approved. The stick is the need to continue to use the services of the DDE to 
prepare the POS and the associated risk of vassalage to the DDE fonctionnaires and their 
masters, the Commissaire de la République . The notion of the POS as a stick can also be 
viewed politically, in that there is unlikely to be any mercy shown to a mayor, by the voters 
or by the opposition politicians, if the mayor does not take up his/her responsibilities or, at 
least, is not seen to try to take these up. The fact that there is a long queue at the DDE could 
be an advantage to a mayor who does not want to get involved in a politically sensitive plan 
and planning decisions. Given that large numbers of new mayors with no POS and with no 
planning experience came to power in 1983, there is a possibility that many of these find the 
prospect of making a POS a daunting one and are content to sit back, wait for the DDE and 
pretend to be discontented. 
In the past, the mayor could blame the DDE for electorally unpopular decisions because the 
state shared the responsibility for POS preparation. Now the blame which can be allocated 
to the DDE is much more limited and can only relate to those decisions which relate to POS 
conformity to other planning documents. Admittedly these decisions might still be extensive 
and might prove to result in a lot of sensitive and unpopular issues but a mayor who tries to 
blame these on the DDE might have a lot of difficulty convincing the electorate. The mayor 
might blame the President of the Département Council for not being given sufficient 
finances to prepare the POS, although this will be much less possible if the mayor and the 
President belong to the same political party. 
On this last point, the matter of party affiliation, there is ample evidence to suggest that much 
greater political importance has become attached to urbanisme. Thus, it is likely that POS 
preparation will contribute to the greater politicisation of planning issues at the local level. 
Many commentators, in fact, see decentralised POS preparation leading to greater conflicts 
between communes than in the past This remains to be seen. However, it will be of 
interest to see if, and with whom, mayors will be "condemned to live together"(57) - the DDE 
fonctionnaires , the Commissaire de la République, the public, interest groups, the President 
of the Département Council, their neighbouring mayors or the bosses of political parties? 
182 
CHAPTER 8 NOTF.S A REFERENCES 
(1) The 4 décrets of 9th September 1983 are·-
DicretNo 83-810 relatif à la commission de conciliation et modifiant le chapitre 1er du atre 
11 du Uver 1er du code d'urbanisme 
DécretNo 83-811 relatif aux projets d'intérêt générai 
Décret No 83-812 relaof aux schémas directeurs 
Décret No 83-813 modifiant le code d'urbanisme et relatif notamment aux plans d'occupation 
des sols 
pp 2767-2776 Journal Officiel, llth September 1983 
(2) The second set of decrees were issued on 30th September 1983 and dealt with permis de 
construire (building permits) and certificats d'urbanisme (planning authorisations) whilst the 
third set, of 29th March 1984, were concerned with démolition certificates, completion 
certificates, conformity certifícales, camping and parking of caravans, subdivisions and wooded 
spaces 
(3) In the case of large scale plans an inquiry committee may be appointed by the Administrative 
Tribunal 
(4) R123 34 points out that the Committee of Reconciliation can only be involved in TOS 
revisions if they affect the general content of the plan, relate to wooded areas or are concerned 
with potentially bad nuisances. 
(5) Circular No. 84-04,10th January 1984 on the Reconciliation Committees 
(6) Ibid., the circular actually states: " que les personnes nommées le soient dans le triple souci de 
l'indépendance personnelle, de la diversité et de l'équilibre " 
(7) Léna, H. (1984) " Les textes". Urbanisme . 202. ρ 76 
(8) L123.I. R123.17 
(9) See for example: 
Taxil, M. (1984) " Elaboration des plans d'occupation des sols", [,'Ar"'"l"¿ Jundique-Drnit 
Administratif. 20th May, pp 281-287 
Theobald, J. (1984) " Les nouveaux instruments d'urbanisme" L'Actualité Jundique-Droa 
Administratif . 20th May, pp 291-293 
Sauvez, M (1984) " Des textes au terrain". Urbanisme . 202, pp 82-86 
Léna, H. op. CIL 
(10) Sauvez, M. op cit., ρ 84 
(11) Lll l . landL12110 
(12) Léna, H. op. CiL, ρ 78 
(13) L122.2 
(14) Léna, H. op. CIL, p. 78 
(15) R122.10 line 2 and R123 5 
(16) 12261ine3andR123.51me3 
183 
(17) Léna, op. cit.. ρ 80 
(18) L123.7JandLni.l.l 
(19) The lírhanimie survey reponed in issue 202 June/July 1984. pp 46-90 repons the views of 35 
actors in the planning process 
(20) Poutissou, A. ib., ρ 73 
(21) Malterre,P. Urbanismi, 202,op.cit.,ρ65 
(22) See for example, Klein, G. (p. 65) Urbanisme 202, op. cit. 
(23) Le Moniteur . 5th July 1985 'Urbanisme: nouveau métier, nouvelle pratique" pp 34-35 
(24) Sauvez, M. op. cit. ρ 84 
(25) Déliante, С Urbanisme 202, op. cit., pp 46/47 
(26) See for example, Rigaud, J. (Deputy mayor and president of the National Federation of 
Planning Agencies) Urbanisme, 202, op. ciL, ρ 87 
(27) Hervio.P. Urbanisme . 202, op. CiL, ρ 59 
(28) The Working Party, under the Chairmanship of Alain Richard (deputy mayor of 
Saint-Ouen-1'Aumone (Val d'Oise) reponed in Le. Moniteur 30th September 1985, pp 23-25 
(29) Ibid.. ρ 23 
(30) Reference cited (29) 
(31) Ibid.. ρ 24 
(32) One study reports on a meeting of the profession atthe Univeraty of Aix-en-Provence on 8th 
November 1985 and attended by practitioners from all of the départements in Provence -Côte 
D'Azur region. This is reported in the following reference: 
Bordonneau, J. (1986) " La réforme de l'urbanisme à l'épreuve des faits". Antunlité 
Juridique-Droit Administratif - N ° · 5, May 
(33) Renouveau d'aménagement was, in fact, the name of the outline act adopted by the 
Assemblée Nationale on 22nd June 1984 
(34) Le Moniteur interview with Y. Dauge, 18th May 1984. " Une nouvelle démarche pour 
l'aménagement urbain ", pp 65/66. 
(35) Lanza, Α. (1986) " Chronique général de législation; les nouveaux instruements de 
l'aménagement urbain". Actualité Juridique-Droit Administratif • 20th January, pp 10-18 
(36) Loi No. 85-729 of 18th January 1985 Relative à la définition et la mise en oeuvre des 
principes d'aménagement. Journal Officiel, 19th July 1985, pp 8125-8172. 
(37) For a review of the provisions of the above Act see; Bousey, S.C. (1985) " Une nouvelle 
définition de l'aménagement", Le Moniteur . 22nd November in the section called coIíeclivit¿s 
terrwruües 
184 
(38) Colly-Teitgen, С. (1986) " L'urbanisme opérationnel; définition et mise en oeuvre de 
principes d'aménagement", L'Anualité Juridique Propriété Immobiliare . lOth January, pp 
7-17 
(39) Ibid. 
(40) Lama, op. CiL 
(41) Article 1 of 1985 Act, ρ 8125 Journal Officiel. cited in reference (36) 
(42) Hall, P.A. (1985) "Socialism in one country: Mitterrand and the struggle to define a new 
economic policy for France", in Cemy, P.G. & Sehain, M.A. (eds) Socialism - the State and 
Public Policy in France. Pinter, pp 81-107 
(43) Bimbaum, P. (1985) "The socialist élite", "les gros" and the state" in Cemy, P.G. & Sehain, 
M.A. op. ciL, ρ 138 
(44) This category has been added to Bimbaum's table which, in the reference cited, did not add up 
to 100%. This decision was taken after contact with the author through the editor of the book 
(45) Bimbaum, P., ρ 130 
(46) Ibid., pp 130/131 
(47) Kesselman, M. (1985) The tranquil revolution at dochemerle", in Cemy, P.G. & Sehain, 
M.A., op. ciL, ρ 179 
(48) Cemy, P.G. 0985) "Socialism, power and party politics", in Cemy, P.G. and Sehain, MA., 
op. ciL, ρ 32 
(49) Hall, P., op. ciL, pp 104 and 105. 
(50) Smyth, R. (1986) "Mitterrand's appointment with fear". The Observer. Sunday 9th March, p21 
(51) Cemy, P.G. op. ciL, ρ 30 
(52) Smyth, R. op. ciL, ρ 21 
(53) At thai point in time if the PS lost this would lead to "cohabitation" of a PS President and a 
Right wing Prime Minister. Clearly he could resign then or stay as he so chose. 
(54) See Kesselman, M. op. ciL, pp 176/177 
(55) De Couison (1984) " A qui profile la décentralisation". Urbanisme, 202, ρ 108 
(56) Kesselman, M. op. ciL, ρ 176 
(57) Vincent Wright observed mayors living with Paris bureaucrats in this way (refer back to 
Chapters 3 and 4) 

PARTIV 
THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 
185 
CHAPTER 9 - ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The three previous parts of this study have examined the development of land use planning in 
France over a period of nearly thirty years. The main focus of study has been the preparation 
of local plans, les plans d'occupation des sols , which have been investigated both as an 
example of centre/periphery relations and as a technical activity. Important in this 
investigation has been a consideration of the various contexts in which plan-making takes 
place notably the legal, administrative-politico and socio-economic contexts. 
The findings in Part Π (Chapters 4 and 5) have demonstrated clearly that POS preparation in 
the pre decentralisation period was indeed a mirror image of centre/periphery relations in 
general. Moreover, these chapters demonstrated that the study of POS preparation was 
indeed an effective way for the researcher to analyse these relationships. Thus, the first of 
the two main arguments of the study, presented in Chapter 1, was found to be valid. Then, 
in Chapter 8, POS preparation in the post decentralisation period was examined. The 
conclusion reached was consistent with the second main argument presented in Chapter 1, 
namely: that the post decentralisation system of French land use planning, as outlined in the 
new legislation (post 1981), showed that there were ambiguities in the legislation, that it 
could be interpreted in different ways and that little provision had been made for its 
implementation. Thus, these findings would suggest that the decentralisation of the land use 
planning system had only marginally taken place and whilst executive decisions for plan 
preparation became the responsibility of the commune mayor, these were an onerous 
responsibility in the absence of resources to do the work. Even if resoureces were available 
for plan preparation, the possibility of a tutelle technique existed together with a posteriori 
control by the préfet. Similarly, the right to take decisions on planning applications was 
transferred to the commune mayor but this was only a conditional transfer. 
A supplementary argument of the study was that the land use planning measures introduced 
by Mitterrand are less interventionist and allowed less public control than those introduced by 
de Gaulle. This chapter will examine this argument by comparing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the POS as an instrument for guiding development in the pre and post 
decentralisation periods. Also to be examined in this chapter are the findings related to the 
two main arguments studied before, but now from a different perspective: first, their 
implications for theoretical or analytic frameworks to explain the plan-making process in 
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France; secondly, their implications for planning practice in France. 
A Comparison of the POS Pre and Post Decentralisation 
In the pre decentralisation period, the Loi d'Orientation Foncière of 1967 and the preceding 
administrative arrangements of the mid sixties for a system of land use planning had as 
result that, by the seventies, the POS had become successfully recognised and accepted as 
the foremost planning document in France. Although national plans and strategic plans 
(SDAU) were still prepared, they had lost favour. The greater certainty which TOS provided 
in a period of economic recession and the basis they gave for dealing with the years of 
neglect of urban problems resulting from rapid urbanisation, earned them more political 
support than national or strategic plans. Indeed it was shown earlier (Chapter 5) that all of 
the main actors in land use planning, mayors, fonctionnaires of the DDE and contracted 
planners of the DDE, agreed on the value and need for POS as the central instrument of land 
use planning even if they were not fully committed to the way the plans were prepared or to 
the content of the plans. Viewed in this way and in the light of the previous embryonic land 
use planning activities, the efforts of de Gaulle have to be seen as positive and innovatory. 
Understandably, given the years of neglect of land use planning and planning problems, the 
system introduced by de Gaulle, and developed by his successors in the seventies, was 
neither a panacea to cure all planning ills nor. 
Neither was the POS as the central instrument in the land use planning system without its 
weaknesses. However, the strengths of the land use planning system with the POS as its 
central focus were several. These are listed below: 
(1) De Gaulle introduced a 'system' of land use planning where hitherto there had 
been patchy and unco-ordinated legislative and administrative measures and 
instruments. From the mid sixties and after the LOF of 1967, an administrative 
framework for land use planning was provided by the state, through the 
Ministry of Equipement and the DDE's . The law of planning integrated the 
main elements for controlling development, that is, plans, development control 
and land management instruments. Noteworthy is the fact that this system was 
achieved within the context of a political majority which espoused indicative 
planning at best and laissez-faire market mechanisms at worse. 
(2) When compared to all other planning instruments in operation over the pre 
decentralisation period, the POS whatever its weaknesses, was, nevertheless, 
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the most effective instrument for the control of land use at that time. 
(3) The POS became a well discussed and well known instrument over the 
seventies. The LOF had ensured that it was compulsory, along with the SDAU, 
in communes with more than 10 000 population. Whilst the upper tier plans 
were unsuccessful even in these larger communes , the evidence of POS 
preparation showed clearly that in those larger communes where urban planning 
problems were more severe and where development pressures were greater, 
considerable progress and enforcement of the law was achieved. In small rural 
communes the other planning instruments, the ZEP and the carte communale , 
provided alternatives to POS which were easier and quicker to prepare yet still 
provided some control over development of communes reluctant to engage in 
POS. 
(4) Whilst preparing a POS was a difficult game to play, many mayors successfully 
learned the rules of the game and the nuances of it. For most mayors, in fact, 
the rules of the POS game were the general rules which applied to all their other 
relationships with the state and its agents in the field. By contrast, the details of 
plan proposals maps and the plans written statement took longer to master and 
some mayors learned more quickly than others and, of course, some mayors 
learned nothing at all. Irrespective of the outcome of POS preparation, a 
positive feature of it was that the state and the communes had to work together 
and central/local collaboration ensured that the state officials were forced to be 
knowledgeable in the affairs of communes and were directly seen to be a party 
to communal planning decisions. 
Turning to the post decentralisation period and the land use planning system which was 
developed by the PS, the election promises and even a first glance at the first Déferre Act 
might have led us to believe that a substantial, almost revolutionary, shift had taken place in 
the context and importance of land use planning. However, the decentralisation process was 
never completed and, as we have seen, the legislation outstanding after the second Defeire 
Act failed to appear and the third tier of sub national government, the région, was not 
established. The legislation for a decentralised land use planning system transferred the land 
use planning system to the communes only conditionally. The conditions of the transfer 
are, however, the key to our understanding how much decentralisation of land use planning 
has taken place. Conditions such as "no POS then no responsibility for treating development 
applications" or "conformity of POS to a set of documents controlled by the DDE" leave us 
in no doubt that the system was less decentralised than the originators of the new system lead 
us to believe. The conditions of decentrahsation are so restrictive that a tutelle technique has 
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been introduced which might prove to be tougher and more controlling than the former 
administrative tutelle . Allied to these conditions, the scarcity of resources for plan 
preparation has created a vassalage of communes to the DDE for their technical services. In 
spite of appearances, the conclusion is that no revolutionary shifts had taken place. 
Although the importance of land use planning was stressed as a central theme of 
decentralisation, it was not accorded a sufficiently high priority in public expenditure, so the 
means were not available to allow mayors choice between the DDE services and other 
technical aid services, let alone to employ their own technical staff. Moreover, beyond the 
question of land use planning, the decline of national and regional planning are further 
evidence that the confessed policy of more planning and the practical reality differ 
substantially. 
To take a generous view of PS intentions, it could be argued that, in spite of economic 
recession and a potentially limited political majority in the Sénat after March 1983, the PS 
were determined, at all costs, to get decentralisation in general and decentralisation of land 
use planning in particular on the statute books. On the other hand, these two contexts were 
not unknown in the first year of the PS administration, and the costs of political expediency 
are clearly seen in the content of the legislation, in the sense that the latter is not completed, 
nor is its content representative of Socialist aims. When the context of the legislation is 
considered in detail, it must lead to the questioning of any generous interpretation which 
might be accorded to PS goals. For example, if decentralisation really meant "transfer of 
responsibility to elected members and clarification of their responsibilities" then this would 
have more likely been achieved if all DDE staff and all staff of the préfet, including the 
préfet, had become employees of the elected councils and directly accountable to them. If 
decentralisation really meant, as Worms said, "less rules and less administration" then it is 
surprising that, even for a POS with minimal content and even for the review of it, the 
process was observed to be much more complex, bureaucratic and time consuming compared 
with the pre decentralisation period. Similarly, if decentralisation aimed to "relieve the state 
of the management of certain local affairs", then it should not have introduced new 
instruments, the PIG and OIN, into plan making, which gave the state a bigger role in local 
land use planning. In view of these obvious differences between PS rhetoric and 
government policy or, to put it another way, the difference between the stated intentions of 
the policy and the realities of the legislative content and the practice which will develop from 
it, it is not surprising that the " déçu du socialisme" set in. 
The extent of the difference between policy and practice can also be observed by looking at 
the role and the content of the pre and post decentralisation POS. As mentioned earlier, the 
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pre decentralisation POS was not without its weakness. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
these weaknesses were both contextual and technical The contextual weaknesses have been 
analysed in the first and second main argument as posed in Chapter 1. 
The role and the technical content of TOS are looked at here to determine their sensitivity in 
the context of PS philosophy. In this context we might expect to see the post decentralisation 
POS reflecting more of the Socialist principles of the PS. In particular, we might expect the 
provisions of the plans to lead to more direct control and intervention in the activities of the 
private sector. We might also expect the plans to reflect a greater degree of local democracy 
than their predecessors. 
From the discussion of the legislation and practice in Chapters 7 and 8, there emerge a 
number of changes in the technical content of POS which may indeed reflect PS philosophy. 
First, is the provision of limiting private development outside of built-up areas with no 
approved POS. This provision would suggest a strong intervention in the activities of 
private development and would suggest that in communes without an approved POS, all 
private development would have to take place within the built-up area. However, if a 
commune without a POS experiences pressures for non-residential development outside of 
the existing built-up area, then it could argue that these developments were "not suitable 
adjoining existing built-up areas". This is allowed under legal rule (L) 111-1-2 of the Code 
d'Urbanisme. In communes with an approved POS, development outside of the existing 
built up area does not apply. In these communes there would be little to stop a mayor 
allowing development where he chose provided, of course, it was consistent with the TOS 
règlement. However, as we know from previous discussion of POS content, departures or 
dérogations from these règlements were commonplace and many were even permissible; 
e.g. exceeding the PLD or making use of provisions of ZAC. No changes have been made 
in the legislation to prevent such dérogations continuing. 
A second provision which could affect the content of POS and which could reflect PS 
philosophy is the possibility of making a POS with minimal or with complete content This 
choice possibility, as discussed in Chapter 8, is contingent on the extent to which the DDE 
insist on certain details of conformity being included in the POS and thus determining the 
degree of detail in its content If the DDE do not impose these sorts of details on communes 
then the plan could contain fewer restrictions and thus less control of private development 
than predecessor ЮЗ. Whilst the amount of detail of a minimal POS would be no less than 
that of ZEP or carte communale, the disincentive to prepare a POS compared to these former 
plans is greater. Indeed, the new, longer and more complex procedure is more likely to 
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discourage POS preparation especially in small, rural communes . Thus, many of these 
communes might not prepare a plan at all. 
A third new provision relative to the philosophy of the TOS is that neither SDAU nor ЮЗ is 
now compulsory in communes with more than 10 000 population. In these circumstances, 
mayors with or without an approved POS can simply decide not to start plan preparation or 
plan review, or may start a TOS but do no more work on it. For many mayors this option 
might prove to be a much more electorally effective method of conducting their affairs. This 
would be especially true in circumstances where the mayor might be able to negotiate private 
development within the existing built-up area or negotiate departures to the limited 
development rule. This is another example which could lead to the relaxation of land use 
control. 
A fourth set of provisions in the Déferre Acts and the 1985 Act which relate to the 
philosophy of the PS concerns POS conformity to other documents, especially the 
introduction of chartes intercommunales and the new definition of aménagement.. These 
taken together, would suggest that a big effort had been made to change the content of POS. 
In particular, the cumulative effects of these measures would suggest that more cogniscance 
should be taken of intercommunal planning issues, more concern for the social and economic 
contexts of land use planning, and more concern for land management These are the issues 
which the Richard Report called the diversification of planning, or the aspects of POS which 
would lead to a document demonstrating more selectivity or" couleur locale " in its content 
than the rigid, universalistic, physical, blueprint content of predecessor POS. These are 
indeed laudable and necessary initiatives. However, their success is limited by a number of 
factors. First, little interest in CI preparation is evident Secondly, and perhaps the main 
difficulty, is the unavailability of professional staff to make plans of this nature. As has 
already been indicated, fonctionnaires have no experience of plans other than the 
predecessor POS, based on the Ministry guidebooks, whilst contracted staff have been 
bogged down for almost a decade in blueprints and although they might be able to prepare 
more selectivistic plans, there are far too few contracted personnel to go round. Thirdly, the 
increased number of requests to prepare POS will place even greater stress on DDE 
resources. Fourthly, some of the 1985 Act provisions concern aspects of development 
planning such as private and public financing of development in which hitherto few of the 
DDE staff have been involved. Generally, there is no evidence whatsoever that any 
amelioration of these circumstances above is likely to take place. Moreover, at the time of 
writing, there is no evidence from the planning literature nor from correspondence with 
practitioners to suggest that post decentralisation POS arc any different in content to pre 
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decentralisation POS. 
A final change which is worthy of mention relates to land management. In the pre 
decentralisation period, a tax was payable for exceeding the PLD. In the post 
decentralisation period this has been relaxed significantly whereby no tax for exceeding PLD 
is now payable by the public sector and, in the private sector, excess PLD tax is now 
distributed to the commune (75%) and the département (25%), whereas previously the 
communes received 100%. This could lead to the encouragement of high rise, high density 
development especially in public sector developments. Moreover, given the financial interest 
of the département in private development then, where the DDE decide development 
applications, it might take a more lenient view than the commune. 
Based on the above discussion and, in response to the last and supplementary argument of 
this study, there are definite signs that the PS tried to introduce greater control in some areas 
of land use planning than in the past, but there are also signs of more relaxations and 
deregulatory measures. Thus, ambiguities abound and what seems to be given by the one 
hand is taken away by the other. The extent to which these ambiguities will be accompanied 
by liberal attitudes to development as against strongly controlling or interventionist attitudes 
will depend on the wider and more general set of parameters governing the behaviour of 
actors in the land use planning process and on their interpretation of the rules of the game. 
A final question relative to PS philosophy and the new land use planning system is whether 
or not greater local democracy has been introduced. The land use planning legislation shows 
clear and definite evidence of more publicity and consultation. In Chapter 8 the provisions 
for including a greater number of participants in plan-making were described as well as 
provisions for more publicity, more consultation time and new arbitration rules. Without 
entering into a debate of public participation venus public involvement or tokenism or of 
degrees of protection of the public versus the private good, (which, are all clearly beyond the 
scope of this study), a general observation can be made: irrespective of how these new 
provisions work out in practice, there is nothing particularly Socialist about them. Indeed, 
these sorts of measures and even more extensive measures of public involvement in the 
planning process, have been practiced for decades in many countries which have had 
successive Right wing governments. 
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Implications for Theoretical or Analytic Frameworks 
Chapter 8 reviewed the possibility of using the Thoenig model of cross-regulation and 
cross- functioning controls as an analytic framework of centre/periphery relations in land use 
plan-making in the post decentralisation period. Whilst decentralisation did nothing to 
change the combination of contextual attributes of the land use planning system found in 
France, which detennined the use of a French model of analysis as against one imported 
from another country, the conclusion reached in using the model to explain centre/periphery 
relations in land use planning was that the it was no longer an adequate analytic framework. 
In particular, the multiplicity of relationships and the number of possible permutations 
between and amongst new and pre existing actors in the plan making explains why this is 
the case. Figure 9.1 provides a summary of these relationships.The upper part of the table 
shows four sets of actors in plan-making some of whom are always present in the 
plan-making process and some of whom not always present. The lower part of the diagram 
shows a simple matrix of relationships within each of the 4 sets and between each of the 
four sets of actors. What was clear from the discussion of these relationships in Chapter 8 
was that, within one set, one actor may not necessarily agree with the remaining actors in the 
same set and may treat with one or more of the other three sets of actors collectively or 
individually in differing ways. On the basis of the above observations, it is concluded that in 
order to formulate a general analytic framework of relationships, all linkages between every 
actor in the planning process and all other actors have to be understood, in terms of the 
degree of harmony and thus support as against conflict and thus lack of support The 
determinants of harmony or conflict in relationships are many, and from the discussion in 
Chapter 8 we can construct a checklist of the possible determinants with respect to POS 
preparation: 
(i) The position of the mayor re the cwnul 
(ii) The political composition of the commune relative to the département and to 
neighbouring communes 
(iii) The degree of party political control at the local level 
(iv) The degree of dependency of the commune on the technical services of the 
DDE as against their own staff 
(v) The extent to which the substantive issues of the POS generate harmony or 
conflict between and amongst actors 
(vi) Finance for TOS preparation 
(vii) Administrative efficiency and effectiveness of both the commune and the 
département 
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This list of determinants may not be exhaustive but it would provide a basis for empirical 
study. Such study would then not only provide a test of the factors outlined above but 
would also lead to a greater understanding of the motivations of actors in post 
decentralisation plan-making and the resultant content of completed plans. 
Implications for Planning Practice 
There is no doubt that, during the late sixties and seventies, the practice of land use planning 
made progress despite the fact that old habits die hard in France. To date, the main change 
which seems to be evident since decentralisation, admittedly in the absence of more detailed 
empirical evidence, is the acceleration of starts in POS preparation. This might be a 
temporary phenomenon, as mayors show to the electorate that they are taking up their 
responsibilities. 
Resources for plan-making are a central problem in the development of the state of the art in 
land use planning. These include both manpower resources and sufficient finanial resources 
for communes to employ their own staff. In previous chapters it has been shown how few 
planners (froth fonctionnaires and contracted ) are actually employed in France and how 
small the budget for plan preparation is. It would seem appropriate to conduct a 
comprehensive review of these matters and, in particular, to compare the outputs which are 
expected from the land use planning system over given timescales and the manpower and 
financial inputs required to do the job. A particular problem in reaching conclusions from 
such an exercise would be determining how to allocate the resources between and amongst 
communes. 
Another concern for the development of French land use planning is that the profession of 
"urbaniste" requires change. Clearly the subject of the establishment of a bureau de 
qualification (qualifications office) as suggested by the SFU, and rejected by government in 
1981, should be reopened for discussion. Allied to this must be the question of more and 
better planning education. If "urbaniste" becomes fully state recognised through a 
qualifications office and control, then educational courses will have to be recognised by it to 
ensure the necessary link between academic and vocational content of courses. Although the 
fonctionnaire planners have managed to run the land use planning system, they have simply 
kept it ticking over and there is little likelihood that they will be able to initiate new ideas in 
planning practice. There are signs, especially in the 1985 Act, that the necessity of linking 
social and economic to spatial change are recognised. The 'how' of achieving this is unlikely 
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to emerge in France. Although the French have begun to study research and practice 
findings from elsewhere ( and this is precisely what might help in unleashing them from an 
old fashioned approach to land use planning) their pride and the fear of conflict in the 
localities might prevent them changing anything in practice. In fact, throughout this study, 
the inviolability of the commune has been demonstrated as a major stumbling block in the 
improvement of planning practice. More especially, the inability of government to 
reorganise subnational government into units which more appropriately reflect planning 
problems and issues is of concern. At the very least, compulsory mergers of communes for 
planning purposes might have helped. These would have the advantage of allowing a more 
effective allocation of resouces even if these resources were less than the outputs of the 
system demanded and they would also lead to a better understanding of spatial relationships 
in land use decisions. 
Political change at national level might change the rules of the game in plan preparation and 
land use planning and, indeed, this is evidenced during the Chirac administration in 1986. 
However, deregulation of land use planning, revocation of regulations or relaxation of them 
by the Chirac government, will only result in heavier costs in the future. In the past, the 
post war economic boom cushioned the diseconomies of uncoordinated public expenditure at 
the local level This is no longer possible and the choice is pay now or pay more later. The 
"quiet revolution of Clochemerle" of the PS decentralisation appears to have been the 
opposite-noisy and not a revolution at all. Old habits may die hard but there is a limit to the 
amount of time the French can keep their land use planning skeletons in the cupboard. 
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Postscript 
In March 1986 the Assemblée Nationale elections favoured the Right wing majority and 
Jacques Chirac, the outspoken mayor of Paris, became Prime Minister. The period of 
cohabitation of Chirac and Mitterrand began. In land use planning, as distinct from foreign 
policy, this unusual political phenomenon had little significance. What did happen 
however, was the introduction of new deregulatory legislation in land use planning. 
Only four months after the right came to power, Pierre Méhagaignerie, the new Minister of 
Planning, introduced measures to cancel the compulsory pre-emption of urban land by 
communes . Then, ZAD and ZIF were re-introduced, and the timing for the introduction of 
the " no development " rule in communes without an approved POS was relaxed. 
Arrangements were then set in motion for the introduction of a new plan, a sort of carte 
communale . This plan is called the MARNU (Modalité d'Application du Règlement 
National d'Urbanisme - a method of applying the national planning regulations). A further 
measure was the starting of PLD levels as an entirely local matter. Finally, the Chirac 
government introduced greater relaxation in the handling of ZAC proposals in commune 
with an approved POS. These now no longer require any state involvement in their 
preparation. 
Thus, deregulation, or relaxation of regulations which provide less public control of land 
use, took place quickly and blundy, and simply added further deregulations to those already 
introduced over the PS period of office. This was consistent with the general ideological 
position of the Right. With this exception, it is clear from this book that, by contrast.there 
has been an inverse logic in the political ideology connected with land use planning in the 
periods of de Gaulle and Mitterrand. 
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GLOSSARY OF FRENCH ACRONYMS 
APUR Atelier Parisienne dVrbanisme - Planning Agency for the Paris 
département/commune 
CAR Conférence Administrative Régionale - (1964-1972) Regional Administrative 
Committee 
CCI Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie - Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
CGP Commissariat Général du Plan - General Planning Commission 
США Chartes Intercommunales de Développement et d'Aménagement -
Intercommunal charters concerned with social, economic and cultural 
developments 
CODER Commission de Développement Economique Régional - Regional Economie 
Development Council, 1964 onwards 
COS Coefficient d'Occupation des Sols -Plot ratio 
CU Communauté Urbaine -Urban community -a grouping of communes with a 
joint administrative council 
CUS Coefficient d'Utilisation des Sols - Plot use ratio proposed in I960's but 
became COS after 1967 
DAFU Direction d'Aménagement Fancier et de IVrbanisme - Part of the Ministry of 
Equipment in the 1960's concerned with land and planning 
DDA Direction Départementale d'Agriculture - Département "field" service of the 
Ministry of Agriculture 
DDE Direction Départementale de l'Equipement-Département "field" service of the 
Ministry of Equipment 
DGE Dotation Globale d'Equipement - Global investment subsidy 
DGF Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement - Global operating subsidy (to communes 
from central government) 
DPU Droit de Préemption Urbaine -1983 Act introduced this to replace ZAD and ZIF 
DUP Déclaration d'Utilité Publique - Declaration of public benefit 
EPA Etablissement Public d'Aménagement - Public Development Agency 
EPCI Etablissement Public de Coopération Intercommunale - Public establishment for 
intercommunal cooperation 
FIAT Fonds d'Intervention pour l'Aménagement Fonder et d'Urbanisme - National 
Land and Town Planning Fund 
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FNAFU Fonds National d'Aménagement Fancier et d'Urbanisme - National Land 
Development and Town Planning Fund 
GAC Groupe d'Administration Centrale - Central Administration in a DDE 
GEP Groupe d'Etudes et de Programmation - Planning Group in a DDE 
HLM Habitation à Loyer Modéré - Dwellings at subsidised rentals 
lAURP Institut d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme de la Région Parisienne - Institute for 
planning and development of the París region 
INFRA Infrastructure section in a DDE 
INSEE Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques - National Institute 
for statistics and economic studies 
LA DATAR Délégation à l'Aménagement duTerritoire et à l'Action Régionale -National 
body responsible for prospective development of the regions 
LOF Loi d'Orientation Foncière - Outline Planning and Land Act 
ME Ministère de l'Equipement - Ministry of Equipment, planning and infrastructure 
MECV Ministère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie - Ministry of Environment 
and Quality of l ife 
NA A zone in а Ю З plan designated for prospective development 
OIN Ouvrages d'Intérêt National - National level developments 
OREAM Organisation Régional (TEtudes de l'Aire Métropolitaine - Regional 
organisation for the study of metropolitan areas 
OREAV Organisation Régionale d'Etudes de l'Aire de la Vallée - Regional organisation 
for the study of valley areas 
PAR Plan d'Aménagement Rural - Rural Development Plan 
PAZ Plan d'Aménagement de Zone -Zone plan, part of a ZAC 
PC Permis de Construire - Building permit 
PC Parti Communiste - French Communist Party 
PD Plan de Détail - Lower tier plan of 1958 Planning Decree 
PIG Projets d'Intérêt Général -Projects of general interest 
PLD PlctfondLégal de Densité - Upper limit of the COS 
PLOFOU Projet de Loi d'Orientation Foncière et d'Urbanisme - Proposal for the outline 
for land policy and planning 
POS Plan d'Occupations des Sols - Land utilisation plan (local plan) 
199 
PS Parti Socialiste - French Socialist Party 
PUD Plan d'Urbanisme Directeur - Upper tier plan of 1958 Planning Decree 
PUS Plan d'Utilisation des Sols - Land use plan proposed in early l96Cfs but 
became POS after 1967 
RISU Receuil d'Informations Statistiques sur l'Urbanisme - Census of urban 
planning statistics (prepared annually by the Ministry) 
RPR Rassemblement pour la République - Right wing political party 
SDAU Scheme Directeur d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme - Upper tier plan of 1967 
Planning Act 
SFU Société Français des Urbamstes - French Planners Association 
SDS Schéma Directeur de Structure - Directive structure plan proposed in early 
1960's but became SDAU after 1967 
SIVOM Syndicat Intercommunal à Vocation Multiple - Intercommunal syndicate for a 
variety of jointly administered functions 
SIVOU Syndicat Intercommunal à Vocation Unique - Intercommunal syndicate for one 
jointly administered function (ceased to exist in 1959) 
SRE Service Régional de l'Equipement - Regional field service of the Mimstère de 
l'Equipement 
TIE Taxe Locale d'Equipement - Local services tax (paid by developer) 
UOC Urbanisme Operationelle et Construction - Implementation, construction and 
development control section in a DDE 
ZAC Zone d'Aménagement Concerté - Concentrated development zone 
ZAD Zone d'Aménagement Différé - Zone of deferred development, open to 
expropriation 
ZEP Zone d'Environnement Protégé - Plan for environmentally sensitive areas 
ZI Zone Industrielle - Industrial zone 
ZIF Zone d'Intervention Foncière - Compulsory purchase zone 
ZPIU Zone de Peuplement Industriel ou Urbaine -Zone of industrial or urban 
population 
ZPPAU Zone de Protection du Patrimoine Architectural et Urbaine - Protection zone for 
architectural or urban heritage 
ZR Zone de Rénovation Urbaine - Urban redevelopment zone 
ZUP Zone à Urbaniser en Priorité - Priority urban development area 
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APPENDIX 2.1 Interviews conducted/meetings attended during empirical study 1 (1981) 
Bouches du Rhone Département: 
Interviews: Deputy Director DDE 
Two chargé d'études DDE 
Area team leaders SDAU group 
Section engineeis 
POS planners 
Mayors 
1 
2 
4 
2 
4 
2 
Total 15 
Mseanfis: Groupe de travail 
SDAU 
Total 
Loire Département 
Interviews; 
М££ІІШ: 
Director DDE χ 2 
Two Deputy Directors of planning agency χ 2 meetings 
Section leaders (TOS) 
Head of operational planning 
Planning liaison officer at Préfecture 
Mayors 
Total 
Groupe de travail 
Total 
2 
4 
4 
1 
1 
2 
14 
2 
2 
Paris (Mimsère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie) 
Interviews: Chief Planner of Ministry 
Deputy Chief Planner of Ministry 
Staff of Service Technique d'Urbanisme 
Planning academics 
Total 8 
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Essonne Département 
Interviews: 
Meetings: 
Deputy Director DDE 
Head of GEP section 
Section leaders, TOS 
Section leaders, SDAU 
Private consultant 
Mayois 
Total 
Groupe de travail 
Total 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
11 
Pas de Calais Département 
Interviews: Director of DDE 
Deputy Director of DDE 
Section leaders in area offices 
Research staff 
Total 
Meetings: Groupe de travail 
Total 
1 
1 
3 
2 
7 
2 
2 
Grand total (interviews) 
Grand total (meetings) 
55 
9 
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APPENDIX 2.2 Interviews conducted/meetings attended during empirical study 2 (1983) 
Paris 
Interviews: Planning academics 4 
Editors of planning journals 3 
Ministry of Decentralisation civil servants 3 
Private consultants 2 
Total 12 
Nord Département 
Interviews: Mayors 9 
Planners 11 
Academics 4 
Lawyer (in planning law) 1 
Total 25 
Grand total (interviews) 37 
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APPENDIX 3.1 Chronological List of Acts and Decrees Associated with LandUsePlanning 
1607 Edict of Sully: relating to building lines and road alignment 
1672 Arrêté du Conseil: relating to housing on the Rue des Arcs (now Rue 
St Martin) which was demolished property. 
The arrêté laid down that the occupiers of this 
housing would have to pay for part of the 
demolition costs because of the increased benefit 
which demolition gave them. 
1776 Edict: proprietors had to pay for part of the cost of road 
development 
1807 Act (Sept): laid down further guidelines re road and building 
alignment 
1810 Act (Oct): re public health; buildings in a bad condition or 
unhealthy condition were placed under the 
supervision of the administration 
1852 Decree (16/3): detailed drawings of building line, structural and 
foundation details had to be submitted for all new 
development. Insanitary property could be subject 
of compulsory acquisition 
1887 Act (30/3): conservation of historic buildings introduced 
1902 Act (15/2): introduction of a building permit for 
sanitary/drainage details for developments in 
towns of greater than 20 000 population. This 
permit was issued by the mayor.and sites 
1919 Act (14/3) and 
1924 Act (19/7) these Acts discussed the development of towns in 
their entirety. In other words, immediate 
development problems should continue to be dealt 
with in separate legislation (e.g. re roads, building 
details), but, in addition, future overall 
development was to be considered and land use 
regulations established in towns of >10 000 
population 
1930 Act (2/5): further details of historic monuments/conservation 
1935 Decree (8/6): contained dispositions militating against 
speculation - used compulsory purchase by zone 
for property of potential increased values. This 
decree was abandoned and replaced by more 
general procedures. 
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1943 Act (15/6): 
1945 Ordinance (27/10): 
1953 Art (1/8): 
1954 Decree (26/6): 
1958 Act (3/4): 
1967 Act (30/12): 
1969 Decree (28/5): 
1969 Decree (30/5): 
1969 Act (31/12): 
1970 Decree (5/6): 
1970 Decree (8/6): 
1970 Decree (28/10): 
1971 Act (16^7): 
1973 Decrees (8/11): 
1974/1975 Circulars: 
1975 Act (31/12): 
1976 Decree (14/5): 
1976 Act (10/7): 
no development was to be allowed in future 
without submission of an application for a 
building permit The building permit had to 
conform to general planningregulations laid down 
in the national planning code and in approved 
plans or subdivision guidelines. Plans as in 
1919/1924 Acts continued. 
the urban code of regulations was also to apply to 
all development outside of towns. 
Loi Foncière (Land Act) introduced new less 
complex guidelines of compulsory purchase for 
housing development and industrial development. 
planning and housing code. 
introduced the planning code as a document in its 
own right; two types of plan introduced-general 
urban plans and detailed plans 
Loi d'Orientanon Foncière - (outline Planning and 
Land Act) Details in text of Chapter 3. This is the 
Act which introduced thep/ал d'occupation des 
sols. 
application of SDAU. 
creation of PAZ allowed housing development of 
greater than 100 units to be developed outside of a 
ZUP 
extension of applicability of 1958 Act plans by 6 
more months - ZAC enforced 
approval of application of ZAC 
introduction of PAR 
application of POS 
all pre 1967 plans replaced inrural areas by POS or 
PAR 
revisions of urban planning and housing code. 
relative to ZAD - ZAD extended from 8 to 14 years 
ZIF - reform of compulsory purchase regulation 
reform of the planning inquiry 
protection of nature - introducedby impact studies 
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1976 Act (31/12): Loi d'Urbanisme (details in Chapter 5) 
1977 19 Decrees (8/7): Application of 1976 A« 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
Procedure for revision of a POS which is already approved (1970-1983) (R123-34) 
The procedure outlined in the figure on the next page is used only when the revisions to 
the plan do not affect the overall content of the plan and when these revisions do not 
involve classified woodlands. 
Between 1970 and 1977 there was no enquête publique held for the surrender of an area 
or the reduction in size of an area already designated for public use - provided it was not 
designated as a green area. 
Between 1977 and 1983 ¿Π revisions were subject to an enquête publique 
208 
Appendix 4.1 Stages in POS revision (quick procedure) 
1 
TOS revision started by Prtfa or the mayor 
2 
Prtfa creates groupe detravad 
3 
Saves of groupe de trovai meeongs 
4 
Enquête publique 
5 
TOS submitted to Municipal Council(s) 
(3 months tunescale) 
6a 
Approval of Council(s) 
7a 
Approval by Prtfa 
X 
> 
\ 4 
6b 
Opposition of Council(s) 
7b 
Ministerial approval 
if population is less 
than 50,000 
7c 
Approved by Conseil d'Elia 
if populauon is more than 
/ 
Modification/revision takes effect 
/ 
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APPENDIX 4.2 Sample Booklets on TOS Preparation Prepared by DDE's or the Ministry (mid 70's) 
. . J lui, Au poinf ou «η SOÍ 
t peut p>t fêtr* фша аюіл' 
E» f f f í t СИ d»rn.«r»» 
'**, fe d«vt\opp*menf 
dec iQilonirJtort » mfr»l-
né d*í ытГгисГіж» dvs 
le d449dre au* coùTenf eber 
•uc coU»cri»i>í»,denc au« 
Il y a tant de choses à et C^âï^loglquel 
fare dans la commune' ~ я 
Il ya le» mal Ic^s.lïcete 
mutuante , la circulation, 
le 4lat^nnemé>i, lel UXSÍS, 
lee cpoifs et l u ссліІЦс-
Гшп« nouilles. 
Il Faut choisir: 
ûue Faire dabord et cem-
rnent le faire au marwjre 
Cpût'puqque lei posublilM 
demprunt sont ІіпііГее£І 
Cornment 'aire pour que 
no* enfants aient un 
peu moins de difftajir«? 
FbHcmt par eiemple.de 
»"Sueur et de diamètre 
de tu^eu -
S« l * i *eut raccorder trot 
¡^««n? *Іо.зп»'м lejunn 
de»»utree^au rése»· déau 
municipel,ce recçordemenf 
сліГе pu» cher a lacoilec· 
tirite,que pour3maison» 
9rou.*.s .. 
ceat simplement, 
une queètionde , 
hngueur debjjéul 
И*'5 f i l e Tuyau rush, et 
que 'on construise trop 
eux alentours, le débit 
«eau sera msuff.sanfoeur 
sabsfaire les beso^s^e 
tout le monde II faudra 
alors remplacer ce lUrau 
par un pJus g r o s 1 
/ * » » il nerf" pas 
le seul, pwceau. ν lei>»«n 
4ul a <endu le Urrain, á 'ait 
une affaire 
_..- sorÎ~(ratmf par ctf^ Tre, 
n'est pescOT&rf du but.. 
eettefcistf,cfest 
imequesuonde 
dfamêtre/ 
l iest donc Mcasfair· d' 
о»з»лі«»г le dtfvHoppemcrC 
m<nít tfiistenT« ou ceux 
darf b rrfabMfîon t&Cfrí-
ttsible den* іл délai assit 
court : 5 a n s 
Au Ifeu di te premecs« qu« 
l'en nt peutr* peut-âtm 
ρ·« Cen/^au f q w d <*** 
oatf>bfitf5 Je ^пдпсетвч^.. 
le m tient 
compte des 
ciiSAÊSIlss. 
mais 
dahord 
OOO ОOO О O C 
mao^nt Moutn _ EPURES 
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On mettait en zon* dt cont-
h-uction, Чял les terrains où 
il ¿hit 5ouh»ifjble d v vor 
lour d«s construction 
I 
POS 
qu'est ce 
b 
peu 
Un POS Cfigaqo 
col|*ct>viré «ΓΙ«« psrtlcutvy 
Le POS « Γ denand« 
a w U C O P * * i l nMjMtcipal/Ou 
ore'scr.r p v le prAfJr 
LA POS est 4ГшіЫ 
aac un bureau uTurbvtisme 
« η c e l l a b o r A t i o n a v e c l& 
m u m c i p a l i r e «Гии g r o u p * 
at travail (rf/uv^miinibfralw, 
•"ed^nic/en») 
ip*c5 avi* d e · kbiwilítí-jttors 
Ί « Γ propoW Α ЦрргоЬаГіоп 
du co«ift*tl mumc/pal 
et Soumis я fcnquêk publique 
Le* Hab'&nfe doivent alors 
ordsanTof \еигз гвтвп^«* 
qui »on/" е*яттссл par le 
fin*/e»ient,lc jb¿ft«/"4P-
proavtf p*r arrêta prefme-
^оглі <і. 
С est la loi d e I utilisation 
p o s ï i b l · du sol d v * \a 
c o m m u n « 
I l comporte donc* 
• un zonaq« donnahTIa vo-
cat im d i s 5 e k 
•zones d ^ a W a f t o n , 
іо*л% indutTrifl les 
•des f ó s e f v · · d# !«rr»i« 
p o u r i e r v i ç # · pubUe·^ y 
S ompri* I4lara(»»«m«nc η vofo« 
•des r o n · » · Α · Ί β ο ί # ^ ^ β « 
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APPENDIX 5.1 Sample Portion of a 1:2 000 Proposals Map from an Urban Area 
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SUMMARY (Dutch) 
In deze studie worden de verordenende bevoegdheden in het kader van de ruimtelijke 
ordening, urbanisme, in Frankrijk gedurende de vijfde Republiek van 1958 tot 1985 nader 
beschouwd. Het onderzoek richt zich voornamelijk op de voorbereiding van de lokale 
plannen, ¡es Plans d'Occupation des Sols (POS). 
Voor deze studie is gedurende een periode van bijna tien jaar onderzoek verricht en, 
behalve een longtitudinale studie is het ook een studie die men in de literatuur zou 
omschrijven als een "cross-national planning study". Deze omschrijving is echter alleen 
van toepassing in die zin, dat de auteur, die de Britse nationaliteit bezit, dit werk in 
Frankrijk verrichtte. Het onderzoek was bedoeld om de Franse bemoeienis met urbanisme 
en de POS-voorbeieiding weer te geven, en was niet opgezet om de bemoeienis of praktijk 
in Frankrijk te vergelijken met die in het eigen land van de auteur. 
De gekozen onderzoeksperiode omvat een tijd van belangrijke politieke veranderingen met 
betrekking tot de ruimtelijke ordening en aangaande de ruimere context van de 
betrekkingen tussen de Staat en de communes, of, om de meer algemeen bekende formule 
te gebruiken: centrum/periferie relaties. 
Het begin van de onderzoeksperiode tot 1969 werd gekenmerkt door de regering van de 
Gaulle, die een voorstander was van een centraal beheer van regeringsfuncties, met 
inbegrip van het urbanisme. Ofschoon urbanisme als legeringsactiviteit aanzienlijk aan 
kracht won gedurende deze periode, werd het geen nationaal of zelfs maar lokaal 
onderwerp van politiek. Tijdens de zeventiger jaren zetten de rechtse regeringen van 
Pompidou en d'Èstaing de traditie voort van een sterke centralistische regering en centraal 
beheer van het urbanisme. Tegen het eind van de zeventiger jaren echter, was urbanisme 
een punt geworden bij de plaatselijke verkiezingen. 
Toen kwam, in Mei 1981, na 23 jaar van rechtse en centrum/rechtse regering, de Franse 
Socialistische Partij (PS) aan de macht onder het presidentschap van François Mitterand. 
Het politieke platform van de PS werd beheerst door een sterke hang naar decentralisatie 
van de macht van het centrum naar de periferie en een verplichting tot meer planning. Voor 
het eerst tijdens deze studieperiode is het urbanisme naar voren gekomen als een nationale 
politieke kwestie, en vormde het een centraal deel van de decentralisatievoorstellen van de 
regering. 
Zo omvat deze studie wat kan worden omschreven als de PRE- en 
POST-decentralisatieperiodes van respectievelijk 1958-81 en 1981-85. De structuur van 
de studie als geheel en de doeleinden van de studie weerspiegelen deze tweedeling. 
Het eerste doel is aan te tonen dat de ruimtelijke ordening in de pre-decentralisatieperiode 
een afspiegeling was van de centrum/periferie relaties in het algemeen, en dat het 
bestuderen van de voorbereiding van de POS de beste manier was om deze verhoudingen 
te verhelderen. Het tweede doel is aan te tonen dat in de post-decentralisatieperiode het 
systeem van de ruimtelijke ordening en de POS-voorbereiding, waarvan beweerd werd dat 
het gedecentraliseerde regeringsfuncties waren, niet echt gedecentraliseerd werden. 
Bovendien wordt aangetoond dat de mate van toezicht op of bemoeienis met de ruimtelijke 
ordening die door de PS is ingevoerd, minder is dan men van een aan de macht zijnde 
socialistische regering zou mogen verwachten; er wordt ook aangetoond dat ze minder aan 
interventie doet dan volgens het systeem dat in de zestiger jaren door de rechtse regering de 
Gaulle was ingevoerd. 
De tekst wordt behandeld in vier delen, waarvan de inhoud en bevindingen hieronder 
samengevat worden. 
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DEEL I, de inleiding, geeft de algemene achtergrond voor de drie andere delen van het 
boek. In het bijzonder wordt de socio-economische context van het naoorlogse Frankrijk 
en de regeringsjaren van de Gaulle in hoofdstuk 1 onderzocht Hierin is het voornaamste 
argument dat voor het naoorlogse herstel veel verwacht werd van de nationale en regionale 
economische planning. 
Langzamerhand, echter, in het begin van de zestiger jaren, verloor de nationale en 
regionale planning aan politieke steun. Toch was het naoorlogse herstel van Frankrijk, 
ondanks het verlies van deze steun, voortreffelijk geweest, en wel gedeeltelijk met behulp 
van deze plannen. In tegenstelling tot de nationale en regionale planning, was het 
ruimtelijke beleid het stiefkind van de regering tot het begin van de jaren zestig, ofschoon 
toen binnen een tijdsbestek van slechts tien jaar grondgebruiksplannen de belangrijkste 
planning-instmmenten in Frankrijk werden. De ontwikkeling van het systeem voor 
ruimtelijke ordening gaf in die periode van tien jaar de drie hoofdkenmerken voor de 
ontwikkeling weer, ¿ e voor de nationale en regionale planning golden, namelijk: étatisme 
(strenge centrale beheersing), technocrarìsme (overheersende rol van een kleine 
ambtenaren-elite) en volontarisme (planning van de privé-sector door middel van 
indicatieve richtlijnen en onderhandeling). 
Als algemene achtergrond bespreekt hoofdstuk 2 de aanpak, het hoofdaccent en de 
methodes die voor de empirische onderzoeken gebruikt worden en ook het algemene 
analytische kader. Er wordt gesteld dat de analyse van het proces voor ruimtelijke 
ordening in Frankrijk cultureel bepaald is, en dat speciale door het milieu bepaalde 
kenmerken balangrijk zijn geweest bij de keuze van Thoenig's model van 
'cross-functioning controls' als het meest geschikte analytische kader. 
DEEL II, de pre-decentralisatieperiode toont aan dat, nadat er administratieve 
maatregelen waren getroffen in het begin tot aan het midden van de zestiger jaren, de 
wettelijke voorzieningen voor de ruimtelijke ordening in 1967 naar voren kwamen in de 
Loi d'Orientation Foncière (LOF). Deze mijlpaal in de wetgeving voor de ruimtelijke 
ordening bracht tegelijk een nieuwe hiërarchie van plannen voor grondgebruik in de 
SDAU, afkorting van Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme , (hoogste 
niveau) en POS (laagste niveau), en een interessant scala van instrumenten voor 
grondexploitatie. Hoofdstuk 3 bespreekt de ontwikkeling van deze wet als nieuw gegeven 
en toont bovendien, als tegenstelling, het anachronistische systeem van een subnationale 
regering waaronder de wet moest worden toegepast. Terwijl het laagste niveau van de 
subnationale regering, de commune, belangrijk was voor de voorbereiding van de POS, 
waren de velddiensten van het Ministerie voor Planning, de Directions Départementales de 
l'Equipement (DDE), gevestigd op het niveau van het regeringsdepartement, toch 
rechtstreeks verantwoording schuldig aan Parijs. De centrale rol van de DDE bij het 
opstellen van plannen weerspiegelt gedeeltelijk de zwak ontwikkelde bezetting met 
technisch personeel bij de communes of groeperingen van communes. 
De milieu-specifieke kenmerken van de planvoorbereiding bleken in de eerste plaats de 
tweevoudige en soms meervoudige rol van de actoren te zijn. Burgemeesters bijvoorbeeld, 
zijn gekozen politici en tegelijkertijd functionarissen van de Staat DDE-ambtenaren zijn 
technici en bestuurs-ambtenaren. Op de tweede plaats kunnen burgemeesters meerdere 
openbare ambten bekleden op lokale en centrale regeringsniveaus. Op de derde plaats 
bestaan er duidelijke verschillen in status tussen "planners" van de DDE. "Planners" die 
hogere bestuursfuncties bekleden, ambtenaren, zijn feitelijk ingenieurs, terwijl alleen de 
lager aangestelden ervaring en training in planning hebben. 
POS-voorbereiding wordt in hoofdstuk 4 besproken als een gezamenlijke activiteit van 
Staat en Commune met de groupe de travail (werkgroep) als voornaamste formele 
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bijeenkomst voor dit doel. Het veldonderzoek heeft aangetoond dat er evenveel overleg 
plaatsvond achter de schermen van de groupe de travail als in de groep zelf, en dat de 
persoonlijke belangen van de twee voornaamste actoren, burgemeesters en ambtenaren, 
een centrale kwestie vormden bij het vaststellen van de inhoud van de plannen. 
Gemiddeld was er 6 jaar nodig om POS voor te bereiden, maar het lage tempo van de 
planvoorbereiding in het algemeen stond meer in verband met gebrek aan technisch 
personeel dan met wat dan ook. 
In hoofdstuk 5, dat het proces van de POS-voorbereiding analyseert, wordt geconcludeerd 
dat het proces inderdaad een afspiegeling was van de centrum/periferie relaties in het 
algemeen. Bovendien bleek het proces geheimzinnig te zijn en ongevoelig voor publieke 
discussie en voor de aard van de planningproblemen. Niettemin werd, ondanks de 
technische zwakheden van de POS, waarvan de voornaamste de starheid ofwel 
blauwdrukstijl was, geconcludeerd, dat het, in vergelijking met de andere plannen en 
instrumenten, in die tijd het meest effectieve instrument voor het ruimtelijk beleid was. 
In het laatste hoofdstuk van DEEL Π worden de zeventiger jaren besproken als 
overgangsperiode. Het is moeilijk te geloven wat voor dramatische ommezwaai er in 
Frankrijk plaatsvond in een tijdsbestek van slechts tien jaar: de traditionele tweedeling in 
Parijs/platteland verdween bijna; er vond een spreiding van de verstedelijking plaats; 
werkloosheid werd een nieuw probleem tijdens een periode van teruggang in de economie; 
modernisme en ontwikkelingen op grote schaal werden geschuwd, en ontwikkeling op 
kleine schaal, de kwaliteit van het leven en nostalgie werden populair, de aandacht 
verplaatste zich van regionalisatie van de subnationale regering naar hervorming door 
versterking van de communes en departementen en, in 1981 kwam de linkervleugel aan 
de macht, op een partijprogramma van nationalisatíe, decentralisatie en meer planning. 
DEEL Ш bespreekt de periode van de post-decentralisatíe. Hoofdstuk 7 bekijkt de 
legislatieve strategie van de 1ste en 2de Déferre Wetten om de drie decentralisatie-doelen te 
bereiken, namelijk: een grotere lokale democratie, verheldering van verantwoordelijkheden 
en het losser maken van de greep van de Staat op de lokale zaken. I de eerste Wet werden 
bij het lokale bestuur drie niveaus ingevoerd, terwijl ruimtelijke ordening het centrale thema 
werd van de 2e Wet, die ook aan de communes verantwoordelijkheid gaf voor 
POS-voorbereiding en de bevoegdheid tot het nemen van beslissingen bij aanvragen over 
grondgebruik. 
Interviews, die in 1983 werden afgenomen, nadat deze Wetten van kracht werden, toonden 
aan, dat er over het algemeen positief tegen de decentralisatie-hervormingen werd 
aangekeken, maar dat men niet voldoende was voorbereid om ze uit te voeren en 
waarschijnlijk onvoldoende middelen had voor de uitvoering ervan. Er bleken bij een 
hernieuwde bestudering van de toenmalige planning-literatuur twijfels en negatieve 
inzichten omtrent de hervormingen te bestaan. 
De wetgeving met betrekking tot de uitvoering van gedecentraliseerde planning wordt, 
tezamen met gedecentraliseerde operationele planning in de Wet van 1985, in hoofdstuk 8 
besproken. Deze nieuwe wetgeving en dat wat blijkt uit de planning-praktijk tonen aan dat 
de overdracht van de verantwoordelijkheden voor de ruimtelijke ordening geen duidelijk 
omschreven zaak was, maar tevens werd decentralisatie van de ruimtelijke ordenig 
beschouwd als voorwaardelijk, met de POS als voornaamste voorwaarde. In communes 
met goedgekeurde POS konden burgemeesters beslissen over aanvragen voor 
grondgebruik, en in communes zonder POS konden zij dit niet. Decentralisatie van de 
ruimtelijke ordening lag dus voor de meerderheid van de communes wel vast in 
beleids-documenten, maar kon in de praktijk niet plaatsvinden. Bovendien werd in alle 
communes, ongeacht of zij goedgekeurde POS hadden of niet, een strenge vorm van 
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bevoogding van de DDE ingevoerd door de nieuwe voorschriften omtrent afstemming op 
andere plannen en beleidslijnen. 
Hoofdstuk 8 analyseert ook het gedecentraliseerde proces van de TOS-voorbereiding in de 
context van Thoenig's model van "cross-functioning controls". Terwijl de 
milieu-specifieke kenmerken van het systeem voor ruimtelijke ordening na de 
decentralisatie bleven bestaan, was het aantal actoren bij het opstellen van plannen 
toegenomen en de betrekkingen tussen en binnen groepen van actoren waren veel 
ingewikkelder dan tot nu toe. Zo bleek het model als kader voor het analyseren van het 
proces niet meer van toepassing. Op grond van wetgeving en praktijk rees ook het 
vermoeden dat de decentralisatiedoelen niet bereikt waren, en dat de hervormingen vrijwel 
uitliepen op verkapte recentralisatie. 
DEEL Г bevat een globale vergelijking, in hoofdstuk 9, van de pre- en 
post-decentralisatie-POS. De conclusie is dat de post-decentralisatie-POS waarschijnlijk 
onverenigbaar waren met wat men van een door Socialisten geïnspireerd plan zou 
verwachten. Het bleek, daarentegen, dat er betrekkelijk eenvoudig een liberale interpretatie 
kon plaatsvinden, en dat die tezamen met een bepaalde deregulatie inderdaad kon leiden tot 
minder toezicht en minder interventie dan in de vorige POS. Ook had het proces van 
gedecentraliseerde POS-voorbereiding meer publieke "betrokkenheid" bij het opstellen van 
plannen gebracht, maar het gevoelen was dat deze maatregelen niet konden worden 
omschreven als socialistische maatregelen. 
De voornaamste theoretische gevolgtrekkingen van de veranderde spelregels voor 
POS-voorbereiding zijn, dat een algemeen analytisch kader waarschijnlijk niet te 
voorschijn zal komen en dat er een uitgebreidere empirische studie nodig is naar 
betrekkingen tussen individuele actoren en groepen van actoren bij het ontwerpen van 
plannen. Er wordt voorgesteld om een systematische lijst van gedragsbepalende factoren 
op te stellen als mogelijke gids voor zulke empirische werkzaamheden. 
De voornaamste conclusie voor de ontwikkeling van de ruimtelijke ordening in de context 
van de decentralisatie was: zorgen voor meer en beter gekwalificeerde planners en, met het 
oog daarop, voor de oprichting van een bureau voor bewaking van de beroepsstatus van 
planners. 
Tenslotte werd de onschendbaarheid van de commune beschouwd als voornaamste 
struikelblok voor de verbetering en de aanpassing aan plaatselijke situaties van de POS in 
de toekomst, met weinig mogelijkheid voor gedwongen groeperingen van communes. 
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SUMMARY (English) 
This study examines the development of land use planning, urbanisme , in France during 
the Fifth Republic from 1958 to 1985. More especially, the focus of investigation is the 
preparation of local plans, les Plans d'Occupaüon des Sols (POS). 
Research for this study was conducted over a period of almost ten years and, in addition to 
being a longitudinal study it is one which would be described in the literature as a "cross 
national planning study". However, this description is applicable only in the sense that 
the author, who is British, carried out this work in France. The research was designed to 
reflect French concerns in urbanisme and POS preparation and was not designed or 
analysed to compare concerns or practices in France with those in the author's own 
country. 
The chosen study period corresponds with significant political change relative to the 
deveopment of land use planning and relative to the wider context of relationships between 
the state and the communes or, to use the more commonly known phrase, centre/periphery 
relations. 
The beginning of the study period up to 1969 was characterised by the de Gaulle 
government espoused to central control of government functions, including urbanisme. 
Although urbanisme was considerably strengthened as an activity of government over this 
period, it did not become a national or even local political issue. Over the seventies, the 
Right wing governments of Pompidou and d'Estaing continued the tradition of strong 
centralist government and central control of urbanisme. However, by the late seventies, 
urbanisme had become a local election issue. 
Then, in May 1981, after 23 years of Right and Centre/Right rule, the French Socialist 
Party (PS) came to power under the presidency of François Mitterrand. The political 
platform of the PS was dominated by a firm commitment to decentralisation of power from 
centre to periphery and a commitment to more planning. For the first time during the study 
period, urbanisme had emerged as a national political issue and formed a central part of 
the government's decentralisation proposals. 
Thus, this study spans what can be described as the PRE and POST decentralisation 
periods representing 1958-1981 and 1981-1985 respectively. The structure of the study as 
a whole and the aims of the study reflect this dichotomy. 
The first aim is to show that land use planning in the pre decentralisation period was a 
mirror image of centre/periphery relations in general and that studying the preparation of 
POS was an effective way for the planning researcher to clarify these relationships. The 
second aim is to show that in the post decentralisation period, the system of land use 
planning and POS preparation, which were claimed to be decentralised government 
functions, showed ambiguities in the legal texts, different ways these could be interpreted 
and problems for their implementation. The reforms represented more imagined than real 
decentralisation. Moreover, the degree of control or intervention in land use planning 
introduced by the PS is argued to be less than might have been expected from a Socialist 
government in power. Also, it is argued to be less interventionist than the system which 
had been introduced in the sixties by the Right wing government of de Gaulle. 
The text is presented in four parts, the contents and findings of which are summarised 
below: 
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PART 1, the Introduction, provides the general background to the other three parts of the 
book. In particular, the socio-economic context of post war France and the de Gaulle 
years of government are examined in Chapter 1. Therein, the main argument is that 
national and regional economic planning were seen as the great hopes for postwar 
recovery. Gradually, however, by the beginning of the sixties, national and regional 
planning lost political support. Yet despite this loss of support, postwar recovery of 
France had been outstanding and, in part, was assisted by these plans. 
By contrast to national and regional planning, land use planning was a Cinderella activity of 
government until the early sixties although then, within only one decade land use plans 
became the most important planning instruments in France. Development of the land use 
planning system in that decade echoed the three development guidelines which had been 
adopted for national and regional planning namely: étatisme (strong central control), 
technocransme (predominant role of a small civil service élite ) and volontarisme 
(planning of the prívate sector through indicative guidelines and negotiation). 
As a general background, Chapter 2 discusses the approach, emphasis and methods used 
for the empirical studies and also the overall analytic framework. The contention is made 
that analysis of the plan-making process in France is culturally bounded and that particular 
characteristics of the French milieu have been important in selection of Thoenig's model of 
cross-functioning controls as the most appropriate analytic framework. 
PART 11, the pre decentralisation period, shows that after administrative arrangements 
had been implemented in the early to mid sixties, the legal provisions for land use planning 
emerged in 1967 in the Loi d'Orientation Foncière (LOF). This landmark in land use 
planning law brought together a new hierarchy of land use plans in the SDAU (upper tier) 
and POS (lower tier) and an interesting range of land use management instruments. 
Chapter 3 discusses the development of this law as innovatory and, in addition and by 
contrast, shows the anachronistic system of sub national government in which it was to be 
used. Whilst the lowest level of sub national government, the commune , was important 
for the preparation of POS, equally important were the field services of the Ministry of 
Planning, the Direction Départementales de l'Equipement (DDE), located at the 
département level of government yet directly accountable to Paris. In part, the central role 
of the DDE in plan making reflects the weakly developed technical staffing of communes 
or groupings of communes. 
The characteristics specific to the French milieu for plan preparation were found to be first, 
the dual and sometimes multiple role of actors in plan-making. Mayors, for example, are 
elected politicians and at the same time, agents of the state. DDE officials are technicians 
and administrators. Secondly, mayors can accumulate public offices at local and central 
levels of government. Thirdly, clear status differentials exist between "planners" of the 
DDE. Those in management roles, fonctionnaire "planners" are, in fact, engineers whilst 
the junior staff are contracted planners with experience and training in planning. 
POS preparation is discussed in Chapter 4 as a joint state/commune activity with the 
groupe de travail as the main formal meeting for this purpose. Empirical findings reveal 
that, as much discussion went on behind the scenes of groupe de travail as at it, and that 
the personally vested interests of the two main actors, mayors and fonctionnaires, were a 
central issue of importance in determining plan content. 
On average, POS took about 6 years to prepare but the slow progress of plan preparation 
in general related more to the insufficiency of technical staff than to anything else. 
In Chapter 5, which analyses the POS preparation process, it is concluded that the process 
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was indeed a reflection of centre/periphery relations in general. In addition, the process 
was seen to be secretive and insensitive to public debate and the plan was seen as 
insensitive to the nature of planning problems. Nevertheless, despite the technical 
weaknesses of the POS, chief of which was its rigidity or blueprint style, it was concluded 
that, in comparison to the other plans and instruments, it was the most effective tool for the 
control of land use at the time. 
In the final chapter of Part 11, the seventies are discussed as a period of transition. It is 
hard to believe how dramatic a tumround happened in France in the space of only one 
decade: the traditional Paris/provinces dichotomy had almost disappeared; counter 
urbanisation took place; unemployment became a new problem in the midst of an economy 
in recession; modernism and large scale developments were shunned and small scale 
developments, quality of life and nostalgia became popular; attention shifted from 
régionalisation of sub national government to reform through the strengthening of the 
commune and départements and, in 1981, the Left came to power on a ticket of 
nationalisation, decentralisation and more planning. 
PART 111, discusses the post decentralisation period. Chapter 7 looks at the cascade 
legislative strategy of the 1st and 2nd Déferre Acts to achieve the three aims of 
decentralisation, namely, greater local democracy, clarification of responsibilities and the 
freeing up of the State in local affairs. Three tiers of local government were introduced in 
the 1st Act whilst land use planning became the central theme of the 2nd Act which also 
gave communes the responsibility for POS preparation and determination of development 
applications. 
Empirical findings in 1983 from interviews conducted after these Acts were issued, 
revealed a generally positive view of the decentralisation reforms but a lack of 
preparedness for their implementation together with doubts about the sufficiency of 
resources for their implementation. Review of the planning literature at that time revealed 
doubts and negative views of the reforms. 
Legislative decrees relating to the implementation of decentralised plan-making along with 
decentralised operational planning in the 1985 Act are discussed in Chapter 8. This new 
legislation and the evidence of planning practice show that the transfer of land use planning 
responsibilities was not a clear cut matter. Indeed, decentralisation of land use planning 
was seen to be only conditional with the POS as the main condition. In communes with 
an approved POS, mayors could decide on development applications and in communes 
without they could not. Thus, for the majority of communes, decentralisation of land 
use planning existed on the statute books but could not take place in practice. Moreover, 
in all communes, irrespective of whether they had an approved POS or not, a strong 
tutelle technique of the DDE was introduced through the new POS conformity 
regulations. 
Chapter 8 also analyses the decentralised process of POS preparation in the context of 
Thoenig's model of cross-functioning controls. Whilst the characteristics particular to the 
French milieu of the land use planning system remained after decentralisation, the number 
of actors in plan-making had increased and the relationships amongst and between groups 
of actors were much more complex than hitherto. Thus, as a framework for analysing the 
process, the model was concluded to be inappropriate. Also, evidence from the legislation 
and from practice suggested that the aims of decentralisation had not been met and that the 
reforms were more imagined than real decentralisation. 
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PART IV, is an overall comparison, in Chapter 9, of the pre and post decentralisation 
POS. The conclusion is that the post decentraUsation POS is unlikely to be consistent with 
what might have been expected of a Socialist inspired plan. By contrast, it was found that 
liberal interpretation could take place relatively easily and together with certain 
deregulations could, in fact, lead to less control and less intervention than in the 
predecessor POS. Also, the decentralised POS preparation process had introduced more 
public "involvement" in plan-making but it was felt that these measures could not be 
described as Socialist measures. 
The major theoretical implication of the changing rules of the game for preparing POS is 
that a general analytic framework is unlikely to emerge and that more extensive empirical 
study of relationships of individual actors and groups of actors in plan making is required. 
A checklist of behavioural determinants is suggested as a possible guide fa' such empirical 
work. 
The major implication for the development of land use planning in the context of 
decentralisation was concluded to be more and better qualified planners and, in association, 
the establishment of a qualifications office to help in thus matter. 
Finally, the inviolability of the commune, was seen as being a major stumbling block to 
the improvement and diversification of POS content in the future with little possibility of 
this level of government being dissolved or litde possibility of compulsory grouping of 
communes 
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SUMMARY (French) 
Cette étude porte sur le développement de planification et d'urbanisme en France durant 
la Cinquième République de 1958 à 1985. Ces recherches se concentrent plus 
spécialement sur la préparation des plans locaux, les Plans d'Occupation des Sols (POS). 
Cette étude a pris presque dix ans de recherche et c'est non seulement une étude 
longitudinale, mais aussi une étude qu'on lécrirait dans la literature comme une "cross 
national planning study". Cette définition est cependant seulement applicable dans un 
sens: l'auteur, qui est Ecossaise, a accompli ce travail en France. Ces recherches visaient 
à traduire l'immixtion française en urbanisme et la préparation-POS, mais cette analyse 
n'était pas destinée à comparer l'immixtion ou la pratique en France à celle du pays de 
l'auteur. 
La période de recherche choisie correspond à celle d'un important changement politique 
dans la domaine de l'urbanisme ainsi qu'un contexte plus large des relations entre Γ état et 
les communes, ou, pour employer la formule plus universellement connue: les relations 
centre/périphérie. 
Le début de la période de recherche jusqu'en 1969 fut marqué par le gouvernement de 
Gaulle, qui était partisan d'une gestion centrale des fonctions gouvernementales, y compris 
l'urbanisme. Quoique l'urbanisme comme activité gouvernementale ait considérablement 
gagné en force pendant cette période, il ne devint pas un thème de politique nationale ou 
même seulement locale. Pendant les années soixante-dix les gouvernements de Droite, de 
Pompidou et d'Estaing, continuèrent la tradition d'un gouvernement fortement centraliste et 
d'une gestion centrale de l'urbanisme. Pourtant vers la fin des années soixante-dix 
l'urbanisme était devenu thème de campagne aux élections locales. 
Ensuite, en Mai 1981, après 23 ans de gouvernement Centre-Droite, le Parti Socialiste 
Français (PS) accéda au pouvoir sous la présidence de François Mitterrand. La 
plate-forme politique du PS fut dominée par un fort penchant à la décentralisation du 
pouvoir, du centre vers la périphérie, et par un engagement à davantage de planning. Pour 
la première fois pendant cette période d'étude l'urbanisme a surgi comme une question 
politique nationale, et a formé une partie très importante des propositions de 
décentralisation du gouvernement. 
Ainsi, cette étude comprend ce qu'on peut décrire comme les périodes de PRE et POST 
décentralisation allant respectivement de 1958 à 1981 et de 1981 à 1985. La structure de 
l'étude dans sa totalité et ses buts reflètent cette dichotomie. 
Le premier but est de montrer que l'urbanisme dans la période de pré décentralisation était 
le reflet des relations centre/périphérie en général, et que l'étude de la préparation-POS était 
pour le chercheur chargé du planning une façon effective d'éclaircir ces relations. Le 
deuxième but est de montrer que dans la période de post décentralisation le système de 
l'urbanisme ainsi que la préparation-POS, dont on prétendait que c'étaient des fonctions 
gouvernementales décentralisées, n'étaient pas décentralisées, et que dans leur mise en 
exécution les réformes proposées fuissent largement nullifiées. En outre il est démontré 
que le degré de contrôle ou immixition dans l'urbanisme, introduit par le PS, est moindre 
que celui auquel on pourrait s'attendre de la part d'un gouvernement socialiste au pouvoir: 
il est aussi prouvé que celui-ci est moins interventioniste que le système introduit par le 
gouvernement de Droite de de Gaulle dans les années soixante. 
Le texte est traité en quatre parties, dont le contenu et les résultats sont résumés ci-dessus. 
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LA PREMIERE PARTIE, l'Introduction, situe le contexte des trois autres parties du 
livre. Spécialement le contexte socio-économique de la France d'après-guerre et les années 
du gouvernement de de Gaulle sont étudiés dans le Chapitre 1. Le principal argument 
développé est qu'on attendait beaucoup du planning économique national et régional pour 
le redressement d'après-guerre. Cependant, au début des années soixante, le planning 
national et régional perdit graduellement du soutien politique. Néanmois, le redressement 
d'après-guerre de la France fut extraordinaire, malgré la perte de ce soutien, et cela en 
partie à l'aide de ces plans. 
Contrairement, au planning national et régional, l'urbanisme fut le parent pauvre du 
gouvernement jusqu'au début des années soixante, bien qu'ensuite, en une décade 
seulement, les plans d'urbanisme fussent les instruments les plus importants en France. 
Le développement du système pour l'urbanisme refléta durant cette décade les trois 
directives du développement qui avaient été suivies pour le planning national et régional, à 
savoir l'étatisme (sévère gestion centrale), le technocratisme (rôle prédominant d'une 
petite élite de fonctionnaires), et le volontarisme (le planning du secteur-privé au moyen de 
directives pécises et de negotiation). 
Le Chapitre 2 parle, comme contexte général, de l'approche, de l'emphase et des méthodes 
employées pour les recherches empiriques, et aussi de la totalité du cadre d'analyse. On 
prétend que l'analyse du processus de l'urbanisme en France sera culturellement 
conditionéee que certaines caractéristiques, spécifiques à l'environnement, ont été 
importantes dans la choix du modèle de " régulation croisée " de Thoenig comme cadre 
analytique le plus convenable. 
DEUXIEME PARTIE, la période de pré décentralisation montre que, après avoir pris 
des mesures administratives du début à la moitié des années soixante, les règlements 
législatifs pour l'urbanisme apparurent dans la Loi d'Orientation Foncière (LOF) en 1967. 
Cette étape dans la législation pour l'urbanisme apporta en même temps une nouvelle 
hiérarchie des plans pour l'occupation des sols dans le SDAU (le plus haut niveau) et les 
POS (le plus bas niveau), et une intéressante gamme d'instruments pour la gestion de 
l'occupation des sols. Le Chapitre 3 traite du développement de cette Loi comme d'une 
donnée nouvelle et met en valeur la contradiction d'un système anachronique de pouvoir 
subnational, sous lequel la Loi devait être appliquée. Tandis que la commune, le niveau le 
plus bas du pouvoir subnational, était importante pour la préparation des TOS, les services 
sur le terrain du Ministère pour planning, les Directions Départementales de l'Equipement 
(DDE), établies au niveau du Pouvoir Départemental, devaient pourtant rendre compte 
directement à Paris. Le rôle central des DDE à la preparation des plans reflète partiellement 
la faiblesse des effectifs du personnel technique dans les communes ou groupes de 
communes. 
Il est apparu les caractéristques de l'environnement dans la préparation des plans 
comportaient tout d'abord un double et parfois multiple rôle des acteurs de l'urbanisme. 
Les maires, par exemple, sont des politiciens élus et en même temps des agents de l'état. 
Les fonctionnaires-DDE sont des techniciens et des adminitrateurs. En deuxième lieu, les 
maires peuvent exercer plusieurs fonctions au niveau local et central du pouvoir. En 
troisième lieu, il existe des différences distinctes de prestiges social entre les "urbanistes" 
fonctionnaires, qui remplissent des fonctions de direction, sont en effet des ingénieurs, 
tandis que les urbanistes plus bas sont des urbanistes expérimentés et entraînés en 
urbanisme. 
La préparation-POS est traitée dans le Chapitre 4 comme activité collective état/commune 
dont le groupe de travail forme la réunion la plus importante pour la réalisation de cette 
224 
activité. La recherche a montré qu'il y avait autant de concertation dans les coulisses du 
groupe de travail que dans le groupe lui-même, et que les intérêts personnels des deux 
acteurs les plus importants, les maires et les fonctionnaires, jouaient un rôle central dans la 
fixation du contenu des plans. 
En moyenne il a fallu б ans pour préparer les POS, mais la lente progression de la 
préparation des plans en général a été plutôt due à l'insuffisance de l'effectifs technique, 
qu'à toute autre raison. 
Dans le Chapitre 5, qui analyse le processus de la préparation-POS, on conclut que le 
processus fut en effet le renet des relations centre/pérpherie en général. En outre, le 
processus semblait être mystérieux et insensible à la discussion publique, ainsi qu'à la 
nature des problèmes d'urbanisme. Néanmois on conclut que, malgré les faiblesses 
techniques des POS, caractérisées par la raideur dans la conception des projets, ceux-ci 
formaient, à ce moment là, en comparaison avec les autres plans et instruments, 
l'instrument le plus effectif pour l'urbanisme. 
Dans le dernier Chapitre de la Deuxième Partie, les années soixante-dix sont traitées 
comme période de transition. Il est diffìcile de s'imaginer quel volte-face dramatique eut 
lieu en France dans une décade seulement: la dichotomie traditionelle Paris/campagne 
disparut à peu près; le contre-urbanisme apparut; le chômage formait un problème 
nouveau en une période de déclin économique. On fuit le modemisme et les projets à 
grande échelle, mais les projets à petite échelle, la qualité de la vie et la nostalgie devinrent 
populaires. On mit l'accent sur le renforcement des pouvoirs des communes et des 
départements, au lieu de le laisser sur la régionalisation du pouvoir subnational. Et, en 
1981, l'aile Gauche parvint au povoir, avec un programme électoral de nationalisation, 
décentralisation, et davantage de planning. 
LA TROISIEME PARTIE traite de la période de post décentralisation. Le Chapitre 7 
examine la stratégie législative des lières et 2ièmes Lois Déferre pour atteindre les trois 
objectifs de la décentralisation, à savoir : une plus grande démocratie locale, la clarification 
des responsabilités et relâchement de la poigne de l'état dans les affaires locales. Dans la 
première Loi on introduisit trois niveau de pouvoir locaux, tandis que l'urbanisme devint le 
thème central de la deuxième Loi, qui accorda aussi des responsabilités aux communes 
pour la préparatio-TOS, et les certificats d'urbanisme et les permis de construire. 
Des interviews, faits en 1983, après l'entrée en vigeur de ces Lois, montrèrent 
expérimantalement, qu'en général, on jugeait positives les réformes de la décentralisation, 
mais qu'on n'était pas suffisamment préparé à réaliser, et qu'on avait probablement pour 
leur réalisation des moyens insuffisants. La lecture de la littérature de planning de l'époque 
mit en lumière des doutes et vues négatives sur les réformes. 
Les décrets d'application concernant l'exécution d'urbanisme décentralisé seront traités 
dans le Chapitre 8, ensemble avec l'urbanisme décentralisé opérationnel de la Loi de 1985. 
Cette nouvelle législation et les preuves apportées par l'application d'urbanisme 
démontrent, que le transfer des responsabilités pour l'urbanisme ne fut pas une affaire 
clairement décrite. La décentralisation était chose conditionelle, avec le TOS en formant la 
condition principale. Dans les communes, dont le POS était approuvé, les maires 
pouvaient prendre des décisions sur les demandes pour les permis de construire, mais dans 
les communes sans approbation du POS, ils ne pouvaient pas le faire. Donc, pour la 
majorité des communes, la décentralisation de l'urbanisme existait dans les livres de 
statuts, mais ne pouvait pas être réalisée en pratique. En outre, dans toutes les communes-
sans tenir compte de l'approbation des POS- une sévère tutelle technique des DDE fut 
introduite, au moyen de nouveau règlements concernants l'uniformité des TOS. 
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Le Chapitre 8 analyse aussi le processus de décentralisation de la préparation-POS dans le 
contexte du modèle de "régulation croisée" de Thoenig. Tandis que les caractéristiques 
propre à l'environnement concernant le système d'urbanisme subsistaient après la 
décentralisation, le nombre d'acteurs dans la processus de la préparation des plans , lui, 
s'accrut et les relations tant entre les groupes d'acteurs qu'à l'intérieur de ceux-ci devinrent 
plus complexes que jusqu'alors. Ainsi le modèle servant de cadre à l'analyse du processus 
fut jugé inapproprié aux circonstances. Egalement, la présomption naquit, au vue la 
législation et de la pratique, que les objectifs de la décentralisation n'avaient pas été atteints, 
et que les réformes ne formaient qu'une sorte de décentralisation imaginaire. 
LA QUATRIEME PARTIE est une comparaison globale, dans le Chapitre 9, de la pré 
et post décentralisation des POS. On peut conclure que les POS de la post décentralisation 
étaient probablement incompatibles à ce qu'on pouvait attendre d'un plan inspiré par les 
socialistes. Par contre il apparut qu'une interprétation libéral pouvait se passer assez 
simplement et que celle-ci pouvait mener, en effet, de pair à certaines dérégulations, à 
moins de contrôle et moins d'intervention que dans les POS précédents. La processus de 
décentralisation de la préparation-POS avait éveillé aussi un intérêt plus vif chez le public 
pour la conception des plans, mais on croyait que ces mesures ne pouvaient pas être 
considérées comme étant des mesures socialistes. 
La plus importante conclusion théorique du nouveau règlement concernant la 
préparation-POS est que probablement un cadre analytique général ne verra pas le jour, et 
qu'il faudra une étude empirique plus détaillée des relations entre acteurs individuels et 
groupes d'acteurs chargés de la préparation des plans. On propose de rédiger une liste 
systématiques de règles, pouvant servir de guide à ce travail empirique. 
La plus importante conclusion pour le développement de la pratique de l'urbanisme dans le 
contexte de la décentralisation était de faire en sorte d'avoir plus d'urbanistes, mieux 
qualifiés, et -pour y avoir- de créer un bureaux de qualification de statut professionnel pour 
urbanistes. 
Finalement l'inviolabilité de la commune fut considérée comme l'obstacle le plus important 
pour l'amélioration et le déploiement des intérêts des POS dans le futur. L'élimination de 
ce niveau de pouvoir ou groupements forcé des communes sont peu probables. 
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1 Before Mitterrand, preparation of the Plan d'Occupation des Sols (POS), a 
reflection of centre/penphery relations in France in general, was a lengthy process 
resulting in POS which, despite their weaknesses, were an effective instrument for the 
control of land use at that time 
2 The majonty of land use "planners" in France are not planners at all 
3 Decentralisation of land use planning in France as presented in the early 1980s is by no 
stretch of the imagination the Revolution of Oochemerle Rather, it represents 
"Socialism trapped within the State" 
4 Public participation measures m land use planning introduced by the Pam Socialiste in 
1981 were measures which were not particularly Socialist at all 
5 Major pnonnes in France for the modernisation of the land use planning system 
should be more planning education, more planners and more planning research 
6 Too much of the English-speaking literature on cross national land use planning 
systems is, at best, superficially descriptive and, at worst, it is a misleading 
representation of the systems in practice 
7 The United Nations policy of increasing female employment in the Organisation to 
30% by 1990, if achieved, is unlikely to resolve the under-representanon of women in 
senior posts in either Headquarters or, more especially, in the field 
8 In the Gulf States, land use planning takes place in an ill-prepared environment and 
shows all the classic characteristics of the blind leading the blind. 
9 Deregulation of land use planning in many European countnes is not only likely to 
prejudice the built environment for future generations in those countnes, but it is also 
likely to set an unhealthy precedent for countnes in the Developing World who rely on 
European lead and guidance 
10. In many Internationa] Organisations offering technical assisstance to Developing 
Countries, land use planning is often misunderstood or is even considered 
irrelevant in the development process. 
11. The label of meaness given to the Dutch and evident, for example, in the phiase 
"going Dutch" is "double Dutch" even to the Scots! 


